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Abstract: According to the traditional inferential theory of perception, percepts of object motion or stationarity stem from an
evaluation of afferent retinal signals (which encode image motion) with the help of extraretinal signals (which encode eye movements).
According to direct perception theory, on the other hand, the percepts derive from retinally conveyed information only. Neither view
is compatible with a perceptual phenomenon that occurs during visually induced sensations of ego motion (vection). A modified
version of inferential theory yields a model in which the concept of extraretinal signals is replaced by that of reference signals, which
do not encode how the eyes move in their orbits but how they move in space. Hence reference signals are produced not only during
eye movements but also during ego motion (i.e., in response to vestibular stimulation and to retinal image flow, which may induce
vection). The present theory describes the interface between self-motion and object-motion percepts. An experimental paradigm that
allows quantitative measurement of the magnitude and gain of reference signals and the size of the just noticeable difference (JND)
between retinal and reference signals reveals that the distinction between direct and inferential theories largely depends on: (1) a
mistaken belief that perceptual veridicality is evidence that extraretinal information is not involved, and (2) a failure to distinguish
between (the perception of) absolute object motion in space and relative motion of objects with respect to each other. The model
corrects these errors, and provides a new, unified framework for interpreting many phenomena in the field of motion perception.
Keywords: direct perception; efference copy; inference; motion perception; self-motion; velocity perception; visual-vestibular
interactions
1. Inferential versus direct perception
How do we maintain the visual percept of a stable world
while images of our environment move across the retinae
during eye movements? Answers to this question can be
classified in two main theoretical approaches. According
to the traditional view, here called inferential theory, we
perceive the motion or stationarity of an object, or of the
visual world itself, on the basis of the outcome of a
comparison between two neural signals (see e.g., Helm-
holtz 1910; Jeannerod et al. 1979; MacKay 1972; Mit-
telstaedt 1990; Sperry 1950; Von Hoist & Mittelstaedt
1950). One signal, here to be called the retinal signal,
consists of retinal afferents encoding the characteristics of
the movement of the objects' image across the retina. The
other signal, encoding concurrent eye movement charac-
teristics, is usually termed the extraretinal signal, be-
cause it does not derive from visual afferents (Matin et al.
1969; Mack 1986; see also Matin 1982; 1986). The compar-
ison mechanism treats the two signals as vectors (see,
e.g., Mateeff et al. 1991; Willach et al. 1985) and applies a
simple rule: when they differ, object motion is perceived;
when they are equal, object stationarity is perceived.
Wertheim (1981) has shown that when a smooth pursuit
eye movement is made across a visual stimulus pattern,
the magnitude of the retinal signal corresponds to the
velocity of the retinal image flow of the pattern. Similarly,
the magnitude of the extraretinal signal corresponds to
the velocity of the concurrent eye movement as "esti-
mated" within the perceptual apparatus (see sect. 5.1). In
the present target article, eye movements are mainly of
the smooth pursuit type. Hence, the terms "magnitude"
or "size" of retinal and extraretinal signals will refer to
these velocity vectors. We see a stable world during eye
movements because retinal and extraretinal signals are
equal: the velocity of the image of the world across the
retinae equals the velocity of the eyes.
The alternative theoretical view, here called the theory
of direct perception, which originated from Gibson (1966;
1979), has no need of the concept of an extraretinal signal
(Gibson 1968; 1973), as it assumes that the perception of
motion derives exclusively from afferent retinal informa-
tion. Its point of departure is that in everyday circum-
stances perception is veridical (it should be: the organ-
ism's chances of survival depend on it - for this reason the
approach is also called the ecological theory of percep-
tion). Hence the perceptual mechanism functions as an
unbiased sampler of external information from the real
world (see Lombardo 1987). According to this theory, the
visual world manifests itself as the particular pattern of
light, called the optic array, that hits an observer's eye.
The informational content of the scene is given in ("spe-
cified" by) particular invariant structural features of this
light pattern. To perceive is to "pick-up" such invariants.
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Thus, movement of an object may be specified by an
invariant described as the concurrent appearance and
disappearance of part of the array (specifying the back-
ground) along the two opposite borderlines of another
part of the array (specifying the object). When the eyes
move across the visual world as during (combined) eye,
head, or ego movements, a coherent streaming motion of
the optic array relative to the retinae usually occurs. The
resulting retinal flow pattern has in recent years become
the focus of research in the literature of direct perception
theory. The basic assumption is that the brain is able to
"pick up" from retinal flow those characteristics that are
caused by invariants of the optic array such as the one
mentioned above (they may be called "optic flow invari-
ants"). A retinal flow pattern, however, may also contain
characteristics that stem from movements of the eyes in
space (caused by eye, head, or ego motion), but these
invariants only specify how the eyes move (or are moved
in space). When these invariants are "picked up," we only
perceive (i.e., become aware of) the particular self- or ego
motions that gave rise to these invariants.l This is called
"visual kinaesthesis." For example, an invariant that spe-
cifies eye movements in the head could be motion of the
dark middle area of the array - specifying the nose -
relative to the outer boundaries of the optic flow field.
Other invariants specify head or ego movements.2
Because the optic array stems from a stable world,
retinal flow never holds optic flow invariants that could
specify motion of the world. Consequently, the visual
world cannot be perceived as moving. Recently, the
question has been raised whether the visual system al-
ways needs to distinguish between optic flow invariants
and self-motion invariants (Cutting et al. 1992b). Al-
though strictly speaking this reflects a deviation from the
original point of departure of direct perception theory, it
does not affect the fundamental principle to be discussed
in this paper: that the perception of object motion or
stationarity stems only from retinal afferent information
and not from comparing retinal and extraretinal informa-
tion.
In neurophysiological research, awareness of ego mo-
tion is usually associated with the output activity of cells in
particular areas of the brain, notably the vestibular nuclei
and the vestibular cortex. These cells are driven by
afferents from the equilibrium system and the somato-
sensory kinaesthetic system (here these will be called,
collectively, vestibular afferents). Many of these cells are
also driven by visual (image flow) afferents. One impor-
tant pathway through which these visual afferents are
conducted is known as the accessory optic pathway (see,
e.g., Buttner & Buettner 1978; Biittner & Henn 1981;
Cohen & Henn 1988; Dichgans & Brandt 1978; Dichgans
et al. 1973; Henn et al. 1974; 1980). These visual afferents
are complementary to vestibular afferents. Their function
is to generate or sustain sensations of ego motion when
the equilibrium system remains silent, that is, in the
absence of an accelerating force acting on the equilibrium
system (e.g., when traveling at constant velocity in a
train). In the literature concerned with research in this
area of so-called visual-vestibular interactions, a visually
induced sensation of ego motion is termed vection, and
the particular features of retinal flow that generate vection
are not called "invariants that specify ego motion," but
"optokinetic." The stimuli that generate them will here be
termed "optokinetic stimuli," and the term "optokinetic
pathway" will be used to denote in general the combined
neural channels that convey the optokinetic afferents that
generate vection and interact with vestibular afferents. To
be optokinetic, a visual pattern must be large, have
relatively low spatial frequency characteristics, move (not
too fast) across the retinae, and remain visible for more
than a very brief interval (see, e.g., Berthoz et al. 1975;
Berthoz & Droulez 1982; Brandt et al. 1973; De Graaf et
al. 1990; Dichgans & Brandt 1978).
It is the purpose of this target article to show that -
within the domain of object-motion perception - an
adapted version of inferential theory, in combination with
knowledge from the research area of visual-vestibular
interactions and ego motion, resolves the differences of
opinion between inferential and direct theories of per-
ception.
2. Problems for both theories
If vection is generated in the laboratory, some perceptual
phenomena may occur that are incompatible with both
direct and inferential theory. As an example, consider
vection created with an "optokinetic drum," a large drum
with vertical black and white stripes painted on its inside
wall that can be rotated around an observer seated inside
on a stationary chair. For the present purpose let us
assume that the drum rotates with an angular velocity of
60 deg/sec around a stationary observer whose body,
head, and eyes are fixed in space (using a small stationary
fixation point attached to the stationary chair). Let us
further assume that the lights inside the drum are extin-
guished (i.e., the observer sits in the dark and does not
know that the drum rotates). If we now suddenly switch
on the lights inside the drum, the observer will initially
perceive the drum correctly as rotating and will experi-
ence no ego rotation. However, within a few seconds an
illusory sensation of ego rotation in the direction opposite
to that of the drum (called circular vection) gradually
develops. During this period, ego velocity is experienced
as increasing and the rotation of the drum appears to slow
down. Finally, the drum is perceived as completely sta-
tionary in space and ego velocity does not seem to in-
crease any further. Circular vection is then said to be
saturated. The whole process - from the moment the
lights inside the drum are switched on to the saturation of
vection - may last between 4 and 6 seconds, depending
on the velocity of the drum. At very low drum velocities,
saturated vection may even be immediate, but in the
present example, where drum velocity is considerably
higher, it may take as long as 6 seconds or more before
vection is completely saturated (for more details about the
dynamics of circular vection, see e.g., Dichgans & Brandt
1978; Mergner & Becker 1990; Wong & Frost 1978).
The question that raises theoretical problems for both
direct and inferential theory is: Why, during saturated
circular vection, is the drum perceived as stationary in
space? Direct perception theory has a simple answer: a
coherent retinal flow of the entire environment is an
invariant that normally specifies ego motion. When
picked up, this yields a percept (an awareness) of ego
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motion, not of drum motion. This reasoning poses two
problems, however. First, how could the drum initially
have been perceived as moving? That suggests the pres-
ence of an invariant that specifies environmental motion.
Second, this anomalous invariant seems to dissipate in
time (as drum rotation appears to slow down gradually)
and disappears completely upon saturation, even though
the optic array and the retinal flow characteristics remain
physically identical.3
Inferential theory can explain why the drum is initially
perceived as moving: its moving retinal image generates a
substantial retinal signal, but the stationary eyes (focused
on the fixation point) generate a zero extraretinal signal.
The two signals therefore differ and the drum is seen to
move. Hence for inferential theory the problem is that the
drum appears to be stationary once vection is saturated.
3. An alternative model
The problems can be solved within the framework of
inferential theory by reconsidering the concept of an
extraretinal signal. This signal is usually defined as encod-
ing ocular velocity and serves to determine to what extent
retinal image motion is an eye movement artifact. The
remaining image motion then reflects real object motion
in external space. However, this reasoning only holds if
the signal encodes eye velocity relative to external space,
not relative to the head. The logic of this point has been
recognized by many authors (see, e.g., Swanston et al.
1987; Swanston & Wade 1988; Wallach 1987) but its
consequences for the nature of extraretinal signals have
not been fully recognized.
Formally speaking, eye velocity in space (Veye s) corre-
sponds to the vectorial addition of eye velocity in the head
(Veycs |,) and head velocity in space (Vhead s). Thus, it is
here proposed that extraretinal signals actually consist of
the vector sum of a Veyes h and a Vheac| s velocity vector.
The Veyes h vector may derive from what is known as the
"efference copy" - a neural corollary to the efferent
oculomotor commands (Von Hoist & Mittelstaedt 1950)4 -
and the Vhead s vector most likely derives from vestibular
afferents that result from head movements.
The implication of this reasoning is that during ego
motion extraretinal signals must also be generated: al-
though the eyes may not move in their orbits during ego
motion, they do move in space and thus create artifactual
retinal image motion.5 How are these extraretinal signals
generated? First, they most probably derive from the
already mentioned vestibular afferents that encode
Vheacl s during ego motion. There must be another source,
however. The point is that in cases where the awareness of
ego motion is sustained visually (vection), there are no
such vestibular afferents: their function is taken over by
the visual afferents that are induced by optokinetic image
flow and pass through such channels as the accessory optic
pathway. These pathways are referred to here by the
general term "optokinetic pathway." Thus, it is proposed
that such particular visual afferents may also generate
(part of) an extraretinal signal. This obviously renders the
term "extraretinal signal" incorrect. Therefore, from here
on, the term reference signal will be used, which empha-
sizes only the evaluative function of the signal with re-
spect to retinal image motion.
In summary, then, the present model holds that refer-
ence signals are compound signals, which may include
(any combination of) an efference copy, a vestibular, and a
visual component. Figure 1 illustrates how such refer-
ence signals may be generated.
The gating mechanism in the optokinetic pathway de-
termines what aspects of visual afferents generate vection
and thus generate or affect reference signals. The features
that make a visual stimulus (its retinal flow) optokinetic
have already been mentioned. They suggest that the
gating mechanism acts as a low band-pass spatiotemporal
filter.
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Figure 1. Functional model describing the generation of reference signals as they interrelate the percepts of ego motion and object
motion in space. Thick lines reflect the traditional inferential literature on object-motion perception. Thin lines reflect the literature
on visual-vestibular interactions and ego-motion perception. Gray arrows illustrate the contribution of the present model, connecting
these two bodies of literature. Note that the reference signal (not the efference copy) feeds into the comparator mechanism and
represents the estimate of eye velocity in space. The term "estimator" has no cognitive connotation but implies that retinal image,
eye, and head velocities are not necessarily encoded correctly but with a particular gain. The dotted lines between the retina and the
oculomotor mechanism and between the estimator of head velocity in space and the oculomotor mechanism represent the pathways
that function to generate reflexive eye movements known as optokinetic and vestibular nystagmus (these are discussed in sect. 5.4).
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A warning should be made here: the addition of a visual
component to the reference signal is not meant to imply
strict linear additivity. In fact, it is quite likely that the
interaction between retinal and vestibular afferent infor-
mation at the level of the estimator of head velocity in
space is nonlinear (see, e.g., Barthelemy et al. 1988;
Borah et al. 1988; Fletcher et al. 1990; Probst et al. 1985;
Xerri et al. 1988).
The theoretical significance of the visual component in
the reference signal - which can be conceptualized in
cybernetic terms as a kind of feedforward signal - is that it
implies a self-referential circularity or "strange loop"
(Hofstadter 1980) in the perceptual system: retinal image
motion may create (part of) a reference signal to deter-
mine its own perceptual interpretation. This circularity
solves the problems associated with the development and
saturation of circular vection: when the optokinetic drum
starts rotating, the moving image of its stripes imme-
diately generates a retinal signal (the eyes do not move in
the head, as they remain focused on the stationary fixation
point). But in the present example (in which the drum
rotates at 60 deg/sec) vection develops only gradually,
due to the low temporal band-pass characteristics of the
gating mechanism in the optokinetic pathway. Hence, a
(visually induced) reference signal is not immediately
present, and the drum is initially perceived (correctly) as
moving. When vection begins to build up, however, so
does the reference signal. The difference between the
(unchanged) retinal signal and this growing reference
signal thus decreases gradually. If perceived object veloc-
ity is determined by this difference -as shown in section
5.2 - drum velocity will be seen as slowing down until
saturation is reached, that is, until the reference signal
has become approximately equal to the retinal signal. The
drum is then perceived as stationary in space.
The relevance of this model for the discussion between
direct and inferential theories of motion perception is that
it provides a view that to a large extent agrees with both
these theories, that is, it creates a compatibility between
the basic presumptions of both inferential and direct
theory. On the one hand, it agrees with the main inferen-
tial premise that information about how the eyes move (in
space) is always necessary to perceive object motion or
stationarity; on the other hand, it also agrees with three
main assumptions of direct perception theory. First, the
percept of object motion or stationarity may indeed stem
exclusively from visual afferents (i.e., when reference
signals only consist of a visual component). Second, reti-
nal flow patterns may indeed specify ego motion and do
not specify motion of the visual environment. Third, the
gating mechanism in the optokinetic pathway (see Fig. 1)
can be viewed as the mechanism responsible for "picking
up" invariants from retinal image flow. Hence, in the light
of the present model, the fundamental postulates of direct
and inferential theory are no longer contradictory.
In the remainder of this article it will be shown that this
also holds for the empirical database that has given rise to
the controversies between direct and inferential theory,
as well as to theoretical attempts to find a compromise
between the two approaches (i.e., theories that propose
that direct and inferential perception are not mutually
exclusive but reflect two distinct modes of perception;
such theories will be called "dual mode theories," see
sect. 5). To make this clear, I will review empirical tests of
predictions that follow from the present model but do not
follow from dual mode theory or from either of the
original two rival approaches themselves. First, however,
an experimental paradigm must be outlined to serve as
the frame of reference in terms of which the data obtain
their significance.
4. Experimental paradigm
Imagine a subject looking at a screen in front of his eyes.
On the screen a visual stimulus is projected. The stimulus
can move in both horizontal directions with a fixed veloc-
ity, set by the experimenter. Assume also that the sub-
ject's head is fixed in space but that his eyes pursue a small
fixation point sweeping horizontally (with another fixed
velocity) across the moving stimulus. If we synchronize
the beginning and termination of the motions of the
stimulus and the fixation point, we can study the percep-
tion of stimulus motion or stationarity during a (pursuit)
eye movement - made across the stimulus - of any given
velocity. We will then use the following conventions: first,
the terms "retinal image" or "retinal signal" will always be
used to refer to the image of the stimulus, not the image of
the fixation point. Second, retinal image velocity will be
defined as the velocity of the eyes in space minus the
velocity of the stimulus in space. This means that the
directional sign given to the retinal image velocity vector
(i.e., to the retinal signal, Vret) will be such that in the case
of a stationary stimulus it is the same as the sign given to
the direction in which the eyes move in space (Veyos s).
Thus when, in the present example, the stimulus is
stationary, the velocity of its retinal image equals Vcy(,s_s.
If the stimulus is indeed perceived as stationary, retinal
and reference signals must be equal too. Now imagine
that we move the stimulus slightly in the same direction as
the eyes. This reduces retinal image velocity and thus de-
creases the size of the retinal signal, which then becomes
slightly smaller than the reference signal. If we further
increase stimulus velocity, the difference between retinal
and reference signals further increases until it become
detectable within the perceptual apparatus. At that point
the threshold is reached for perceiving stimulus motion
during a pursuit eye movement. The retinal signal is then
exactly one just noticeable difference (JND) smaller than
the reference signal (see MacKay 1973; Wallach & Kravitz
1965; Wertheim 1981). This may be expressed as:
VrelW = Vref - JND (1)
where VretW is retinal signal size at the threshold for
stimulus motion with the eyes (with-threshold), and Vief is
the magnitude of the reference signal induced by the eye
movement. Conversely, if the stimulus moves in the
direction opposite to the eyes, retinal image velocity
increases. The threshold for perceiving stimulus motion
in that direction (against-threshold) is then reached when
V,.utA = Vref + JND (2)
where VretA is retinal signal size at the against-threshold.
It thus follows that
— v (3)
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Since retinal image velocity can be calculated as Veycs s —
Vslim s (where VsUm_s is stimulus velocity in space), this
may also be written as:
I Ml") _ I .stiniA.s .stmiW.sl (4)
Hence, half the difference between the stimulus veloc-
ities at the two opposite thresholds for perceiving object
motion can be used as an operational measure of the
magnitude of one JND between retinal and reference
signals.6
At the exact midpoint between the two opposite thresh-
olds - which in this article will be called the point of
subjective stationarity (PSS) - retinal image velocity
(Viet.pss) corresponds to V,.cf because
V + V
V — v rctW T * relA
V
 ret. PSS g
= (V.,r ~ (V.,f + JND) =
Thus at the PSS retinal image velocity is not only propor-
tional to the retinal signal but also the concurrent refer-
ence signal. We may therefore take retinal image velocity
at the PSS as an operational measure of reference signal
size.
The gain of a reference signal (Gr(.f) is the extent to
which it registers the actual velocity of the eyes in space
(Vey(,s s). It can be expressed as:
_ • rel (6)
Since Vr(,f was operationalized as Vret PSS, Grefmay also be
expressed as:
_
 Y
 rel . PSS
V
•eyes PSS. s
(V)
VuyesPSS.s being the velocity of the eyes in space at the
PSS. Since retinal image velocity equals Veyes s minus
stimulus velocity in space (Vstim s), this may also be ex-
pressed as:
G,cr = 1 - vvstimPSS.s
v
•eyes PSS.s
(8)
where VstilllPSS s is stimulus velocity in space at the PSS.
Note that the PSS is the midpoint between two opposite
thresholds. If they are equal, VstimPSS s is zero. Gref then
equals 1, which means that eye velocity in space is
correctly registered in the reference signal.
What would unequal thresholds mean? Assume that
the with-threshold is higher than the against-threshold.
VstiinPSS s then differs from zero and is in the same direc-
tion (has the same sign) as VeyesPSS s. According to Equa-
tion 8, Gref is then smaller than 1, which means that the
reference signal is too small, that is, that eye velocity in
space is underregistered in the reference signal (to the
extent of 1 - Gref). Conversely, if the against-threshold is
higher than the with-threshold, the stimulus moves at the
PSS in the direction opposite to VeyesPSS s. Gref is then
larger than 1, and Gref - 1 indicates the extent to which
eye velocity in space is overrepresented in the reference
signal. Hence asymmetric thresholds indicate an under-
or overregistration of eye velocity in space in the refer-
ence signal depending on which threshold is higher, that
is, on whether the PSS has shifted in the direction with or
against the eyes.
5. Empirical tests of the model and their
relevance for direct and inferential theory
5.1. Thresholds for motion perception. As mentioned in
section 3, there have been some attempts to bridge the
gap between the direct and inferential approaches in the
form of a dual mode theory. This is basically the assump-
tion that there exist two modes of visual perception: a
direct mode, in which extraretinal signals play no role and
which yields veridical percepts, and an inferential mode,
which makes use of extraretinal signals and may yield
illusions. For example, it is claimed that when a visual
pattern is very large and covers most or all of the visual
field, a particular mode of perception called visual cap-
ture becomes dominant. This mode needs no extraretinal
signals and creates veridical percepts (see, e.g., Stark &
Bridgeman 1983). Hence it can be viewed as a direct
perceptual mode (e.g., Mack 1978). (It is also possible to
view visual capture as a cognitive influence on percep-
tion, assuming that such patterns evoke a cognition of
environmental stationarity because we know that our
environment is normally stationary.)
Dual mode theory (Mack 1978; 1986; see also Matin
1986) has developed from concepts originally formulated
by Wallach (see, e.g., Wallach 1959) to explain the phe-
nomenon of center surround induced motion (a stationary
stimulus is seen to move when its surrounding back-
ground moves, irrespective of whether the eyes fixate the
stimulus or track the surround; e.g., Shulman 1979).
According to Wallach, there are two kinds of cues that
may generate a percept of motion: "object-relative" and
"subject-relative" cues (see also Shaffer & Wallach 1966).
The "object-relative" cues stem from motion of objects
relative to each other (i.e., from motion of object images
relative to each other on the retina; see Matin 1986).
These "object-relative" cues presumably overrule or sup-
press what Wallach called "subject-relative" cues, which
stem from object motion relative to the observer. Center-
surround induced motion is then explained as follows: the
percept of surround motion, which is "subject-relative,"
is overruled by the percept of motion that stems from the
"object-relative" cue of surround motion relative to the
center stimulus. The impression of motion, however, is
attributed to the smaller center stimulus, because -
according to a Gestalt-like principle called the "sta-
tionarity tendency of large stimuli" (Duncker 1929) - a
surround tends to act as a perceptual frame of reference
(see, e.g., Mack & Herman 1978; Wallach 1959).
According to dual mode theory, "object-relative" and
"subject-relative" cues somehow force the visual system
to operate in a direct or in an inferential perceptual mode,
respectively. The dominant direct mode is always opera-
tive in normal circumstances, because objects usually
move relative to a full-field visually structured back-
ground - which implies the presence of "object-relative"
motion cues - and the Gestalt principle mentioned above
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always attributes the impression of motion to the smaller
objects. The inferential mode, on the other hand, is seen
as a kind of backup system, which uses extraretinal sig-
nals. It becomes operative if no "object-relative" cues are
present (e.g., when objects move in a totally darkened
environment). This mode produces illusions because of an
underregistration of eye velocity in the efference copy.
Dual mode theory may be criticized on the basis of the
argument that illusions of motion of the visual world often
occur in situations where they should be prevented by
capture (e.g., when dizzy, or when gently pressing a
finger against the eyeball). But in the present section we
will take a different approach, reviewing a number of
experiments whose results show that the logic of dual
mode theories is flawed, because the empirical criterion
for distinguishing between the two modes is question-
able.
The experiments concern predictions about thresholds
for motion during eye movements. According to the new
model, the difference between the thresholds with and
against the eyes corresponds to twice the JND between
the retinal and the reference signal (Equation 4). As JNDs
increase linearly with signal size - Weber's law - the
distance between the two thresholds should increase lin-
early with eye velocity (in space). Wertheim (1981) mea-
sured these thresholds for a large stimulus pattern (head
fixed in space) and shows this to be true (Fig. 2). The
dependency of the thresholds on eye movement velocity
(rather than amplitude) implied that during pursuit eye
movements the magnitude of retinal and reference signals
corresponds to the encoded velocity of eye and image
movements.7
In Figure 3 the data from the same experiment are
plotted in terms of a relation between retinal image
velocity and eye velocity (in space). The dashed line in this
graph divides the vertical distance between the two
threshold lines in half. It thus represents retinal image
velocity at the midpoints between the two opposite
thresholds, or Vret PSS, that is, it gives the magnitude of
Vrof at any eye velocity (in space), and according to
Equation 7, its slope reflects Gref.
In this particular experiment, Gref was approximately
1, that is, eye velocity in space was encoded more or less
correctly in the reference signal. It should be noted that
in this study the stimulus pattern was present on the
screen throughout each pursuit eye movement that was
made across it. Hence, during the eye movements there
was always retinal flow. Therefore, the reference signal
must - apart from its efference copy component - have
contained a (relatively small) visual component. If the
stimulus had been very small and had been visible only
briefly during each pursuit eye movement, no such visual
component would have been generated, because with
V)
*O)
03
>•
lo
ci
O)
E
15
c
re
t
1 R
I D
10
5
0
• i
• against the eyes thresholds
o with the eyes thresholds
stimulus
perceived
as moving
against the eyes /
/
/ /
/ / /
/ / /
/ /
i i
i
/ ,
/ n o
/Stimulus
/ motion
/ perceived
/ / cv/
/ /
/
/
stimulus
perceived
as moving
with the eyes
-
10
eye velocity (deg/s)
15 20
Figure 3. Retinal image velocity at the two opposite thresh-
olds (with and against the eyes) for perceiving stimulus motion
in space of a large stimulus pattern, during a pursuit eye
movement to a fixation point sweeping across the pattern, as a
function of eye velocity. Head is stationary in space.
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such stimuli retinal afferents are too small and too short-
lived to pass through the optokinetic pathway (given its
low spatiotemporal band-pass gating characteristics).
Consequently, it is predicted that with small and briefly
visible stimuli the reference signal (its size and gain)
should be less than with large stimuli that remain visible
for a longer period.
Experiments with such small and briefly visible stimuli
(performed in total darkness) have been reported by Mack
and Herman (1978). These do indeed indicate the pres-
ence of undersized reference signals (Gref < 1), because
they yield high with- and low against-thresholds: at the
PSS the stimuli always moved slightly in the same direc-
tion as the eyes. Since in these experiments reference
signals could have consisted only of an efference copy, this
is evidence that, during smooth pursuit eye movements,
ocular velocity in the head is underregistered in the
efference copy. In the Mack and Herman study the
asymmetry between the with- and against-thresholds was
quite strong. The against-threshold was often so low that
it actually became "negative," that is, when stationary, the
stimuli were still perceived as moving above threshold
against the eyes (to reach the against-threshold they must
be moved slightly with the eyes). This phenomenon is
known as the Filehne illusion (De Graaf & Wertheim
1988; Filehne 1922; Mack & Herman 1973; Wertheim
1987). Its occurrence always implies a significantly under-
sized reference signal.8
The Wertheim (1981) study, however, does not neces-
sarily prove the existence of reference signals that include
a visual component. Since the stimulus was quite large (38
X 20 deg), the absence of a Filehne illusion could be
explained as an instance where, according to dual mode
theory, a direct mode of perception has occurred: visual
capture may have happened or the "stationarity ten-
dency" of large stimuli may have counteracted the Fil-
ehne illusion.
To test these hypotheses against the present one, the
Wertheim (1981) study was replicated with a large but
briefly visible stimulus pattern flashed on the screen for
only 300 msec during the pursuit eye movement
(Wertheim 1985; Wertheim & Bles 1984). Because briefly
visible stimuli, whatever their size, cannot be optokinetic
(do not pass the low temporal band-pass gating in the
optokinetic pathway) they cannot generate a visual com-
ponent in the reference signal (see Fig. 1). Hence the
Filehne illusion should reappear. But according to a visual
capture or stationarity-tendency hypothesis, no such illu-
sion should occur with such a large stimulus. As shown in
Figure 4, however, the illusion was observed.
Nevertheless, the support for the present model is still
not definitive, because visual capture or a stationarity
tendency might need more than 300 msec to build up. To
test the model against this possibility, the experiment was
repeated, but now with stimuli varying in optokinetic
potential (Wertheim 1987). A very powerful optokinetic
stimulus should induce such a large visual component
that reference signals may become oversized (Gref > 1). In
terms of Equation 7, this means that to reach the PSS such
a pattern should be moved against the eyes. If the effect is
strong enough, an inverted Filehne illusion should be
observed (the stimulus would, when stationary, seem to
move with the eyes). No visual capture or stationarity-
tendency hypothesis can be compatible with such a re-
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Figure 4. Stimulus velocity at the two opposite thresholds
(with and against the eyes) for perceiving motion in space of a
large stimulus pattern, during a pursuit eye movement to a
fixation point sweeping across the pattern, as a function of eye
velocity. Head is stationary in space. Upper panel: stimulus
continuously visible. Lower panel: stimulus visible for only 300
msec. (Note the occurrence of the Filehne illusion.)
suit. Various stimulus patterns were used. Each consisted
of a large sinusoidal grating of a particular spatial fre-
quency. Low spatial frequency patterns have a stronger
optokinetic potential than high spatial frequency patterns
(Berthoz & Droulez 1982; Bonnet 1982; De Graaf et al.
1990). Hence the former should create a larger visual
component in the reference signal than the latter; and
with very low spatial frequencies the reference signal
might become oversized.
This indeed did happen: when the patterns were made
visible long enough (1 sec) to generate a visual component
in the reference signal, the lowest spatial frequency
pattern created an inverted Filehne illusion and increas-
ing spatial frequency reduced Gr(,f. At the highest spatial
frequency Gref even became less than 1 again.9 It is
interesting to note that when the gratings were presented
only briefly (300 msec) during the pursuit eye movement,
the normal Filehne illusion was again always observed
(G,.ef being approximately 0.8) and spatial frequency had
no effect. This was in line with expectations because such
briefly visible stimuli, whatever their spatial frequency
characteristics, have no optokinetic potential.
The conclusion that reference signal gain can actually
be modulated invalidates the empirical basis on which the
compromise of dual mode theory rests. The point is that
the empirical criterion, which makes it possible to iden-
tify whether a percept is direct or inferential, depends on
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the issue of perceptual veridicality, an issue closely tied to
the idea that extraretinal signals are always undersized.
The traditional claim of direct perception theory is that
perceptual deviations from reality indicate a lack of infor-
mation in the optic array, that is, particular invariants are
absent, incomplete, or have changed structurally. Such
instances do not reflect (deficient) characteristics of the
perceptual picking-up mechanism but "impoverished"
visual information in the environment, often believed to
be an artifact of laboratory conditions. Normal, ecologi-
cally relevant percepts are thought to be veridical. (For
some discussions of the central role of veridicality in
direct perception theory, see Gyr 1972; Lombardo 1987;
Ullman 1980.)
In inferential theory, the extent to which percepts
deviate from reality reflects the extent to which the gain of
extraretinal signals deviates from 1. Since the Mack and
Herman (1973) studies on the Filehne illusion (see above)
it has been assumed that extraretinal signals have a gain
less than 1. Consequently, inferential theory has always
found it difficult to explain instances of really veridical
perception (see, e.g., Matin 1982).
These contradictory views have (implicitly) led to the
decision rule of dual mode theory: if a percept is not
veridical, this shows that it must have been mediated
inferentially, that is, with the help of (insufficient) extra-
retinal information; and if the percept is veridical, it must
have been mediated directly (for some examples of this
reasoning, see Bridgeman & Graziano 1989; Mack 1978;
Matin 1982; Stark & Bridgeman 1983). The evidence from
the threshold experiments mentioned above shows the
flaw in this argument: it is the implicit but mistaken belief
that inferential perception should always be biased be-
cause the reference signal is always undersized. This is
not true. Reference signal gain is not a constant. Hence
inferential perception may or may not be veridical. Per-
ceptual veridicality thus becomes a matter of degree and
depends on whether or not (and how much) Gref deviates
from 1. The present conclusion that reference signal gain
is not fixed but can be modulated by retinal flow thus
destroys the criterion for distinguishing between direct
and inferential perceptual modes and thus invalidates its
empirical base.
The present notion of a visual component in reference
signals provides a new explanation (without the need for
dual mode theory) of why under normal daylight circum-
stances no illusory motion of the world occurs during an
eye movement: such illusions only happen if Gref differs
significantly from 1. Although efference copy components
in reference signals are indeed too small, the reference
signals themselves usually are not: eye movement in-
duced retinal image flow generates an additional compen-
satory visual component (the compensation need not be
very precise: Vref must only be enhanced enough to make
its difference with Vret less than one JND). Actually, the
reason efference copies associated with pursuit eye move-
ments are undersized may be that if they were not
undersized, an eye movement induced visual component
would oversize the reference signal, which could create
illusory motion of the world.
The present model is also able to explain center-
surround induced motion without using the concepts of
"object-relative" and "subject-relative" motion: when the
stationary center stimulus is fixated with the eyes, the
moving surround induces image flow across the retinae
and this generates a (relatively small) reference signal.
The image of the center stimulus, however, does not
move on the retinae and thus generates a zero retinal
signal. The center stimulus is hence perceived as moving
in space. When the surround is pursued with the eyes,
the illusion corresponds to the Filehne illusion: the small
stationary stimulus seems to move against the eyes during
a pursuit eye movement (see sect. 5.3 for a quantitative
treatment of induced motion).
5.2. Velocity perception. We are now in a position to
investigate some basic assumptions of direct perception
theory. To this purpose we will begin with a closer look at
Figure 3. Imagine a horizontal line cross-secting this
graph. Along this line Vret remains constant, which means
that we always have the same retinal image flow charac-
teristics (invariants): those present in the retinal image
flow at the intersection between the vertical axis and the
horizontal line. When we move from left to right along
this horizontal line, however, the percept varies. First the
stimulus is seen to move against the eyes, but then, with
increasing eye velocity, the perceived velocity of the
stimulus is reduced until, at a certain eye velocity, the
(against-) threshold is reached. After this point the stim-
ulus is seen as stationary across a certain range of eye
velocities. At the end of that range the with-threshold is
reached. Now the stimulus is again perceived as moving,
but in the other direction (with the eyes) and now its
perceived velocity increases with eye velocity. In other
words, all percepts of motion, stationarity, direction, and
velocity depend on the ratio between retinal image veloc-
ity and eye velocity (in space). This means that, contrary
to the claims of direct perception theory, the invariants
present in a particular instance of image flow themselves
have no fixed perceptual significance. In defence of direct
perception theory, it might be postulated that the invari-
ant that must be "picked up" to perceive object motion
could be a "higher order" one (similar to the one men-
tioned in Note 2), consisting of the ratio between a normal
invariant present in the retinal image flow (Vret) and eye
velocity information. But that would be contradictory to
the basic idea of direct perception theory that the percept
of object motion derives exclusively from retinal informa-
tion. The point is that such a "higher order" invariant
actually represents the main inferential principle: in addi-
tion to retinal information, eye movement information is
always necessary.
The claim that the above-threshold perceived velocity
of a visual stimulus depends on the relation between
retinal image velocity and eye velocity (in space) is incom-
patible with direct perception theory for a further reason.
According to this theory, eye movements are considered
exploratory information sampling activities, necessary to
"pick up" invariants. They do not (i.e., should not) affect
percepts of object motion. If anything, they might en-
hance the quality of such percepts, but they do not define
them (see, e.g., Gibson 1979, p. 219).
In terms of the present model, the claim that perceived
stimulus velocity depends both on how the image moves
across the eyes and on how the eyes move (in space) can be
formalized as follows: perceived stimulus velocity de-
pends on how much the retinal and reference signals
differ, minus the JND between them, or
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V™,., = Vrof - Vret - JND (9)
where Vust]S is the subjectively perceived velocity of the
stimulus in space and Vref and Vret the magnitudes of
the concurrent reference and retinal signals respectively.
The threshold is represented by the additional require-
ment that Vcst s remains zero as long as |Vref — Vret| S
JND. Note that when the eyes move faster across a
stimulus, Vri.f and Vrct increase equally, so their differ-
ence remains the same; however, the JND grows (Weber's
law), reducing Vest s. Hence the present model predicts
that during (faster) pursuit eye movements we should
underestimate stimulus velocity in proportion to the
increased JND, or, stated differently, Veslsshoidd depend
on eye movement induced changes in the thresholds for
motion.
To test this prediction, a velocity magnitude estimation
experiment was carried out in which stimulus velocity was
judged while pursuit eye movements - of various veloc-
ities - were made across the stimulus pattern (Wertheim
& Van Gelder 1990). The results showed that when the
stimulus moved in the same direction as the eyes, Vest s
was indeed underestimated as much as the with-
threshold for motion was elevated.
When stimuli moved against the eyes the underestima-
tion of Vcst s was less pronounced and with high stimulus
velocities it was even absent. One explanation is that the
high retinal image velocity afferents that occur in against-
the-eyes conditions may not so easily pass the low tem-
poral band-pass gating mechanism in the optokinetic
pathway (see Fig. 1). This would decrease the (visual
component in the) reference signal, that is, reduce Vrefin
Equation 9. Vest s then increases, because the difference
between V,.ut and Vref increases (Vrct is always larger than
Vief when stimuli are perceived as moving against the
eyes - see Fig. 3). That counteracts the underestimation
effect. Another explanation could be as follows: when a
stimulus is perceived as moving in the same direction as
the eyes, Vr<,t is always smaller than Vref (see Fig. 3).
Hence, in Equation 9, (Vref - Vret) is positive. As soon as
it grows larger than one JND, Vest s increases from its
initial zero level. But when stimuli are perceived as
moving against the eyes, Vret is larger than Vref (see Fig.
3), which means that the factor (Vref - Vret) is negative. As
long as the absolute value of the factor (Vref — Vret)
remains less than one JND, Vest s remains zero, that is,
below threshold, but as soon as it grows larger than one
JND, the absolute value of Vest s in Equation 9 becomes
larger than two JND. Thus a discontinuity may occur
immediately above the against-threshold: Vest s does not
gradually increase from zero but jumps to a higher level,
canceling the velocity underestimation effect of the in-
creased threshold.
An effect opposite to the threshold-related under-
estimation of stimulus velocity with stimuli moving in the
same direction as the eyes should occur when the eye
movement is stopped abruptly (e.g., when the fixation
point sweeping across the stimulus pattern is suddenly
arrested). This reduces the threshold and the stimulus
should thus suddenly be perceived as accelerating, that
is, as moving faster than when the eyes were still moving.
This "acceleration illusion" was also reported by
Wertheim and Van Gelder (1990), who showed it to be
independent of other factors, such as the sudden change
in Vret itself or in the relative velocity between the
(images of) the stimulus pattern and the fixation point.
The underestimation phenomenon with stimuli that
move in the same direction as the eyes explains the so-
called Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon: the perceived veloc-
ity of a stimulus is less when it is pursued with the eyes than
when it moves - with the same speed - across stationary
eyes (Aubert 1886; 1887; Dichgans et al. 1969; 1975;
Fleischl 1882; Gibson et al. 1957; Mack & Herman 1972).
The phenomenon also occurs in a visually "rich" environ-
ment and has been recognized as anomalous in direct
perception theory (Gibson et al. 1957). The present model
explains the phenomenon as being identical to the velocity
underestimation phenomenon during pursuit eye move-
ments: when a stimulus is tracked visually, it moves in the
same direction as the eyes and thus its velocity is underesti-
mated. The fact that the stimulus is actually tracked with
the eyes is irrelevant (for a quantitative analysis of this
claim, see Wertheim & Van Gelder 1990).
This explanation obviates another slightly different
version of dual mode theory, one originally designed to
explain the Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon (Dichgans &
Brandt 1972). According to this version, we perceive
motion either in an "afferent mode" from image motion
across (stationary) eyes or in an "efferent mode" by identi-
fying object motion with ocular motion, that is, during
ocular pursuit of the stimulus (actually, the "efferent
mode" has also been considered as one of three modes of
visual perception - see e.g., Wallach et al. 1982; Wallach
1987 - the other two being related to retinal image-
motion cues and to object-relative motion cues). The
"efferent mode" is presumably less precise, yielding
slower velocity percepts. The modes have been identified
with the direct and inferential modes mentioned earlier
(Mack 1986; Mack & Herman 1972), the slower percepts
of the "efferent mode" being explained as caused by the
underregistration of eye velocity in the efference copy.
It is interesting to note that Dichgans et al. (1975)
reported that the Aubert-Fleischl phenomenon was less
pronounced with low than high spatial frequency stimuli.
The reason was that the perceived velocity of gratings
moving across stationary eyes was reduced with lower
spatial frequencies and this did not happen when the
gratings were pursued with the eyes (see also Diener et
al. 1976). In terms of the present model this is explained
as follows: when gratings move across stationary eyes they
generate retinal flow, which induces a reference signal
that consists only of a visual component. Low spatial
frequency gratings are more optokinetic than high spatial
frequency ones, however. Hence, the former should
induce larger reference signals than the latter, that is,
larger JNDs (Weber's law), and thus higher thresholds.
Since, as explained above, higher thresholds create
slower perceived velocities, low spatial frequency stimuli
will appear to move more slowly across stationary eyes
than high spatial frequency stimuli. When the gratings
are tracked with the eyes spatial frequency has no effect,
because there is no image flow across the retinae, that is,
no visual modulation of reference signals.
This also explains the stationarity tendency of large
stimuli: they are simply more optokinetic than small ones.
They accordingly have higher motion thresholds and their
perceived above-threshold velocities are correspondingly
reduced. Thus, there is no need to assume that large
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stimuli tend to act as perceptual frames of reference
(Mack & Herman 1978) - an assumption that is in any case
questionable: a frame of reference does not define its own
motion or stationarity.
Patterns moving across the retinal periphery also seem
to have more optokinetic potential than when they move
centrally (Dichgans & Brandt 1978). Thus, when a stim-
ulus moves continuously across the retinal periphery of
stationary eyes it may gradually produce quite a large
reference signal (composed of only a visual component).
The difference between retinal and reference signal is
hence gradually reduced, which should result in a de-
crease of perceived stimulus velocity. In some cases the
difference may even become less than one JND, causing
the stimulus to appear stationary. Such phenomena have
indeed been reported (Cohen 1965; Hunzelmann & Spill-
mann 1984; MacKay 1982).
5.3. Absolute versus relative motion perception. So far, in
referring to the present model, the terms "stimulus veloc-
ity," "threshold for motion," or "perceived motion" have
meant motion of objects relative to external space (i.e.,
3-D "Newtonian" space, as defined by the horizontal
surface of the earth and its gravitational field). Hence-
forth, this will be termed "absolute motion." Now let us
consider the perception of motion of objects relative to
each other, which will be called "relative motion" (see
Kinchla, 1971, for a similar use of the terms absolute and
relative motion).
Assume that the eyes sweep across two stimuli, SI and
S2, moving relative to each other. According to Equation
9 (sect. 5.2), the subjectively estimated absolute velocity
of an SI (VestI s) equals the difference between the eye
movement induced reference signal and the retinal signal
(Vretl), minus the JND:
(10)
Similarly, with respect to S2 we may write:
Vust2.s = V,.ef - V,.^ - JND (11)
The subjectively perceived velocity of SI relative to S2
(VestlA2) equals the difference between Vestl s and Vest2 s.
Hence:
VeS,,A2 = Vesll.s - Vest2.s = V,.et2 - Vrctl - JNDV2 (12)
This means that the perceived velocity of two stimuli
relative to each other should be independent of how the
eyes move (i.e., of reference signals), depending only on
the difference between the two associated retinal image
velocities minus a noise factor.10
Equation 12 is of course subject to the condition that
VestlA2 remains zero (below threshold) whenever |Vret2 -
Vret l | < JNDV2. In terms of Weber's law this means that
at the threshold for relative motion between SI and S2,
Vre.i V,.ut2 = c o n s t a n t (13)
This prediction was tested (Wertheim & Niessen 1986) by
measuring the threshold for relative motion between two
identical stimulus patterns while subjects tracked a fixa-
tion point sweeping (at various velocities) across both
stimuli. The results (Fig. 5) confirm Equation 13.
This finding is theoretically important in the debate
between direct and inferential theory. The point is that,
since retinal image velocity is always equal to the differ-
ence between eye velocity in space (Veyes s) and absolute
stimulus velocity (Vstim s), Equation 12 can be written as
Ves.,A2 = Vstjml.s - V,im2.s - JNDV2 (14)
Hence, not only does the percept of relative motion
between objects depend exclusively on retinal afferents
(Equation 12), but it is also always veridical, because it
corresponds to the physical description of how the objects
move in space - apart from a noise factor (Equation 14).
These conclusions agree with the basic claims of direct
perception theory, even though they follow from inferen-
tial reasoning; hence, with respect to relative motion,
there is no disagreement whatsoever between the two
approaches. It seems that the debate between the two
theories actually reflects a failure to distinguish between
percepts of relative motion (which are independent of
reference signals) and percepts of absolute motion (which
depend on reference signals). To state that both theories
concern the perception of "motion" is to invite confusion.
We should separate the concept of "motion" into absolute
and relative motion, and correspondingly distinguish be-
tween percepts of absolute and relative motion (e.g.,
between seeing whether a car moves on the road and
seeing whether it moves relative to another car).
In retrospect, this makes sense: inferential theory al-
ways concerns percepts of absolute motion, even if not
mentioned explicitly (as for example in the literature on
the Filehne illusion). Hence it refers to illusions caused
by properties of reference signals. Direct perception
theory is concerned with perception in natural "ecologi-
cally relevant" environments, that is, with the perception
of relative motion of objects moving against a visual
background. If the background is seen as stationary in
space, the relative motion of an object against the back-
ground equals its absolute motion in space. Hence all
percepts of motion become veridical. To illustrate this, let
SI be an object moving against a visual background S2.
The subjectively perceived absolute velocity of the object
SI can be expressed as:
(15)V = V — V
vosl l .s vosl2.s v e
or
or
= Vesl2.s - (V,im2.s - V,iml.s - JNDV2) (16)
(Vref - Vrct2 - JND) - (Vslim2.s - V,llml., - JNDV2) (17)
Equation 16 shows that if a background is stationary
(Vstim2 s = 0) and is also perceived as such (Vest2 s = 0), the
absolute motion of the object, VesU s, is perceived veri-
dically (apart from a noise factor). Equation 17 shows that
this is true even in cases where the gain of reference
signals differs from 1, if only the JND between Vrcfand
Vret2 is large enough to maintain a percept of background
stationarity. Note that this is an example of a veridical
percept of absolute motion in the presence of an inap-
propriately sized reference signal (visual capture).
If, on the other hand, the background moves in space,
its estimated absolute velocity, Vest2 s, is usually not equal
*° ^stim2.s (e-S-> because of a size or spatial frequency
induced stationarity tendency, or because it is perceived
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Figure 5. The difference between retinal image velocities of two identical stimulus patterns, SI and S2, at the thresholds
for detecting relative motion between them, as a function of retinal image velocity of one of the two patterns.
Measurements taken with moving eyes (during ocular pursuit of a fixation point sweeping at various velocities across both
patterns) and with stationary eyes (fixation point stationary on the screen). Head is fixed in space.
during an eye movement). Equation 16 shows that the
percept of absolute object motion, Vestl s, then becomes
less veridical, that is, unequal to VstilI)Ls. This provides a
quantitative description of center-surround induced mo-
tion: a stationary object (Vstiml s = 0), seen against a
moving surround (Vest2 s < V,tim2.s)> is perceived as mov-
ing in space (Ves,,.s ¥= 6).
Note that this view of induced motion differs from the
one given by Wallach or dual mode theory (see sect. 5.1),
according to which the crucial element of induced motion
is the dominance of "object-relative" motion cues. Seen
from the present perspective, however, induced motion
is an illusion of absolute motion (see also Kinchla 1971).
The illusion is not that the center dot seems to move
relative to its surround (this is seen correctly), but that the
center dot seems to move in space. This is illustrated by
the fact that we can also express induced motion formally
by substituting (V
 s - Vstiml.s) for Vretl s in Equation
10:
Ve,,,., = V,.ef - Veyes.s + Vstiml.s - JND (18)
Thus, if we fixate the stationary stimulus (Vstjml s = Veyes s
= 0), it is seen to move in space with a velocity propor-
tional to the visually induced Vr(.f created by the surround
image flow across the retinae (minus the JND). Note that
in such circumstances the illusion should develop gradu-
ally, because the induction of a visual reference signal is a
gradual process (actually, we should expect the duration
of this process to become shorter with slower surround
motion; see the discussion of the generation of vection in
sections 2 and 3). If, on the other hand, the eyes track the
surround, induced motion should be immediate, because
Vrefthen consists of just an efference copy component (no
image flow across the retinae), which is about 20% smaller
than Vuyes s. Vestl s is then proportional to (Vref - Veyes.s).
If this is larger than one JND, induced motion (the
Filehne illusion) occurs. There is indeed some empirical
evidence (see Reinhardt-Rutland 1992) that supports this
claim, that induced motion develops gradually when the
eyes fixate the stationary center stimulus but is immediate
when the eyes fixate the moving surround. A related
prediction would be that no induced motion should occur
if Vref approximates Veyes s (see Equation 18), that is, if
reference signal gain is close to 1. That may happen if the
eye movement sweeps across the whole induced motion
display in a normally illuminated environment, generat-
ing a visual component next to the efference copy.
Although relative motion between objects is not af-
fected by reference signals, it may be affected by eye
movements for another reason: eye movements made
across various moving stimuli may increase retinal image
velocities, that is, retinal signals. This would not affect the
differences between these retinal signals, but it would
increase the JNDs between them (Weber's law). Accord-
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ing to Equation 12, this should elevate the threshold for
relative motion of objects with respect to each other (see
Murphy 1978; Nakayama 1981) and reduce perceived
relative velocities. This may cause a "freezing illusion":
imagine a screen on which various stimuli move relative
to each other with different but not too high velocities. An
eye movement across the screen will then increase the
relative motion thresholds so much that the display seems
to become motionless, as if suddenly frozen. Nakayama
(1981) actually predicted that such a phenomenon should
cause the disappearance of kinetic depth perception,
which depends on the detection of small differences in
relative velocity between many stimuli on a screen (e.g.,
Braunstein 1976; Wallach & O'Connell 1953).
5.4. Interfacing ego- and object-motion perception and
visual-vestibular interactions. The main function of the
vestibular apparatus is to signal head movements to the
brain. According to direct perception theory, this is only
confirmatory information because the visual system does
the same through visual kinaesthesis. No particular inter-
action between these two kinds of information is postu-
lated (but see Note 2) and the visual perception of object
motion is thought to be independent of vestibular stimu-
lation. As mentioned earlier, eye and head movements
are viewed as exploratory information sampling activities,
which, if anything, should only improve perception. In
the direct perception literature there is only one excep-
tion. This is the case of overstimulation of the vestibular
apparatus. Such overstimulation yields a percept, or
awareness, of self-motion which differs from that of visual
kinaesthesis: orderly percepts are disturbed and the ob-
server experiences a sense of disorientation, part of which
consists of perceiving the visual world as moving. How-
ever, since direct perception theory is mainly concerned
with normal (ecologically relevant) perceptual conditions,
it has no formal model for what happens in such cases,
apart from the assumption that such conditions make
retinal events "obtrusive" (Gibson 1968).
As shown above, the present model differs from this
view. Although it agrees that percepts of relative motion
may indeed be independent of vestibular stimulation,
this is not the case with percepts of absolute motion. Here
reference signals are always involved and they may in-
clude a vestibular component. The idea of a vestibularly
induced kind of efference copy was first proposed by
Sperry (1950), who called it a "corollary discharge." This
term often features in the inferential literature (see, e.g.,
Jeannerod et al. 1979). To a certain extent the present
model agrees with this idea. The difference, however, is
that according to the present model vestibular stimula-
tion does not generate an independent signal but a com-
ponent in the reference signal. This is not just a matter of
semantics, because the further assumption that reference
signals may also include a visual component now intro-
duces a new element: it implies an interaction between
visual and vestibular information in the reference signal
(i.e, in the brain's estimate of how the eyes move in space).
As a result, the neurophysiological literature on visual-
vestibular interactions, which consists mainly of research
on ego-motion perception, now becomes relevant to the
study of the visual perception of object motion.
Although this literature is much too large to review in
the present target article, it should be mentioned that it
often includes speculations about possible neural sub-
strates of what we have called reference signals. For
example, physical movements of the eyes in space -
irrespective of whether they are caused by eye move-
ments in the head, head movements, or both - have been
recognized in the output activity of cells in the vestibular
nuclei (Berthoz et al. 1981; Cohen 1981; Fuchs & Kim
1975; McCrea et al. 1981; Yoshida et al. 1981), in the
flocculo-nodal lobe of the cerebellum (Cohen 1981; Lis-
berger & Fuchs 1987a; 1987b; Stone & Lisberger 1990a;
1990b) and in the vestibular cortex (Biittner & Buettner
1978; Biittner & Henn 1981). The activity of some of these
cells is in fact modified by visual stimulation, that is, by
retinal image motion or optic flow (see, e.g., Nagao 1988;
Noda 1986; Waespe & Henn 1981; Waespe et al. 1981;
Watanabe 1984). The time course of this modulation
differs among cells, but seems to be slowest in the vestibu-
lar cortex. Hence the output activity of cells in that area
might represent the neurological substrate of reference
signals (see also Straube & Brandt 1987). The neural
networks of which these cells are part have largely been
charted out (e.g., Barthelemy et al. 1988; Berthoz &
Melvill Jones 1985; Cohen & Henn 1988; Henn et al.
1980; Ito 1982; Precht 1982; Straube & Brandt 1987;
Waespe & Henn 1979; Xerri et al. 1987; 1988). They are
sufficiently complex to allow for a subsystem such as
described in Figure 1 (or Fig. 7 below).
To illustrate how closely object-motion perception is
linked with self- and ego motion, let us analyze the
occurrence of saturated vection, not as described earlier
for circular vection in an optokinetic drum (sect. 3) but as
it occurs in an everyday kind of situation. Imagine a train
engineer seated at the front of a train looking straight
ahead and making no head movements. When the train
begins to move, it accelerates. The vestibular apparatus,
which only reacts to accelerations, responds. Integration
of the response produces information about head velocity
in space (recognizable at the level of single cell activity -
e.g., Benson 1990); this, according to the present model,
is used to generate a reference signal that provides the
visual system with an estimate of how fast the eyes move
in space (see Fig. 1). If the estimate is not too much in
error, the reference signal will be approximately equal to
the retinal signal evoked by the moving image of the
visual world. Since small differences are masked by the
JND, this keeps the world perceptually stable. When
the train reaches a constant velocity, the vestibular appa-
ratus becomes silent, but now vection takes over to
maintain the sensation of ego motion, that is, the decreas-
ing vestibular component in the reference signal is re-
placed by a gradually growing visual one. The reference
signal thus maintains its size and the percept of a stable
world remains. Without this visual-vestibular interaction
the reference signal would decrease with the decrease of
vestibular reactivity and the world would lose its stability,
seeming to "rush" toward the observer. This illustrates an
important ecological function of the visual-vestibular in-
teraction taking place within reference signals: to inter-
face the perception of a stationary world with the percep-
tion of ego motion.
Such interactions do raise a problem for the present
model, however. It is well established that the time course
of development of a vestibular response differs from that
of an optokinetic one (see, e.g., Dichgans & Brandt 1972;
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Hennetal . 1980). Hence the development of the various
reference signal components is not always synchronous.
For example, the vestibular apparatus reacts fast to rela-
tively high frequency self-movements but it may take
longer before a visual component is fully grown. Another
problem is that the integration of vestibular information
into velocity information is not perfect and depends on
the frequency range within which the vestibular system
responds (Benson 1990). Thus, it is unlikely that Gref is
continuously close to 1 during activities like running or
dancing. Nevertheless, we usually do not experience
illusory motion of the visual world when engaged in such
activities. The answer is probably that the JNDs of refer-
ence signals which include a vestibular component are
very large. That would mask quite large unwanted differ-
ences between retinal and reference signals.
To investigate this issue, Wertheim and Bles (1984)
measured the JND of reference signals during ego mo-
tion. They rotated subjects sinusoidally (0.05 Hz, various
amplitudes) on a rotating chair inside a totally darkened
optokinetic drum, which could be rotated independently
around the subject. The inside of the vertically striped
drum could be illuminated briefly (400 msec). This was
done at the point where the subject rotated at peak
velocity. Thus the drum wall served as a (full field)
stimulus pattern that could be moved in space with or
against the direction of the subjects' ego rotation in space.
The two opposite thresholds for absolute motion of the
drum wall were measured at various ego velocities, yield-
ing JNDs of 35% of ego velocity. This is similar to the
findings of Wallach (1985), who reported that the distance
between the with- and against-thresholds for perceiving
object motion in space is very large when measured with
subjects walking alongside the stimulus. His results sug-
gest JNDs that amount to 40% of ego velocity.
Such large JNDs should indeed facilitate a smooth
interfacing of ego motion with percepts of environmental
stationarity. However, the price is a dramatic increase of
the perceptual thresholds for absolute object motion
during ego motion and, because of that, a strong under-
estimation of absolute object velocity during ego motion.
Such effects are indeed well documented (Berthoz &
Droulez 1982; Biichele et al. 1980; Pavard & Berthoz
1977; Probst et al. 1980; 1984; 1986).
But the mechanism that serves the ecological function
of interfacing percepts of ego motion and environmental
stability has more drawbacks - percepts may be produced
that are exactly opposite to what they should be: a really
moving scene can erroneously be seen as stationary. This
happens when we see a moving train close to the window
of our own stationary train: the moving train acts as an
optokinetic stimulus and creates a sensation of ego mo-
tion. It thus generates a reference signal that grows in size
until its difference with the retinal signal (encoding the
retinal image velocity of the moving train) becomes less
than one JND. The moving train is then erroneously seen
as stationary in space. This is basically the same phenome-
non as the development of saturated circular vection in an
optokinetic drum.
The opposite, illusory motion of an actually stationary
scene, may also occur. A common example is what hap-
pens after a period of extreme vestibular stimulation:
neural activity of cells in the central areas upon which the
vestibular afferents converge dies out only gradually (as
evidenced by a continuation of reflexive nystagmus eye
movements, called "afternystagmus"; see, e.g., Henn et
al. 1980). Hence, a residual vestibular component re-
mains present in reference signals and oversizes them,
causing illusions of environmental motion. Note that this
explains the perception of environmental motion during
dizziness. Hence, the present model differs from the
traditional inferential view that such percepts are caused
by an absence of efference copies during such reflexive
nystagmus eye movements.
Similar reasoning may apply to the movement after
effect, MAE (when a stimulus pattern is suddenly
stopped after having moved for a while across stationary
eyes, it is perceived as moving slightly in the opposite
direction; the illusion may last many seconds, during
which the threshold for object motion in the original
direction is elevated). The most common, but still some-
what controversial, explanation of MAE is in terms of
fatigued direction selective cells (see Denton 1977; Fav-
reau 1976; Moulden 1975; Sekuler et al. 1982). The
present explanation is different: when the lights in an
optokinetic drum are suddenly extinguished, vection de-
cays only slowly and reflexive nystagmus eye movements
continue for a while. This suggests a continuation of
central neural activity upon cessation of retinal flow
(Henn et al. 1980). Hence visually induced (components
in) reference signals may also decay gradually after retinal
flow stops. As long as they last, however, a stationary
stimulus, viewed with stationary eyes, will be seen as
moving in space (see Equation 18). The JND associated
with that residual reference signal explains the elevated
threshold for motion in the direction of the original retinal
flow (i.e., in the vectorial direction of the reference
signal).
These examples show that, according to the present
model, an appreciation of visual-vestibular interactions is
needed to explain phenomena in the field of visual object-
motion perception. The inverse is also true, however:
the present experimental paradigm can serve as a tool in
research on ego-motion perception and visual-vestibular
interactions. The method for measuring reference signal
magnitude (and gain) by measuring retinal image velocity
at the PSS can be used to measure the gain of the response
of the various parts of the equilibrium system (the semi-
circular canals, which react to angular accelerations, and
the otoliths, which respond to linear accelerations of the
head in space).
An example of such a study is the Wertheim and Bles
(1984) experiment cited earlier, in which subjects were
rotated inside an optokinetic drum. That experiment was
not only designed to measure the JND between retinal
signals and vestibularly induced reference signals; it also
attempted to measure the response of the semicircular
canals (neglecting possible kinaesthetic feedback) and its
interaction with reflexive nystagmus eye movements dur-
ing ego rotation in darkness. According to the present
model, such ego rotation should induce reference signals
that consist of the vectorial sum of Vhead s (the response of
the semicircular canals) and a Veyes h component. The
presence of a Veyes h component stems from the reflexive
nystagmus eye movements that occur during stimulation
of the semicircular canals (in a normally illuminated
environment nystagmus eye movements serve to stabilize
the visual gaze in space during ego motion, but they also
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occur in darkness). When a subject is rotated around the
vertical axis on a rotating chair, nystagmus consists of slow
phase smooth compensatory eye movements in the direc-
tion opposite to head rotation, alternating with fast phase
recuperating saccades in the same direction as head
rotation. Thus, during slow phase nystagmus eye move-
ments, reference signal magnitude should be smaller
than during the suppression of nystagmus (nystagmus
suppression occurs when we ask the rotating subject to
fixate the eyes on a small head-stationary fixation point),
because Veyes_h then approximates zero.
Wertheim and Bles tested this hypothesis by perform-
ing their drum experiment with and without the suppres-
sion of nystagmus. They showed that (at the 0.05 Hz ego-
rotation frequency used in this experiment)
Vref = Vre,PSS = - 1.07 Vheac,s - 0.72 Veyesh - 0.74 (19)
Hence, Vref was indeed decreased by slow phase nystag-
moid eye movements (during slow phase nystagmus eye
movements the sign of V
 s h is opposite to that of Vheac| s)
and increased when they were suppressed. Note that this
means that slow phase nystagmus eye movements do in
fact generate efference copies in reference signals in
which only 72% of Veyes s is registered, just as in the case
of pursuit eye movements. This finding is at variance with
the traditional view, mentioned earlier, that nystagmoid
eye movements do not generate efference copy signals
(Howard & Templeton 1966; Johnstone & Mark 1970;
1971; 1973; Kornhuber 1974; Leibowitz et al. 1982; Ray-
mond et al. 1984; but see Bedell et al., 1989, and Mit-
telstaedt, 1990, for experimental findings and theoretical
views that agree with the present observation).
Since in this experiment subjects were rotated along
their vertical axis in total darkness, the Vhead s term in
Equation 19 actually reflects the gain of semicircular canal
afferents (although some kinaesthetic feedback may also
have been present). The small (7%) overregistration of
head velocity in these afferents explains the oculogyral
illusion (when an observer is rotated in complete darkness
and nystagmus is suppressed with a head stationary fixa-
tion point, this fixation point, rotating with the observer,
seems to move slightly faster than the observer, see, e.g.,
Eisner 1971; Graybiel & Hupp 1946; Howard 1982; Ross
1974; Whiteside et al. 1965): the velocity of the fixation
point in space is overestimated because it corresponds to
the difference between a zero retinal and a slightly over-
sized reference signal.
Recently, the characteristics of reference signals cre-
ated by linear accelerations of the head in space - the
characteristics of the otolith afferent response - have also
been investigated in a series of experiments at our labora-
tory (Wertheim 1992a; 1992b; Wertheim & Mesland 1993;
Zeppenfeldt 1991). Here Vre, PSS was measured with
subjects moving forward or backward on a linear track sled
between two screens on which the stimulus (a checker-
board pattern) was flashed (300 msec). The subjects
looked straight ahead (a fixation point was placed several
meters in front of the endpoint of the sled's track) and thus
perceived the stimulus patterns peripherally. The sled
moved sinusoidally (at 0.15 Hz and with a 109.5 cm/sec
peak velocity) and the experimental room was completely
dark to prevent the creation of a visual component in the
reference signal (no retinal flow from the environment).
Reference signals were measured with the monitors
placed at various positions along the sled's track (i.e., at
various phases of the sinusoidal sled motion) and the best-
fitting sinus through these data was calculated.
As can be seen in Figure 6, the results showed that this
particular ego-motion profile created undersized refer-
ence signals with a gain of 0.76 and a small phase lead of
3.8 deg (a similar phase lead - of approximately 6 deg -
can be calculated on the basis of a mathematical model of
the otolith system; see Grant & Best 1987; Marcus 1992).
If such experiments are performed with linear ego-
motion sinusoids of other frequencies and amplitudes,
the full transfer function of the otoliths may become
known (again, under the assumption of neglectable kina-
esthetic feedback).
In a similar experiment (see also Wertheim & Mesland
1993) we measured G,.ef at the point of maximum sled
velocity (109.5 cm/sec) in darkness, but now we compared
it to a condition with the lights on in the experimental
room. In darkness, the reference signal was again under-
sized (Gref being 0.8), but when the lights were on,
allowing for the generation of a compensatory visual
component in the reference signal, Gref became 1. This
pattern of results is remarkably similar to the one dis-
cussed with relevance to the Filehne illusion (see sect.
5.1).
The same logic is used in a current research project, in
which we investigate whether the otolith response
changes after adaptation of the equilibrium system (adap-
tation is induced by rotating subjects in the gondola of a
centrifuge such that they sustain a force of 3G for pe-
riods between 1 and 2 hours; see Bles et al. 1989; Ockels
et al. 1989; 1990; Wertheim 1992a; 1993; Wertheim et al.
1989).
The present paradigm might even prove useful in the
clinical diagnosis of vestibular deficiencies. For example,
one study (Wertheim et al. 1985) tested the hypothesis
that resting level activity of the central vestibular system
is abnormally noisy in schizophrenia. Functionally, this
implies very noisy reference signals, that is, abnormally
large JNDs between retinal and reference signals, even if
no head movements are made. Very high thresholds for
motion were indeed observed with such patients. Find-
ings were similar with patients who were not schizo-
phrenic but had been diagnosed as having a noisy vestibu-
lar apparatus.
5.5. Conclusions. The controversies between direct and
inferential theories of motion perception may have origi-
nated at least in part from different and sometimes contra-
dictory philosophical views (Gibson 1973; Lombardo
1987). However, on the empirical level, most of the
debate stems from the puzzling observation that the data
gathered in everyday situations often differ from those
gathered in strictly controlled laboratory conditions. The
present model provides a theoretical alternative to
the two approaches for two reasons. First, it explains the
"puzzling" differences by showing that the two ap-
proaches actually reflect research on different topics:
direct perception theory is concerned with the percep-
tion of relative motion and inferential theory with the
perception of absolute motion. Second, it describes
(quantitatively) how the two topics relate to each other.
As a result, a certain compatibility is created between
premises from direct and inferential theories, premises
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Figure 6. Modulation of the reference signal (drawn line) during sinusoidal linear ego motion.
that have traditionally been considered contradictory.
Thus, in agreement with direct perception theory the
perception of object motion may indeed stem exclusively
from visual afferents, and retinal flow only contains infor-
mation about ego motion and not about motion of the
visual world. There is also agreement with the inferential
assumption that information about how the eyes move in
space is necessary for perceiving absolute object motion.
However, on other issues the model diverges from direct
and inferential theories. Thus, it disagrees with the direct
perception assumption that self-motion is basically ex-
ploratory and only serves to upgrade perception. It also
disagrees with the assumption that to perceive absolute
motion the brain needs no estimate of how the eyes move
in space. With respect to inferential theory, the present
model replaces the concept of efference copy and corol-
lary discharge with that of a (compound) reference signal.
As it includes a visual component, the common assump-
tion that it should be considered extraretinal and has a
fixed gain is also abandoned. Finally, since the present
model actually describes how percepts of self-motion and
of object motion interface, it broadens the scope of the
study of visual object-motion perception to include
visual-vestibular interactions.
So far, this target article has been devoted to the
description of the model and of an empirical paradigm
which can be used to quantify its parameters and to test its
predictions. The results of these empirical tests appear to
support the model; their theoretical implications are
shown to resolve most of the controversies between direct
and inferential theory and seem to invalidate the theoreti-
cal rationale of dual mode theory. At the same time, new
explanations have been given for many well-known phe-
nomena in the field of motion perception. What remains
now is to review theories and data that may point to
deficiencies of the present model and directions for fur-
ther research.
6. Problems and speculations
6.1. The Post and Leibowitz model. Post and Leibowitz
(1985) have proposed a version of inferential theory that is
at odds with the present model for two reasons. First, it
assumes that a very large moving stimulus pattern always
induces vection irrespective of whether its image moves
across the retinae (according to the present model vection
develops only through retinal image flow); in addition,
such stimuli always cause reflexive optokinetic nystag-
mus. Second, according to Post and Leibowitz, efference
copies - which, for the purpose of comparing their model
with the present one, may be treated as reference signals
- are proportional not to eye velocity, but to the effort
invested in voluntary control of oculomotor activity. No
effort is invested when eye movements are reflexive.
Thus, optokinetic nystagmus generates no efference
copies, but its suppression (by focusing the eyes on a
head-stationary fixation point) takes effort, and this does
evoke efference copies. With stronger optokinetic stimuli
it presumably takes more effort to suppress optokinetic
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nystagmus. Consequently, just as in the present model,
efference copies are proportional to the force of vestibular
and optokinetic stimulation. Many predictions derived
from the present model therefore also follow from the
Post and Leibowitz model.
The two models can be tested against each other,
however, because they predict opposite effects when
nystagmus is not suppressed. Consider a large stimulus
pattern that moves sinusoidally in front of the observer,
slowly enough and with an amplitude small enough to
maintain continuous sinusoidal slow phase optokinetic
nystagmoid eye movements without any fast phase sac-
cadic eye movements. According to the Post and
Leibowitz model, such conditions evoke sinusoidal vec-
tion, and since there is no efference copy (the eye move-
ments are reflexive) and a zero retinal signal (no retinal
image motion), the pattern should be seen as stationary in
space. The present model predicts the opposite: first, in
the absence of image flow across the retina no vection can
develop; second, the absence of retinal image motion
implies a zero retinal signal, but the slow phase eye
movements generate nonzero (efference copy composed)
reference signals. Hence, the pattern should be per-
ceived as moving in space.
Such an experiment was recently reported (Mergner &
Becker 1990). The stimulus consisted of a full-field
shadow pattern moving sinusoidally across a semicircular
screen. Subjects fixated a small fixation point, which was
also projected on the screen and could move indepen-
dently. It moved synchronously with the shadow pattern,
having the same frequency but a different amplitude, that
is, a different velocity. In their experiment, Mergner and
Becker started out with the fixation point moving much
more slowly than the shadow pattern, causing retinal
image motion of the pattern. In this situation, sinusoidal
vection always developed to saturation (at which point the
shadow pattern appeared as stationary in space). They
then gradually increased the velocity of the fixation point.
Vection remained. However, at a certain moment fixation
point velocity became equal to the velocity of the pattern,
that is, it became part of the pattern. This is the critical
condition, because in terms of the Post and Leibowitz
model the slow phase reflexive nystagmus eye move-
ments are now completely unobstructed by any voluntary
effort to track the target. At this moment all subjects
experienced a sudden elimination of vection, perceiving
themselves as stationary and the pattern as moving in
space, whatever the duration of the trial. This supports
the present model and is contrary to the predictions of the
Post and Leibowitz model.
6.2. Retinal image flow and vection. The Mergner and
Becker (1990) experiment did indeed show that vection
fails to develop in the absence of retinal slip (see also Fig.
1), but this poses a problem: in an optokinetic drum,
circular vection occurs always (i.e., also when nystagmus
is not suppressed). There may be two reasons for this.
First, if a full-field stimulus pattern is tracked with the
eyes from extreme right to extreme left (as during the slow
phase of optokinetic nystagmus) its image does not move
across the retinae but illuminates different parts of them.
To the visual system this is perhaps also a vection-
inducing cue. Mergner and Becker used a shadow pattern
with low contrast values that may have reduced the
salience of this cue. We tried to test this idea with some
pilot measurements: with a sinusoidally moving optokine-
tic drum (high contrast black and white stripes) vection
always developed, including when the stripes were
tracked with the eyes. However, one may also track the
stripes of the drum with the head (eyes stationary in the
head). The retinal image of the stripes then always illumi-
nates the same retinal area. It appeared that in such cases
vection did indeed fail to develop.
Second, it is possible that the repetition of brief in-
stances of image flow during the fast phases of normal
optokinetic nystagmus has the potential to induce vec-
tion. If so, the gating mechanism in the optokinetic
pathway could be viewed as a velocity storage mechanism
(Raphan et al. 1977) that can be loaded by brief repetitive
instances of image flow across the retinae.
Another pertinent problem is that according to section
3, an optokinetic stimulus generates (a visual component
in) reference signals because during vection the visual
system assumes that the eyes move in space. But if this is
so, should not vection always occur when an optokinetic
reference signal (component) is generated? Clearly this is
not always the case. For example, when pursuit eye
movements across a visual background generate image
flow across the retinae, vection usually does not occur, not
even if the background consists of a strong optokinetic
stimulus pattern (such as the one used by Wertheim,
1987, to invert the Filehne illusion). This suggests that
the common pathway on which optokinetic afferents and
vestibular afferents converge branches off in two direc-
tions, one generating ego motion, the other (its corollary)
converging on the reference signal. Different gating
mechanisms (i.e., different thresholds) may then be asso-
ciated with the two branches (see Fig. 7).
6.3. A "visual efference copy"? Ehrenstein et al. (1986a;
1986b; 1987), using a briefly visible point stimulus, re-
ported that the Filehne illusion increased dramatically
with stimulus presentation times below 300 msec, imply-
ing a very strong reduction of reference signal size (in
some cases even to zero). This poses a problem: without
its visual component, reference signal magnitude should
remain constant, as it still contains an efference copy
component, encoding about 80% of eye velocity in the
head. Ehrenstein et al. measured the PSS with a forced-
choice method of constant stimuli using only two re-
sponse alternatives (motion with or against the eyes),
excluding "no motion" responses. Since with extremely
brief stimulus presentations motion perception may be-
come ambiguous or impossible (see, e.g., Algom &
Cohen-Raz 1984; Bonnet 1982; Henderson 1971; Johnson
& Leibowitz 1976), this may have caused a response bias.
We were unable to replicate Ehrenstein's finding with a
larger stimulus pattern (Wertheim & Bekkering 1991;
1992) using our standard staircase method of limits, in
which the two opposite thresholds are measured sep-
arately, thus always allowing for "no motion" responses.
Reducing presentation times to 150 msec never yielded
large Filehne illusions (Gref remained approximately 0.8).
However, the JND increased dramatically (suggesting
that such brief retinal afferents are quite noisy). With
presentation times below 150 msec, the JND became so
large that retinal image velocity at the against-the-eyes
threshold reached the upper limit for detecting image
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motion. In such cases subjects never perceive motion
against the eyes, which means that the PSS cannot be
measured.
In another experiment (De Graaf & Wertheim 1988),
however, using a very high spatial frequency stimulus
pattern (a little cloud of dots) visible for 300 msec in the
retinal periphery, we did observe a very large Filehne
illusion, suggesting a 0.5 reference signal gain. This is
difficult to explain. One possibility is that the efference
copy is not (as traditionally assumed) a neural corollary of
the efferent command signals to the oculomotor muscula-
ture (Note 4) but stems from visual afferents (i.e., from
visual kinaesthesis) that converge on the reference signal
through a fast visual pathway with high spatiotemporal
frequency band-pass gating characteristics. In the retinal
periphery such a "visual efference copy" would be smaller
than in the foveal area, because the retinal periphery is
much less sensitive to high spatial frequencies. This could
also explain the Ehrenstein effect: retinal afferents from a
single-point stimulus that is visible extremely briefly
might not generate such a "visual efference copy" at all,
because they may not pass even this high spatiotemporal
frequency gate.
Anatomically, such a fast visual channel could be in-
cluded in the optokinetic pathway. There are some indica-
tions (Stone & Lisberger 1990a; 1990b) that the accessory
optic pathway contains both a low and a high spatiotem-
poral band-pass gating mechanisms, as reflected in the
different temporal characteristics of the simple and com-
plex spikes of floccular Purkinje cells.
Although the idea of such a fast visual channel in the
optokinetic (accessory optic) pathway is quite speculative,
the idea is attractive, because it further blurs the distinc-
tion between direct and inferential theory: a "visual effer-
ence copy" would make the concept of visual kinaesthesis
compatible with inferential theory. It might also help
explain why vection can be instantaneous when an op-
tokinetic drum is very slowly set into motion and op-
tokinetic nystagmus is not suppressed.
On the other hand, the idea of a visual efference copy
should not be embraced too easily because it also creates a
serious problem: when a moving stimulus is properly
tracked with the eyes in total darkness, there would be no
efference copy, that is, no reference signal. Since there is
also (almost) no retinal image motion, that is, no retinal
signal, such a stimulus should be seen as stationary in
space. This is not what happens: we do see stimulus
motion under such conditions. This seems quite incom-
patible with the concept of a "visual efference copy."
6.4. Signal magnitude. Recently, we observed that the
Filehne illusion is age dependent (Wertheim & Bekker-
ing 1991; 1992): with very brief stimulus presentation
times (150 msec), the usual illusion occurred with normal
student subjects, but with older subjects it disappeared
and with subjects over 50 years of age it was inverted (the
correlation between Glcf and age was approximately 0.7;
n = 38). With longer stimulus presentations Grcf gradu-
ally returned to approximately 1 for all ages. Thus, it
appeared as if reference signals, (i.e., efference copies)
grow (beyond proportion) with increasing age. A more
plausible explanation, however, is that when people age it
takes more time to register image velocity in the retinal
signal. Extremely brief stimulus presentations would
then yield undersized retinal signals. Very high retinal
image velocities are then needed to augment retinal
signals enough to make them larger than reference sig-
nals, that is, to reach the against-the-eyes thresholds.
Hence stimulus velocity at the against-the-eyes threshold
would become very high, and consequently Vret PSS
would increase, creating the impression of a very large
reference signal.
This illustrates a particular complexity of the present
model: in section 4, reference signal magnitude was
operationalized as retinal image velocity at the PSS.
However, this presupposes a proper encoding of retinal
image velocity in the retinal signal. If retinal signals
underregister image velocity (i.e., if their gain is less than
1), an inverted Filehne illusion should occur, which creates
the impression that reference signals are oversized (see
sect. 5.1). This means that the magnitude of retinal and
reference signals cannot be assessed absolutely, but only
relative to one another. Hence, to decide whether a
particular condition really creates an increase or decrease
in reference signal size, arguments over and above those
mentioned in section 5 must be considered. For example,
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the occurrence of a Filehne illusion with briefly visible
stimuli can only evidence undersized reference signals,
not oversized retinal signals, because briefer stimulus
presentations are unlikely to increase retinal signals.
6.5. The vectorial nature of retinal and reference signals.
The present experimental paradigm is based on stimulus
motion collinear with self- or ego movements. It therefore
uses simple subtraction and addition of retinal and refer-
ence signals and of the components within reference
signals. The only exception in this respect is the visual
component in reference signals, which is likely to show
nonlinear interactions with the other components. The
assumption that the other additivities in the present
model are linear, however, could be viewed as a minimum
requirement, at least as long as we do not discover
evidence to the contrary. Thus, at present, the model
considers calculations concerning these components as
basically vectorial.
The somewhat more complex calculations, which en-
sue when retinal and reference signals are not collinear
(i.e., when the stimulus and the eyes do not move collin-
early), have recently been described by Mateeff et al.
(1991). These could be extended to include 3-D motion in
space: since vestibular afferents encode 3-D ego motion,
they may induce 3-D (components in) reference signals.
Inferential theory was originally formulated to describe
the perception of position of stimuli in space as a function
of eye position in the head (see e.g., Helmholtz 1910;
Matin et al. 1969; Mittelstaedt 1990). Since velocity
relates mathematically to position, it might be possible to
extend the present model to include the subjective per-
ception of the position of stimuli in space, and perhaps
also the perception of the direction and orientation of
stimuli in space. In addition, a model similar to the
present one could be developed to describe perception
during saccadic eye movements (see Note 7).
6.6. Other sensory domains. Formally, the reasoning
behind the present model applies to any perceptual
system with which object motion can be perceived. For
example, consider the tactile system: when our fingertips
move across a tactile stimulus (e.g., a rough surface), its
shearing velocity across the skin is encoded in an afferent
tactile velocity signal (Vskin). To determine its perceptual
significance, a reference signal (Vref), encoding finger
velocity in space (Vfing s), should be created. The stimulus
will then be felt to move in space if the difference between
Vref and Vskin exceeds one JND. Because of Weber's law,
the tactile thresholds for stimulus motion with and against
finger movements should grow wider apart when finger
velocity increases, just as the two opposite thresholds for
visually perceived motion grow wider apart with increas-
ing eye velocity (Fig. 2). The shearing velocity of the
stimulus across the skin at the midpoint between these
thresholds (Vsldn PSS) would then indicate the magnitude
of the tactile reference signal, and its ratio with Vfmg s
would express its gain.
Although no such experiments have been reported,11
there is some evidence supportive of such a tactile model:
tactile vibrational thresholds are elevated with increased
velocity of the skin surface in space (Angel & Malenka
1982; Coquery 1978; 1981; Coquery & Amblard 1973;
Dyhre-Poulsen 1978; Paillard et al. 1978; Rauch et al.
1985; see also MacKay 1973). It is interesting to note that
recent data from our lab (Bles et al. 1994) show that skin
stimulation may cause (illusory) sensations of ego motion.
Hence, in the tactile domain there may also exist a self-
referential (component in the) reference signal, analogous
to the visual one in the present model.
Similar experiments can be performed in the auditory
domain by measuring thresholds for hearing the motion of
a sound source in space during self- and ego motion. The
present model thus provides a theoretical framework for
studying the perception of object motion (and sta-
tionarity) in any sensory domain, that is, in any perceptual
system with a sensory surface that can move in space.
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NOTES
1. In this target article the term "self-motion" denotes move-
ment of parts of the body of the observer; the term "ego motion"
denotes whole body movement.
2. Originally, Gibson (1966, pp. 283-84) recognized that
vestibular (and somatosensory) afferents may also generate or
contribute to percepts of head or ego motion. He proposed that
such percepts derive from the covariation of visual and vestibu-
lar afferents, their correlation serving as a special kind of
invariant. In a later paper, however, Gibson seems to let go of
this idea, as he suggests that information about eye and head
movements derives from visual kinaesthesis, vestibular informa-
tion being confirmative only (Gibson 1968; see also Stoffregen &
Riccio 1988). In fact, actual research in the tradition of direct
perception theory has taken this line of thought and confined
itself exclusively to the investigation of optic (or retinal) flow
invariants (see, e.g., Andersen 1990; Cuttingetal. 1992; Gibson
1979; Koenderink 1990; Koenderink & van Doom 1987; Owen
1990; Warren 1990; Wolpert 1990).
3. One might assume that this anomalous invariant remains
unchanged but that the percept changes. This would, however,
imply that there is no one-to-one relation between an invariant
and the percept that results when it is picked up, an implication
that also seems incompatible with direct perception theory.
4. Some authors have proposed that the efference copy may
instead stem from combining these corollaries with afferent
oculomotor feedback (see, e.g., Matin 1982), or even from such
feedback only (e.g, Skavenski 1972). More recent views, how-
ever, tend to agree with the original assumption of Von Hoist
and Mittelstaedt (see, e.g., Mittelstaedt 1990; Steinbach 1987).
5. Note that, although ego motion is usually treated as an
effect, that is, as a perceptual result of a particular action or
stimulation, here it is implied that it also causes some other
effect.
6. Actually, when the retinal signal is just noticeably larger
than the reference signal, the JND might be slightly larger than
when the retinal signal is just noticeably smaller. Such a differ-
ence would be extremely small, however, and is unlikely to be
reliably measurable. In a velocity discrimination experiment,
Sekuler (1990) determined the JND between two moving stim-
ulus patterns (since the eyes of the observer were kept stationary
- they were fixed on a stationary fixation point which disap-
peared at the moment of stimulus presentation - this may have
corresponded to the JND between a retinal signal and a zero
reference signal). She did indeed find that the JNDs for velocity
increments and decrements between the two stimuli were
equal, but during measurements of only speed discrimination
(without, or with degraded, directional motion information),
Sekuler observed that the JND for increments and decrements
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differed, depending on the speed on the criterion pattern. Note
that since we have defined both the retinal and the reference
signals in terms of velocity vectors, which include directional
information, the latter finding need not be contrary to the
present assumption that the JNDs in Equations 1 and 2 may be
considered equal.
7. During saccadic eye movements made across a stimulus,
the threshold for motion of that stimulus increases linearly with
saccadic amplitude (Bridgeman et al. 1975). This suggests that
the present model could also apply to motion perception during
saccades, the dimension defining the size of retinal and refer-
ence signals being amplitude instead of velocity.
8. Mack and Herman (1978) proposed that during the brief
moment when the small stimulus is visible its adjacency to the
fixation point moving across the screen may add to the strength
of the Filehne illusion. However, De Graaf and Wertheim (1988)
showed that this is not the case. Hence this factor is not included
in the present analysis.
9. There is at least one other report in which the Filehne
illusion occurred with a large stimulus pattern that remained
visible for a relatively long duration (Mack & Herman 1973). It is
interesting that, just as in the present experiment, this pattern
contained very high spatial frequency components.
10. Vief is the same in Equations 10 and 11, because only one
eye movement is made. Thus its associated noise level, the
JND, is also the same in these equations. However, a difference
between two noise factors (assuming Gaussian noise) may be
estimated as the square root of their sum of squares. Hence the
noise factor in Equation 12, which represents the noise between
two retinal signals, may be estimated as JNDV2, that is, as
slightly larger than the JND between retinal and reference
signals.
11. J. Lackner and G. P. Amgott-Kwan performed an un-
published experiment in the Department of Psychology at
Brandeis University, Boston, similar to the one proposed here.
Although it served a different purpose and covered only a small
range of stimulus and hand velocities, they did in fact observe a
widening of the no-motion range with faster hand movements.
Their data also suggest a slight overregistration of hand velocity
in the tactile reference signal.
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Analysis of information for 3-D motion
perception: The role of eye movements
George J. Andersen
andersen@ucracl.ucr.edu; Department of Psychology, University of
California at Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521
The model proposed by Wertheim suggests that the use of
extraretinal information (eye movements) is central in the anal-
ysis of motion into object- and self-motion components. Al-
though it is obvious that some type of eye movement informa-
tion must be incorporated in the analysis of retinal motion,
several issues are particularly problematic for the proposed
model.
1. Object motion, self-motion and eye movements. One of
Wertheim's assumptions (also an assumption of other theoretical
approaches of motion perception) is that the primary perceptual
stimulus needed is retinal motion. Retinal motion includes
transformations resulting from motion of objects, motion of the
observer, and global transformations of the retinal image result-
ing from eye movements. Von Kries (1910/1962), in his notes on
the writings of Helmholtz, and more recently McConkie and
Farber (1979), argued that an analysis of retinal motion contain-
ing transformations due to eye movements and object motion
would necessarily result in incorrect recovery of depth and 3-D
shape from motion parallax. The present approach addresses
this problem by comparing a retinal and reference signal. The
accuracy of perceived object motion would depend on the
accuracy of the reference signal. Any error in this signal would
result in misperceived object motion. Although this may not be
a severe problem for simple retinal transformations (e.g., hori-
zontal motion of a frontal parallel surface) it would be partic-
ularly difficult to successfully recover object motion during
complex transformations (e.g., translation in the depth of a
slanted surface).
A second limitation is the use of eye movements in analyzing
transformations resulting from self-motion. According to the
proposed model, an OKN (optokinetic nystagmus) signal is
generated during self-motion that is used with vestibular infor-
mation during head rotation to derive a percept of stationarity in
space. One unusual characteristic of the model is that self-
motion, in terms of eye movements, is determined by activation
of the vestibular system. In contrast, stationarity can be deter-
mined by eye movements activated by either an oculomotor
mechanism (presumably an OKN signal) or the vestibular sys-
tem. However, stationarity resulting from vection saturation
necessarily implies that the observer perceives self-motion.
Thus, self-motion can occur at either output in the model.
This issue aside, the accuracy of perceived stationarity would
certainly depend in part, on the accuracy of the OKN signal in
terms of magnitude and direction. The study by Brandt et al.
(1973), however, suggests that the direction of OKN can be
dissociated from the perceived direction of circular vection.
Subjects were seated in a circular vection drum and required to
fixate a grating pattern in the central visual field which moved in
the same direction or the one opposite to the motion of the
surrounding drum. They found that induced vection was always
determined by the surrounding motion, whereas OKN was
always determined by the direction of the central field stimulus.
These results indicate that OKN can be dissociated from the
perceived direction of induced circular vection (for a discussion
of this issue see Andersen 1986).
A third limitation concerns the application of the model to
complex transformations of the retinal image during locomo-
tion. For the moment, assume that the proposed model does not
have the limitations discussed above. The proposed model is
theoretically sound if the retinal transformations involve homo-
geneous regions of velocity (e.g., transformations resulting from
visual stimulation in a circular vection drum with or without the
initiation of eye movements). However, it would have consider-
able difficulty with transformations resulting from observer
motion through the environment, especially if the environment
contained objects or surfaces undergoing motion independent
of the observer's motion. It is the latter complex cases, in my
opinion, that led Gibson and other researchers to propose
analyses based primarily on visual information.
2. Alternative models and formal analyses of optic flow.
Wertheim argues that direct perception assumes that the per-
cepts derive from retinally conveyed information alone. Gib-
son's analysis of transformations of the optic array, or optic flow,
has traditionally been viewed as information not in the retinal
image but the world or environment. This unique description of
perceptual information has been a source of disagreement and
discussion by advocates of both the direct and the inferen-
tial/information processing approach. In my opinion, this de-
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bate is focused primarily on what a theorist emphasizes as
information. Specifically, the question of whether information is
in the environment or in the retinal image can be addressed by
considering two different classes of models. Let us first examine
them without regard to the semantically loaded labels typically
associated with them. Class I models assume that the informa-
tion is present in the transforming pattern of light and thus in the
environment. Although it is true that information is first avail-
able to the visual system at the retina, and thus is subject to
global transformations resulting from eye movements, this point
is irrelevant, because the information, according to this class of
models, is in the pattern of light. Thus, although this approach
must acknowledge the existence of eye movements, it does not
view the retinal image as the critical level of analysis and does
not consider it to be the appropriate description of information.
According to class II models, on the other hand, the first stage
at which information is available to the visual system is the
retinal image. Hence this must be the first level at which
information can be analyzed. This class of models (e.g., Koen-
derink & van Doom 1976; Longuet-Higgins & Prazdny 1980)
typically involves formal mathematical analyses of the trans-
forming retinal image; but often, as a first stage of analysis, the
transformation of the retinal image is decoupled into translation
and rotation components. The rotational components, which
would be the result of eye movements, are not analyzed.
Instead, the remaining analysis is focused on the translation
components.
It is important to note that although class I and class II models
use information quite differently, they can both be considered as
emphasizing the same information - the transformations of the
optic array separate from the transformations due to eye move-
ments. It is this point that distinguishes the model proposed in
the target article from analyses concerned with optic flow.
Wertheim's model suggests that the analysis must have as a
central component the incorporation of extraretinal information
(eye movements); the class I and II models consider eye move-
ments to be of secondary importance.
In summary, the issues discussed above are particularly prob-
lematic for analyses based on retinal motion. One should not
conclude, however, that eye movements are not important in
perceptual processing. At some level of analysis the visual
system probably has to use information regarding eye move-
ments (whether it be an efference copy signal or a mathematical
analysis involving the decomposition of the transformation into
translational and rotational components) in analyzing transfor-
mations of the visual scene. Although information for eye move-
ments from the vestibular and extraretinal signals certainly are
important in our perception of both object and observer motion
in the 3-D world, it seems likely, given the complexity of these
transformations, that the analysis is primarily visual in nature.
A theory of the perceptual stability of the
visual world rather than of motion perception
Wolfgang Beckera and Thomas Mergner"
awolfgang.becker@medizin.uni-ulm.de and »mergner@sun1 .ruf.uni-
freiburg.de; aSektion Neurophysiologie, UniversitSt Ulm, D-89069 Ulm,
Germany and bAbteilung Neurologie, Albert-Ludwigs-Universita't, D-79104
Freiburg, Germany
In his target article, Wertheim proposes a unifying theory of
motion perception, which he feels reconciles previous theories
that have variously stressed the role of extraretinal signals and of
cues contained in the optic flow. According to Wertheim, the
novel thing about this theory, illustrated by gray arrows in his
Figure 1, is a link between (1) the perception of self-motion and
(2) visuo-oculomotor mechanisms of motion perception. From a
systems engineering point of view this is an almost trivial
postulate: given that the head can move in space, a summation of
a visual object's retinal slip with an extraretinal signal of eye-in-
head velocity (efference copy) can only provide an indication of
object versus head rotation. To arrive at a notion of object-in-
space rotation we obviously need to know head movement in
space. Such knowledge is forwarded by the vestibular system
cooperating with a variety of other sensory channels (neck
proprioceptive, optokinetic, arthrokinetic) and, last but not
least, cognitive mechanisms (Mergner & Becker 1990). Al-
though this cooperation results in perfect registration of self-
motion, and hence of object motion, in most everyday situa-
tions, it can be misled in the laboratory when its fundamental
premise - long-term stability of the visual surround as a repre-
sentation of the "world' - is violated; the resulting illusions that
afflict the perception of head motion in space also distort the
perception of object motion, in a manner that can be predicted
from its dependence on head-in-space representation (Mergner
et al. 1992). Thus, we cannot but agree with Wertheim's basic
postulate, which is a logical consequence of the head's mobility.
However, as we shall discuss below, this is not to say that we
agree with all of Wertheim's views.
Wertheim's experimental and conceptual approach mixes up
two related yet not identical issues, (1) the perceptual stability of
the world during eye movements and (2) the perception and
quantification of object motion in space. It is debatable whether
his experimental approach does not bias the study of (1), and it
appears inappropriate for (2). In fact, except for saccades (and for
some unphysiological conditions such as spontaneous
nystagmus), people do not make spontaneous eye movements
across a visual scene. Such movements occur only when they
track a stimulus ("visual object") moving relative to the back-
ground ("scene"); in doing so, their attention is normally focused
on the object but not the scene.
In asking his subjects (Ss) to report movements of the back-
ground (the stimulus in his terminology) while pursuing a
moving fixation point, Wertheim must have dissociated their
orientations of gaze and of visual attention. However, the
perceptions of self-motion, object motion, and scene motion
may depend strongly on where visual attention is directed.
Under a variety of experimental conditions we have observed
that Ss who concentrate on delivering concurrent indications of
self-motion and object motion in space during stimulation will
report that the scene was stationary when questioned on their
perception of scene motion after termination of the stimulus; in
contrast, when instructed to give a concurrent indication of the
scene's behaviour they will perceive it as moving in space and
will change their judgments of object and ego motion so as to
restore compatibility with both the scene-in-space and object-
versus-scene perceptions (Mergner & Becker 1990). Thus, if we
assume, for lack of relevant details on experimental procedures,
that Wertheim's Ss were instructed to watch background stabil-
ity during their eye movements, the thresholds he reports may
underestimate those occurring in "natural" situations.
By a similar argument, in order to investigate and quantify the
perception of object motion we must, in the first place, focus the
perceptual inquiry on actual objects rather than on the scene.
Otherwise, given (1) that registration of self-motion is an indis-
pensable prerequisite for judging object motion in space and (2)
that scene motion conflicts with the working hypothesis of the
movement-in-space channel (stationarity of the world), we risk
obtaining a distorted picture of object behaviour. Clearly, we do
not doubt Wertheim's experimental results, which are valuable
and consistent as such, but we insist that they be correctly
labeled: they concern the perceived motion of a visual stimulus
the eye is not tracking because it is engaged in the pursuit of
another stimulus; unless positive evidence is given, they are not
applicable to the movement of the stimulus that is being
pursued.
Wertheim realizes that the perception of self-motion depends
on a visual-vestibular interaction. Unfortunately, his description
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of the visual component of this interaction (the "gating mecha-
nism ") remains rather vague; except for some qualitative indica-
tions, we are given no estimates for its time constant, its gain, its
dependence on stimulus characteristics, and the mode of inter-
action with the vestibular signal.
There are obvious reasons to ask for such details. We take it
from Wertheim's description that with presentation times of
more than 300 msec the gating mechanism begins to contribute
significantly to the reference signal suggesting a time constant of
less than 1 sec. Furthermore, its contribution is said to establish
a total gain of the reference channel of about unity; given an
efference copy of 0.7-0.8- V , one would infer a gain of 0.2-0.3
for the gating mechanism. On the other hand, the building up of
activity in the optokinetic channel during sustained rotation of a
scene, to a level where it can no longer be distinguished from
the retinal signal, is viewed as the cause for the emergent
perception of scene stationarity and the concomitant circular
vection (CV); for this interpretation to hold, the optokinetic
contribution ought to have a gain of about unity and a time
constant considerably in excess of 1 sec.
Wertheim claims that the optokinetic contribution to his
reference signal explains center-surround induced motion
(Duncker illusion; Duncker 1929) and dissolves the distinction
between "subject-relative" and "object-relative" motion. If we
take this claim and Figure 1 at face value, the illusory perception
of object motion in space that is evoked by an optokinetic
movement behind the stationary object should disappear if the
optokinetic contribution to the reference signal is balanced by
an efference copy of opposite direction.
However, (unpublished) results from our laboratory strongly
suggest that this is not the case. We presented Ss with a
sinusoidal rotation of an optokinetic pattern, and with an (ini-
tially) stationary light spot in front of the moving pattern which
they were to fixate. Invariably this stimulation led Ss to experi-
ence an object-in-space rotation. Ss were then to move the
object, by means of a joy stick, in the opposite direction while a
constant scene-to-object motion was maintained (by an appro-
priate coupling of the object and scene actuators), until the
object would appear stationary. None of our Ss (N = 6) was able
to perceptually stabilize the object by this procedure although,
using a similar method, all could nullify vestibular and neck-
proprioceptive illusions of object motion (cf. Mergner et al.
1992). Ss continuously increased the physical spot excursions up
to a manifold of the retinal stimulus without major effects on
perceived object motion in space. It is interesting that during
the later course of such trials a strong CV and motion sickness
would develop.
These observations suggest that visual capture and object-
relative cues constitute a powerful and separate system of
object-motion perception that is (1) not accessible to oculomotor
efferent signals and may (2) contradict oculomotor and vestibu-
lar cues or (3) change their interpretation. To illustrate point (3)
we note that naive Ss who are presented with an object and a
scene that rotate together in a sinusoidal manner will veridically
perceive both object and scene as rotating in space and will
experience no CV. In contrast, when the object is moving at a
different velocity or when it is fixed in space, a CV develops, but
only secondary to the (illusory) percept of object-in-space mo-
tion evoked by the relative motion between object and scene
(Mergner & Becker 1992, p. 231).
A further argument against Wertheim's explanation of the
Duncker illusion comes from the observation that center-
surround motion also induces marked percepts of object-in-
space motion at frequencies (e.g., 1 Hz) that would seem to
exceed the cut-off frequency of his gating mechanism (again, one
would like to know its characteristics).
To explain a variety of phenomena Wertheim invokes his
hypothesis of a dead zone ("JND") affecting the reference signal
and growing in proportion to its magnitude. It is unclear,
however, whether he also envisages a JND for his retinal signal -
if Weber's law is invoked for the reference signal why not also for
the retinal one?
In the context of relative motion perception it becomes
unclear where in the topology of Figure 1 we are to assume the
JND. By estimating the JND for the perception of velocity
differences to equal about V2-times the JND for perception of
movement in space, Wertheim seems to suggest that the signals
Vrei-Vreti and Vrel-Vlel2 are first subtracted from each other (the
difference then would have V2-times the noise of Vrcl) before
applying the dead zone, which would therefore be located after
his comparator mechanism. The preceding paragraphs, how-
ever, suggest that the dead zone operates on the V1(.rinput to
the comparator, sparing the retinal input. Also, on the basis of
Equation 12 one would conclude the constant in Equation 13 to
be of the order of JND-V2/Vre, or 0.14 (Fig. 2 suggests a value
of 0.1-Vret for JND); however, the value taken from Figure 5 is of
the order of 0.5.
A final comment concerns the vestibular contribution to the
hypothesized reference signal. It is surprising that the vestibu-
lar registration of head velocity in space should have a gain of
more than unity (cf. Equation 19) at a frequency as low as 0.05
Hz. We and others have observed clearly lower gain values (cf.
Mergner et al. 1991, p. 393; 1992, p. 659). We suspect that the
presentation of the visual scene at regular intervals and always
during the same phase of the vestibular stimulus may have
helped to establish almost the same notion of head-in-space
velocity as its permanent visibility would have evoked.
Finally, still in the context of visual-vestibular interaction, it is
surprising that some well-considered theories of visual-
vestibular interaction such as the conflict model of Zacharias and
Young (1981) or descriptions of basic principles of perceptual
stability of the visual world (Bischof 1974) are not even men-
tioned by Wertheim.
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In the attempt to reinforce the behavioral validity of the tradi-
tional inferential theory of perception, Wertheim has reconsid-
ered the nature of the extraretinal signal. The reference signal,
instead of the extraretinal one, is assumed to encode information
about eye movement relative to external space together with
visual spatiotemporal and vestibular motion information. Al-
though this novel position appears reasonable and is capable of
explaining some contradictory experimental findings, it faces
serious problems, both old and new.
The basic assumption of the traditional inferential theory is
the egocentric, mostly oculocentric, representation of the exter-
nal world; that is, to be compatible, the metrics of both the
retinal and the hypothesized extraretinal signals must be de-
fined in visual angles. Wertheim accepts that "we see a stable
world during eye movements because retinal and extraretinal
signals are equal: the velocity of the image of the world across
the retinae equals the velocity of the eyes" (sect. 1, para. 1).
However, even under conditions in which the eye rotates
around a fixed center, the two signals do not operate in the same
metric.
The above claim is derived from the fact that the eye's rotation
center does not coincide with the eye's nodal point. So when the
eye rotates a certain angular distance, the corresponding shift in
the retinal image of a stationary object will actually be a fraction
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of that angle. In terms of visual directions, the ratio could be up
to 1:2. The same ratio will hold for foveal velocity during smooth
pursuit of a moving target and for the target's retinal velocity
relative to the stationary eye. Jung (1972), who first advanced
this line of argument, used it to explain the Aubert-Flieschl
phenomenon. This can also be considered the source of the
Filehne illusion. As a consequence, we must assume that recal-
ibration of the extraretinal signal is a precondition for visual
stability during eye movements.
The discrepancy between the center of rotation and the nodal
point of the eye high-lights the role of another factor that is
usually underestimated by the inferential theory, the target's
distance. Two targets at different distances which were previ-
ously on one visual axis lose this identity of their visual direc-
tions after an eye movement (Howard 1982, p. 278, Fig. 7.1).
This means that retinal velocity during eye movement is a
function of the target's distance. This factor could play an
important role in contradictory demonstrations of the Filehne
illusion: it is much easier to experience the illusion when the
moving target and the background are located in different planes
than when they are in the same plane.
The situation becomes more complicated when someone tries
to define the metrics of eye movement relative to external space.
Wertheim introduces the vector signal of head movement in
coordinates of 3-D "Newtonian" space (sect. 5.3, para. 1). It is
not difficult to show that the metrics of head rotation differ from
the oculomotor and retinal vector metrics even when a subject is
sitting upright and turning his head and eyes around a vertical
axis. If we also take into account translational head movements
(because the head has 6 degrees of freedom), this raises the
question of the metrics of the reference signal. We must agree
that Wertheim's Equation 9 is accurate only if the dimension-
alities of its terms are the same. However, Vest s and Vref are
encoded in the metrics of the exocentric coordinate system
whereas Vrel is encoded in oculocentric terms. Moreover, in
general, there is no universal transfer rule for transforming one
coordinate system into another: the rule depends on the relative
positions and movements of the observer and the external
objects. This point was in fact crucial for Gibsons rejection of
geometrical optics in favor of his ecological position (Gibson
1979).
The acceptance of a visual component of the reference signal
reflects the proved significance of visual feedforward in visual
stability processing in addition to visual feedback (e.g., Be-
lopolsky 1978; MacKay 1973). Unfortunately, this claim cannot
be formalized in terms of vector algebra (see sect. 6.5, para. 1)
and leads to the redundant duplication (or triplication?) of visual
pathways in the proposed model in the target article.
According to the proposed model, the reference signal has no
sensory correlate; it is used only to cancel, completely or
partially, the retinal signal. As a result, its role is purely visual
rearrangement. The sensations of self-movement or self-
stability come through a parallel branch of the information
processing system, although the reference signal itself contains
all necessary data. The model does not provide any special
mechanism for the coordination of visual and ego movement in
space. For example, the model is rather efficient in explaining
the time course of background motion perception (assuming
variability in Vref gain) but fails to explain movement of
eye/head/body egocenters during the circular vection illusion.
It is worth noting that direct perception theory manages this
problem by considering the observer's body parts as the context
of the optical array (Gibson 1979).
The most challenging problem for both theories remains the
nature of eye or, more appropriately, gaze positional sense, by
which I mean the human's ability to hold, reorient, and locate
the position of attentional focus in space. Direct perception
theory does not indicate the body's landmark connected with
the gaze direction (this cannot be derived simply as the center of
the optical array). On the other hand, this sense cannot be
identified with an extraretinal or a proposed reference signal.
Two examples will illustrate this idea. First, when the stabilized
retinal image subtends a large visual angle (> 40 deg of arc), eye
movements do not change its apparent spatial location, as occurs
with a smaller image. Especially interesting is the fact that, in
both cases, subjects experience their gaze as moving in space
(Belopolsky 1985; Zinchenko & Vergiles 1972). Second, when
voluntary eye movements are made as the subject examines
meaningless texture patterns through an artificially reduced (up
to 3-5 deg of arc) central visual field, the visual world is
perceived as movable relative to the stationary gaze (Belopolsky
1978).
In summary, Wertheim's target article provides a subtle
analysis of the direct versus inferential perception controversy.
However, the attempt to resolve the controversy on the basis of
inferential theory has made it too complicated and flexible to be
an effective tool for predicting perceptual experience in certain
conditions.
Biological perception of self-motion
Ronald G. Boothe
boothe@rmy.emory.edu; Departments of Psychology and Ophthalmology
and the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center, Emory University,
Atlanta, GA 30322
The schematic in the upper right hand corner of Figure 1
illustrates a view of a retinal image in which an element moves
from point X to point Y. There are three ways this retinal image
movement could have come about. The first, illustrated in the
upper left of Figure 1, is that the head and eye remained steady
and that an object in the environment moved from A to B. The
second, illustrated in the lower left, is that the object and the eye
remained steady, but that the head moved from A to B. The
third, illustrated in the lower right, is that the object and the
head remained steady, but the eye rotated in the socket from
position A to B. Thus, the perceptual system of a biological
organism that has such an eye is confronted with an ambiguity.
How does it decide what this movement from X to Y an the
retinal image means in terms of what is happening in the
environment?
There are two general theories about how this perceptual
problem might be solved. Direct perception theories state that
there are lots of other elements moving in the retinal image at
the same time as this particular one we are focusing our atten-
tion on, and that the information potentially available from all
these moving elements (the optic flow) is sufficient to disen-
tangle the various environmental sources that gave rise to these
movements in the retinal image. Inferential theories state that
the brain uses extraretinal sources of information to estimate
head movement (derived from vestibular system input) and eye
movement (derived from copies of motor efference). When
these extraretinal sources are subtracted from the retinal mo-
tion, the remainder can be interpreted as movement of objects
in the environment.
Wertheim points out that both these theories have problems
accounting for some perceptual illusions that involve vection.
He offers an alternative model that attempts to solve these
problems by introducing the concept of a "reference signal." His
alternative model relies on input from the optokinetic system to
supplement the extraretinal information used by the inferential
theories. He cites empirical data obtained in laboratory settings
that support the predictions of his model. There are problems in
generalizing Wertheim's model to more general ecological con-
ditions, however, because the optokinetic system does not
provide the requisite information except under specialized
conditions.
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Figure 1 (Boothe). Schematic illustration of three environ-
mental sources of retinal motion.
I illustrate the reason for this in Figure 2. The schematic at the
top of the figure shows an eye that is viewing three large trees.
Low spatial frequencies from these trees form images in the
retina, illustrated in the schematic in the middle of the figure.
The left bottom schematic illustrates what happens to the retinal
image when the trees are stationary and the eye or head is
rotated. This retinal motion provides the input to the optokine-
tic system that Wertheim uses in his model to explain the
vection illusion. However, the right bottom schematic illus-
trates what happens to the retinal image when the trees and the
eyes are stationary and the head translates, as would happen in
the example Wertheim uses of a train engineer. There are three
different velocities generated here, one for each tree. Which of
these velocities is Wertheim going to plug into the optokinetic
system to help generate Vref? It is obvious that the information
needed by Wertheim's model is not going to be provided by the
optokinetic system under general ecological conditions. This
only works for specialized conditions in the laboratory, such as
when the movements feeding into the optokinetic system are all
generated by objects that happen to be at the same distance
from the observer.
Mother Nature has no interest in conforming to our theories
of perception. She is only concerned with picking up informa-
tion that has been demonstrated to be important for survival
over evolutionary time. She is therefore unlikely to care
whether the information available to the brain is of retinal or
extraretinal origin (a distinction that is important to direct
perception theorists). On the other hand, she is not likely to be
very interested in trying to figure out the meaning of informa-
tion that would only be available in artificial laboratory environ-
ments and not in the environment in which evolution took place
(conditions that are sometimes used to test predictions of infer-
ential theories). When presented with a complicated set of
retinal and extraretinal stimulations in a laboratory environ-
ment, a biological system is likely to interpret the information in
terms of what external conditions would have to have been
present in the environment in which evolution took place in
Figure 2 (Boothe). Schematic illustration of optokinetic stim-
ulation produced in the ordinary environment when the eye is
rotated, but not when the head is translated.
order for that pattern of stimulation to have occurred. Given this
rationale, there is no reason we should be surprised by the fact
that when seated in a drum in a laboratory in which the retinal
stimulation is as in the lower left of Figure 2, and the efference
copy in the brain indicates that the eyes are still, and the
vestibular system input indicates that there is no acceleration,
and this pattern of stimulation continues for some time, vection
occurs. The only condition that could have occurred in the
environment in which our species evolved that would give rise
to this sustained pattern of stimulation would be if the world
were stationary and we were spinning around at a constant rate.
Extending reference signal theory
to rapid movements
Bruce Bridgemana and Jean Blouinb
<•bruceb@cats.ucsc.edu and >>taboscm@fmnrs11.bitnet; "Department of
Psychology, University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064
and "Laboratoire de Controle Sensorimoteur CNRS, D6partement de
Neuroscience, University de Provence, Marseille 13397, France
Wertheim's view of motion perception brings together a wealth
of observations and theory that have accumulated over several
decades, synthesizing them into a comprehensive model. The
present model is aimed at smooth self-motion and continuous
eye movements. We would like to begin the process of extend-
ing the model to ballistic bodily movements and saccadic eye
movements as well, and on the sensory side to address percep-
tion of abrupt jumps of visual targets.
Reference signal theory predicts that the relative contribution
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of retinal and extraretinal signals for motion perception is a
function of the presence or absence of relative motion cues
during movement. In a normal structured visual environment,
retinal signals provide the dominant information processed by
the brain for perceiving the motion of a visual object. In a dark
room (i.e., when no relative motion cues are provided), how-
ever, extraretinal signals necessarily dominate. In the latter
condition, Wertheim assumes that the reference signal for
processing space constancy emerges from a combination of
signals from different sources capable of providing an estimate of
how the eyes move in space (e.g., efference copy of the oculomo-
tor outflow, vestibular signals).
Problems of information pickup around saccadic eye move-
ments are fundamentally different from those around smooth
movements because vision and velocity estimation continue
during smooth movements while both of these are interrupted
or suppressed during saccades. In an accompanying BBS target
article, Bridgeman, Van der Heijden, and Velichkovsky (this
issue) propose that quantitative subtraction of retinal and extra-
retinal signals before and after a saccadic eye movement is not
necessary — rather, all sources of spatial information are simply
used during a new fixation to provide perceptual and motor
orientation. Nevertheless, we suggest that a richness of informa-
tion sources exists for calibrating perception and visually guided
behavior surrounding saccadic and other ballistic movements.
Recently, we have examined empirically whether signals that
do not provide information about how the eyes move in space can
nevertheless inform the perception of spatial position. More
specifically, in a dark room we tested whether saccadic suppres-
sion of displacement is modified in combining eye and arm
movements toward a small target shifted during a saccade
(Blouin et al., submitted). The arm movements were rapid and
visually open-loop. After they jabbed a pointer at the target's
position, subjects judged whether a small visual target had been
displaced during the saccade. We found that the perceptual
threshold of target displacements increased when subjects re-
sponded with combined eye and arm movements compared to a
situation with only saccadic eye movements. Signals arising
from the sensorimotor arm system hence reached the spatial
processing system and increased perceptual stability of visual
world.
In this experiment, subjects corrected most of their arm
trajectory toward the displaced targets. Error messages about
the programmed movements (i.e., eye and arm) therefore
reached the eye and arm motor control systems without being
perceived. Nevertheless, they served to amend the motor
responses rapidly in relation to the new target position through
short latency secondary eye movements and online corrections
of the arm trajectory. Following the movements, the null error
signal issued from the sensorimotor arm system presumably
overlapped the postsaccadic retino-oculomotor error signal at
the conscious level and a stabilized environment was perceived.
Terminal hand position error was then interpreted as being
within the range of normal endpoint dispersion associated with
the production of rapid arm movements rather than a change of
the environment. All these processes involve evaluation of
retinal and extraretinal signals after the completion of the
saccade and the arm movement, rather than pre- and postmove-
ment comparisons.
These results are in agreement with Wertheim's model and
provide further evidence that space perception is not restricted
to the visual modality, especially in the absence of relative
motion cues. Rather, the results argue for a supramodal spatial
processing in which multiple nonvisual mechanisms are closely
involved, including those that do not provide information about
the position of the eyes in space. Specifically, this experiment
reveals that the processing and updating of spatial information
seem not only to take into account movements that change
position of the eyes in space, such as eye, head, or locomotor
movements (as emphasized in Wertheim's target article), but
also spatially goal-directed arm movements that do not affect eye
position in space.
An additional result speaks to the influence of extraretinal
signals on perception. Judgments that the target had not
jumped were most frequent when the target indeed failed to
jump, that is, perception of target displacement during the
saccade was veridical except for the increased displacement
threshold. This was true only when the eye and arm were moved
simultaneously, even if the arm movement was mechanically
interrupted just as it began. Thus an efference copy of the
corrected arm movement must have informed the visual system
about the extent of the target displacement. When only the eye
moved, however, judgments that the target had not jumped
were most frequent when the target actually jumped slightly in
the direction opposite the saccade. This result shows that the
arm movement did not serve merely to increase displacement
thresholds nonspecifically, but altered the perception of posi-
tion. The underconstancy is consistent with the finding of
Bridgeman and Stark (1991) that the combined gains of effer-
ence copy and oculomotor proprioception are less than one in an
unstructured field.
The difference between our arm movement condition and our
no arm movement condition is analogous to Wertheim's measure
of the midpoint of the subthreshold range and again shows that
arm movement efference copy and proprioception contribute to
perceptual judgment. The details of the saccadic and the smooth
movement system are different, but the general principle of
combining multiple information sources seems to be the same.
Ego- and object-motion perception: Where
does it take place?
U. Buttner and A. Straube
u7x31aa@sunmail.lrz-muenchen.dbp.de; Department of Neurology,
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Klinikum Grosshadem, 81377 Munich 70,
Genvany
Vestibular stimulation leads to the sensation of ego (self)-
motion, whereas visual stimulation can lead to both object- and
ego-motion perception. Thus a multimodal visual and vestibular
interaction should be the neuronal basis for ego-motion percep-
tion. There is a vast literature on neuronal activity related to
visual-vestibular interaction that includes many articles refer-
ring to object and ego motion. In this commentary it will be
argued that despite the vast and "sufficiently complex" literature
on this topic, there is still a lack of satisfactory evidence for a
signal that might be related to the sensation of ego motion. In
particular, the question of a primarily cortical or subcortical
interaction is still under discussion.
The fact that neurons that respond to both visual and vestibu-
lar stimulation have been recorded in the vestibular nuclei in
the brainstem (Waespe & Henn 1987) has been taken as an
indication that a reference signal for visually-induced ego mo-
tion is present in the brain. However, there are several points of
evidence against such an assumption. In particular, the follow-
ing factors must be considered:
1. Eye movements: Vestibular and visual stimuli that induce
ego motion also lead to eye movements, that is, nystagmus. In
many studies, a distinction cannot be made whether activity
might be related to the eye or to a reference signal for ego-
motion velocity. Visually induced ego motion (vection) of con-
siderable magnitude also occurs during the suppression of
nystagmus (Botzel & Griisser 1982). Under certain conditions,
slow phase nystagmus velocity and vection, which are normally
in opposite directions, can be dissociated (Brandt et al. 1974).
No studies specifically addressing these points have been per-
formed and hence results indicative of an ego-motion reference
signal have not been established (Buettner & Buttner 1979). It
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should be stressed that in subcortical structures highly specific
signals can also be encoded; for example, Purkinje cells (Pcs) in
the oculomotor verinis of the cerebellum have been found to
encode target velocity during head, eye, and target motion
(Suzuki & Keller 1988).
2. Location: Neuronal correlates of a reference signal for ego
motion should be expected specifically in cortical structures
rather than in the brainstem. In recent years, many vestibular
cortical areas have been delineated (Guldin et al. 1992): the
parieto-insular vestibular cortex (PIVC), area 3aV, area 2v, and
parietotemporal association area T3. In most of these areas
neuronal evidence for visual-vestibular interaction has also been
found (Buttner & Buettner 1978, Buttner & Henn 1981; Grusser
et al. 1990a; 1990b). For most of these areas, however, a specific
functional role has not been established, particularly in relation
to a reference signal for ego motion. They are probably not
primarly involved in the generation of vestibular system-related
eye movements. Some might be involved in the vestibular and
visual control of posture, and others might encode motion;
however, there are no results indicating a specific relation to the
encoding of vection.
Another important but unanswered question concerns where
the convergence of vestibular and visual signals relevant for
vection takes place. It has been postulated that visual-vestibular
signals from the vestibular nuclei are transferred to cortical
areas via thalamic nuclei. However, only very sparse projections
from the vestibular nuclei to the thalamus have been found
(Lang et al. 1979). At present, it appears likely that visual signals
relevant to vection originate in cortical areas and converge at the
cortical level with vestibular signals (Straube & Brandt 1987). As
one would expect from these concepts, visually induced ego-
motion sensation is lost in patients with parieto-temporal lesions
when visual stimulation is restricted to the ipsilateral visual
cortex (Straube & Brandt 1987).
As mentioned above, it is not quite clear by which routes the
vestibular signals enter the cortex. Descending pathways from
cortical vestibular areas to the vestibular nuclei have been
recently demonstrated (Guldin et al. 1992). These pathways
might be involved in the cortical control of posture, but their
relation to vection is unknown.
3. Temporal and physical aspects: To demonstrate a neuronal
signal encoding vection, it is also important to consider temporal
aspects of vection. Vestibular neurons carry a signal related to
the velocity-storage mechanism during optokinetic stimulation
(Cohen et al. 1977; Waespe & Henn 1987). Such signals have not
been encountered in cortical vestibular areas (Buttner & Henn
1981; Grusser et al. 1990a; 1990b). Velocity-storage signals can
be best related to eye movement parameters rather than to
vection. They usually have a buildup of several seconds,
whereas under certain stimulus conditions ego-motion sensa-
tion can have latencies of less than 1 second (Straube et al. 1990).
It has also been shown that visually induced ego-motion percep-
tion depends on stereo-optical perceived depth (Wist et al.
1975). Such stereo-optical visual responses are found only in the
visual cortex.
Recently, attempts have been made to train monkeys to signal
a distinction between visually induced ego and object motion
(Mergner, personal communication). With these experiments it
appears feasible to record neuronal activity which can be related
either to ego or object motion. Thus, at present, the challenge is
to provide neurophysiological evidence for the theories and
concepts as shown in Wertheim's Figure 7. Until then, the
present neurophysiological data cannot be taken to support of
any of the theories related to vection.
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Sensor fusion in motion perception
David Coombs
david.coombs@nist.gov; Robot Systems Division, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899
A goal of robotics is to discover principles that enable systems to
behave robustly in complex domains, and animals offer rich
examples of such systems to study. Wertheim's theory elegantly
unifies empirical data and existing theories. It is satisfying to see
the theory grounded in the neurophysiological structures that
have so far been implicated, since implementation feasibility is
important. Nevertheless, speculation on additional cues to mo-
tion perception might be reasonable. Vision is the primary cue
to perceiving motion of objects, but there are several possible
clues to ego motion (motor efference from eye, neck, and body,
vestibular and otolith afference, oculomotor kinesthesis, visual
afference, and expectations) and these may influence the per-
ception of motion in general if they help inform ego-motion
estimation. Ideally, a robot would perceive motion and behave
appropriately. The system would attempt to assimilate sensory
data from several modalities to estimate the motion of the
creature itself, and of nearby objects. Human motion percep-
tion can be considered from this viewpoint.
Suppose that one drives a car over a bumpy road. The largest
visual flows indicate forward translation, yet the vestibular and
otolith systems do not. They indicate accelerations of the head
with respect to a coordinate system (CS) that is a low-pass
filtered (smoothed) version of the (bouncing) car CS, since the
subject has reached a steady velocity and is no longer accelerat-
ing. There are three possibilities. The vestibular and otolith
signals fully describe the subject's motion and a large segment of
the world is moving rapidly past the subject; or there is a steady
state component of the subject's motion to which the vestibular
and otolith organs no longer respond; or both the subject and the
scene are moving with respect to the world. How does the
system choose a combination of ego motion and object motion
that accounts for the observations?
Two obvious policies are to take the most likely interpretation
based on experience, and to make the most conservative judg-
ment with respect to the creature's safety. The creature must
presume that it can influence its motion, so it might as well
attribute perceived coherent large-field motion to ego motion
and behave accordingly. If it cannot control the relative motion,
its response will be irrelevant, but if it can, it might avoid
colliding with trees, for instance. It might be argued, then, that
the safe interpretation is to attribute the recent history of
sensory cues to ego motion.
A crucial element of Wertheim's model is the incorporation of
the sensory data histories and the resulting interactions. The
temporal characteristics of each cue might be considered. What
determines the spatiotemporal properties of the optokinetic
signal that contributes to perception of ego motion? Certainly
the range of image flows that can be used is limited by the range
that can be perceived, but is use of the data further limited? It
has been noted (Howard 1982) that the sense of vection approx-
imately follows the time course of the decay of the vestibular
system's response to constant rotation of the body. These spa-
tiotemporal response characteristics of complementary signals
such as vestibular data might be natural for limiting the use of
visual signals to charge up the eye ego-motion reference signal.
Suppose that image flows corresponding to ego motions below
the sensitivity of the vestibular system contribute to the refer-
ence signal immediately and faster flows contribute to the
reference signal only after the vestibular system could be ex-
pected to fall silent. Then vection would be induced imme-
diately at accelerations below the sensitivity of the vestibular
system. Vection would result later for larger accelerations only
after the history of conflicting vestibular data is sufficiently old
that the subject may have been slowly accelerated, undetected
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by the vestibular system. Thus, motion would be attributed to
both the subject and the scene until enough time has passed so
that the subjects motion alone could account for the visual
motion.
Consider the extinction of vection in an ordinary situation.
Suppose one is sitting in a train and an adjacent train begins to
move, inducing vection. When one looks up and sees that
another train (and not one's own) is moving, the vection is
extinguished. What factors could have extinguished vection? It
could not have been vestibular sensations resulting from looking
up, or they would also suppress the veridical perception of ego
motion when one's train does begin to move. Again, there are
three cases. The other train moves, one's own train moves, and
both trains coincidentally begin to move at the same time. When
one looks out the window, one can presumably determine
whether either or both of the trains are moving against the
ground and trees. (It might be interesting to know whether
there is a difference in the reaction times to extinguish vection
and to confirm veridical ego motion.) This example suggests that
some sensory fusion occurs at a high level even if it is not
necessarily required for behavioral responses. It further con-
firms that in ordinary behavior, the creature may actively seek
out additional information to assess the situation. There is a
related question I would like to consider. When a person
experiences vection in a parked car, a common reaction seems to
be stomping on the brake pedal before looking up to determine
whether the car is in fact rolling. Does a train passenger ever
stab at an imaginary brake pedal at the onset of vection? If not,
then this suggests that low-level "reflexive" reactions to ego-
motion perception are influenced by high-level contextual ex-
pectations. It may be impossible to decouple models of motion
perception from models of behavior and expectation; it seems
likely that higher-level models will be necessary to predict many
observed behaviors.
Direct perception theory needs to
include computational reasoning, not
extraretinal information
Niels da Vitoria Lobo
niels@bohr.cs.ucf.edu; Department of Computer Science, University of
Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816
I will argue two points. The first is that neither direct perception
theory nor Wertheim's theory needs extraretinal (oculomotor)
information to achieve the explanatory power desired. Second,
both theories need a stronger role for inferential reasoning,
along the lines of the target theory's comparator mechanism.
[See also Ullman: "Against Direct Perception" BBS 3(3) 1980.]
Examine Wertheim's functional model (outlined in his Fig. 1).
The main disagreement I raise concerns how it is that eye
velocity becomes known (to generate the reference signal); I will
argue that retinal motion information suffices for the task. If one
considers the model in Figure 1 minus the efference copy
pathway from the oculomotor mechanism, then, with one ex-
ception, all of the claimed new explanatory power still holds.
The exception appears to be the argument presented at the
beginning of section 5.2 regarding a horizontal line through
Figure 3. It would seem that this argument about the results in
Figure 3 necessitates oculomotor input. This is deceptive.
Examine carefully the conditions under which the experiments
pertaining to Figure 3 were performed. They (and others with
similar findings) took place in front of screens with visible
borders. Hence, when nonzero eye velocity is used, border
effects allow the computation of eye velocity from purely retinal
image flow information. The claim that retinal velocity (of the
stimulus) is kept constant (when considering the horizontal line
through Fig. 3) is accordingly true only for a portion of the
retinal array. Invariants present in retinal flow do not stay the
same when moving across the horizontal line of Figure 3.
There is computational evidence that retinal flow does suffice
for obtaining ego motion of the eyes (which can generate the
reference signal needed for the comparator mechanism). Novel
methods for computing ego motion and alternatives to the target
theory's comparator mechanism for detecting (independent)
object motion from purely retinal flow have been presented
recently (da Vitoria Lobo 1992; da Vitoria Lobo & Tsotsos 1991).
[See also Tsotsos: "Analyzing Vision at the Complexity Level"
BBS 13(3) 1990.] The key idea behind the alternatives to the
comparator mechanism can be expressed as follow: the argu-
ments are made at the level of description of three-dimensional
motion. For a purely translating eye, any retinal flow (at a point
in the image) with a component perpendicular to a radial line
from the FOE (focus of expansion) must be due to independent
object motion. For an eye that translates and rotates simul-
taneously, a three-point computation that cancels rotation suf-
fices to detect independent motion. The computation of ego
motion by this approach of cancelling rotation is similarly simple
and efficient. The only departure from direct perception theory
in that work is that the notion of computation (and hence
representation) is needed, something that die-hard direct per-
ception proponents appear to deny.
The second point of this commentary is related to the above.
The target article seems to be right in suggesting that the
stationarity tendency of large stimuli arises from their large
optokinetic potential. The problem with relying on this as the
complete story is that other phenomena will not be explained.
Consider, for example, the explanation offered for the moving
train experience: the window containing the moving train acts as
the optokinetic stimulus for experiencing ego motion. First, one
can observe that one does not typically experience ego motion
every time one sits in front of a movie screen (even though its
field of view is at least as large as that of a moving train). Second,
one can experience ego motion when peering out the small
window of a stationary docked airplane if the adjacent plane
begins to move. Both these observations seem to suggest the use
of expectation as a factor in deciding the final interpretation of
retinal input data, the final interpretation being one that satisfies
the most factors and wins out among competing interpretations
(hypotheses). It appears that computational inferential reason-
ing is necessary to achieve this.
Ambiguities in mathematically modelling the
dynamics of motion perception
Robert A. M. Gregson
rag655@cscgpo.anu.edu.au; Department of Psychology, Australian
National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia
This is a valuable review of experiments whose ingenuity is
impressive. It is always a pleasure to read carefully described
results which irrevocably undermine simplistic theories of per-
ception; without such results the exercise of constructing mathe-
matical models can become vacuous.
Wertheim's coverage of motion perception, which interlocks
in ways we do not fully understand with the perception of space
(Dzhafarov 1992), advances analyses at two levels; vector sum-
mation of velocities and flow diagrams. It is purely with his use of
mathematics that I seek clarification. I have no objections to his
use of deterministic as opposed to stochastic algebra, but my
first difficulty arises in his Equations (17) and (18) in section 5.3.
Let us rearrange (17) to read
Vesn.s = Vrc/ - Vrel2 - VjMma., + V,,,mJ., + A14JND [17A]
There is a problem here in that a JND is traditionally inter-
preted (as Wertheim does in the last paragraph of sect. 5.2) as a
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minimum sort of quantal jump which is modulo 1 (that is, it can
only take integer values), so a quantity less than unity is by
definition zero. Perhaps Wertheim is not using JND in that
sense here, but as some second-order discontinuity in the
system. Now, (17)-(18) gives
V,r,2 + Vs,i,,,2, = Vcjes.s + V2/ND [17B]
But if we do rearrange to get [17B], how do we interpret this? Is
there a constant difference between VelJCSS and the l.h.s. of
[17B], or is this a vector sum equation in which the resultant of
the l.h.s. always predicts Vcyl:ss with a fixed (vectorial) disparity,
which Wertheim calls a noise factor in his discussion of (12) in
section 5.3? Equation [17B] is as I have written it; if I can in his
algebra add JNDs linearly and not vectorially, then I can take
.414 JND to be zero and get
Vr,,2 + Vslh,e., = Veljes., + JND [17C]
If I cannot take (17) and (18) as simultaneous equations, then this
is an interesting algebra, but there seem to be implicit rules in
the manipulation of the equations which need spelling out,
perhaps as some sort of axiom.
I accept that the kinetics of visual motion involves eyes
movement, object movement, and perceived motion, but I find
ambiguities in how to represent the system's properties alge-
braically. I find more interesting Wertheim's observations that
the process of moving into dynamic equilibrium in motion
perception is not instantaneous (of course, in a biological system
it would be amazing if it were); the vector equations are thus
representations of the outcome of a process, and not a process
description in themselves. Delays are sometimes sufficient in
themselves to introduce nonlinearities in system dynamics,
which may be what Wertheim is trying to capture by adding in
JNDs. I should have thought that the appropriate algebra to
describe processes which can be destabilised and can restabilise
themselves under continuous input, was delay-differential
equations. Let us consider the status of Wertheim's Figure 7 (in
sect. 6.2), where he gives a lines-and-boxes description of the
system. This isn't a mathematical model; it tells us what a system
might do if it existed. I counted 14 functional links between
boxes, some of which contain scalars (velocities) some estimates
of scalars, and others mechanisms or subsystems which are
probably already known to be nonlinear. To test this theory, I
would ideally want to simulate Figure 7 on a computer, and to do
that I need the 14 delay-differential equations of the links
between boxes, plus three inputs, to get two outputs, taking the
mechanism boxes as given a priori. Some of the boxes (the
velocities) can be coalesced with their input-output links, thus
reducing the order of the system. There are no feedback loops in
Figure 7 (unless they are within the "mechanism" boxes), so if
the system can become stable, it has to be interpreted as
embedded in a larger system with feedback through "will,"
"image," and "percepts." Whether one can defensibly represent
such things as "will" by scalars is by no means certain. If Figure 7
is completely open-loop (admittedly with step functions in some
places) it could be reduced to one equivalent equation with
discontinuities allowed in input-output mappings, but it is not
clear that this would be the vector calculus which Wertheim
uses.
Now, how can such a system be externally identifiable? As
Walter (1982, p. 96) comments, "the computational burden
imposed by the test of a model for structural global identi-
fiability grows very rapidly with the model order," and "the
chosen parameters do not correspond to the degrees of freedom
of the problem."
There is a defence for what Wertheim is trying to do, in that he
is studying an adaptive system, and modelling such systems can
sometimes be facilitated by splitting the dynamics into slow
dominant components and residual high frequency parasitic
frequencies (Ioannou & Kokotovic 1983) which would presum-
ably correspond to the brief periods in which motion vision runs
to stability. As the exercise stands at present, it is not a mathe-
matical model, but it lists some properties a model lying be-
tween physiology and psychophysics would have to reproduce.
Computational aspects of motion perception
during self-motion
Itzhak Hadanj and Bela Julesz
hadani@gandalf.rutgers.edu; Department of Psychology and Laboratory of
Vision Research, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903
Wertheim has made two significant contributions to the field of
space perception. First, he has diagnosed some theoretical
difficulties in both inferential and direct perception approaches
that try to explain the phenomena of visual stability, object
motion, and self-motion. Second, he has advanced a theoretical
model that assumes the existence of a reference signal which
gets inputs from visual, ocular, and vestibular outputs. The main
problem with this model is that it is physically unsubstantiated
and can serve only as a qualitative framework. This is mainly
because the perception of visual stability, ego motion, and
object's motion cannot be accounted for kinematically without
considering ego distance and structure of visual objects; these
elements are missing in the model.
To see the problem of what is required from a moving
observer in order to perceive real motion of objects in space, let
us turn to the simpler case of perceiving static objects as static.
To obtain visual stability of objects, one needs to stabilize the
retinal image against eye movements in space. We distinguish
between two cases: (a) Stabilization is carried out solely on the
basis of retinal information, as assumed by the direct perception
theory. In computational vision this capacity is called passive
navigation (Bruss & Horn 1983). (b) Stabilization is carried out
with the aid of extraretinal signals, which we call active naviga-
tion. Wertheim correctly concludes that both types of navigation
play a role in space perception. It is clear, however, that
extraretinal signals are insufficient to account for the static
appearance of objects because they are inaccurate (due to noise
in the ocular control mechanism) or partially missing (due to
insensitivity of the vestibular organ to linear motion).
We therefore restrict our arguments to passive navigation.
Several approaches have been used to address the issue; the
discrete approach, the differential approach, and the least
square approach. Works in all categories show that the optical
flow depends upon the six motion parameters of the eye, on the
(ego)distance, and on the 3-D structure of the objects (as
compared to the single angular velocity vector considered by
Wertheim). Works in the discrete and differential approaches
are also characterized by analyzing the minimum conditions
under which an ideal observer can solve the navigation problem.
These minimal conditions are given in terms of the number of
points and views required to extract the six movement parame-
ters of the eye and the distance (or structure) of objects' points.
The most rigorous solution was advanced by Tsai and Huang
(1985). They show that seven points and two views are required
to recover uniquely the distance and the motion parameters, but
this solution is only good up to a scalar in the translation vector.
The consensus in computational vision is hence that the problem
of passive navigation in a static environment has no unique
solution but a solution up to an arbitrary affine transformation
(Koenderink & van Doom 1991). This is called the "indetermi-
nate scale problem" and has direct implications for visual per-
ception in general and Wertheim's model in particular, because
it means that a visual system cannot uniquely recover the
reference signal from the optical flow even when the scene is
static.
It is clear that the problem of passive navigation becomes
more complicated mathematically and less determinate when
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some of the visual objects are moving. To solve for this case the
visual system has to extract from retinal projections three
additional motion parameters in the space of each object's point
(Hadani et al. 1980).
Interestingly enough, our main argument is not against the
physical inaccuracies of Wertheim's model but against the con-
sensus in computational vision about the indeterminacy of the
passive navigation problem. In contrast to this view, it has
recently been shown that the absolute distance of objects and
the eye movement parameters can be uniquely and metrically
extracted from the optical flow as suggested by Gibson's direct
perception concept (Hadani et al. 1993; Hadani & Kononov
1993). Furthermore, to account for visual stability the later work
shows how a moving observer can reconstruct dynamic (time
changing) retinal projections of static objects into a representa-
tion given in time invariant space coordinates. This was done by
solving the optic-flow equations in both the discrete and differ-
ential approaches. It was shown that the differential case re-
quires only a single visual point to carry out all the computations
for passive navigation, because even the smallest visual point
(say a star) has an extension on the retina due to the light point
spread function. Such theoretical developments may give
Wertheim's model a robust support.
Another difficulty in Wertheim's scheme is the ambiguity
with respect to the kind of representation his model attributes to
the organism; is it egocentric, exocentric, or retinocentric? The
definition of the reference signal leads us to believe that what he
means is exocentric representation. This is because the refer-
ence signal is defined as encoding the motion of the retinal
surface in space. However, in Wertheim's paper percept sta-
tionarity is often associated with stationarity of the image on the
retina, particularly when the eyes accurately pursue a smoothly
moving target. This may lead to the wrong interpretation that a
stable percept is retinocentric. The problem becomes more
ambiguous when the perception of moving objects is analyzed.
In this case the reality is that both frames of reference, the object
and the observer, are moving relative to a third frame of
reference, which is the inertial space. Wertheim "solves" the
problem of relative motion perception, however, by eliminating
the reference signal in his equations. It is then unclear what
remains of the frame of reference. These conceptual difficulties
could be eliminated if Wertheim clarified the differences be-
tween events observed in different frames of reference and the
attributes (coordinates) of their representations.
The inferential model of motion perception
during self-motion cannot apply at constant
velocity
Richard Held
held@id.mit.edu; Infant Vision Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139
The traditional model. Wertheim considers the scope of infer-
ential theory to extend beyond the visual changes produced by
eye movement within the orbit, for which it was developed, to
movements of head and body. According to traditional theory,
signals from the movement of retinal images converge together
with control signals from movements of the eye in its orbit. At
some center of convergence these signals are evaluated with
respect to each other. Retinal signals that are discounted by
control signals from movements of the eye are seen as stationary
while those that are not discounted are seen as moving. One
might say that the convergence center of these paired signals
incorporates expectancies about the relation between body
movements and visual changes. (Parenthetically, these expect-
ancies can even be altered by a process of adaptation that has
been demonstrated in rearrangement experiments; Welch
1986). Wertheim claims that, by analogy, retinal signals accom-
panying movements of the head that carry the eyes with it are
evaluated with respect to signals about the head movement
(Wertheim's reference signal). Accordingly, an observer should
report visible objects as stationary when reference signals bal-
ance signals from retinal image movement whereas sufficiently
discrepant signals should elicit perception of visual motion.
Failure of the model. Wertheim takes up the case of a station-
ary and fixating observer inside a rotating drum which he
believes raises problems for the traditional inferential theory.
According to him, the moving image of the drum on the retina
should be seen as moving since reference signals from the
stationary and fixating observer are inadequate to discount the
retinal signals. Instead, observers often see the drum as station-
ary while feeling themselves in rotation - the familiar phenome-
non of circular vection. Wertheim claims that seeing the moving
drum as stationary contradicts traditional inferential theory
which, consequently, requires modification. His modification
incorporates the strange claim that in the absence of a reference
signal from body movement, the retinal motion signal must
provide the missing reference signal. Thus he postulates that
the retinal signal itself provides the reference signal that dis-
counts the motion signal it also provides. The evidence that such
a reference signal actually exists is dubious, as is the existence of
a "low band pass" pathway allegedly filtering this signal with a
time constant measured in seconds. Apart from these consider-
ations, however, one wonders why such contorted reasoning is
necessary at all.
Wertheim's oversight. I suspect that the problem derives from
an uncritical extension of the traditional inferential model of
eye-in-orbit to head and body movements. Let us reconsider the
extended inferential theory. If an observer's movements are
restricted to those of the eyes, the traditional model applies.
Efferent signals that control displacement, velocity, and acceler-
ation of the eyeball provide a reference signal against which any
movement of a visual target can be compared and either dis-
counted or not. If the observer is restricted to movements of the
head on torso, neuronal signals that control and monitor the
kinematics of these head movements will also provide a refer-
ence signal against which any and all movements of a visual
target can be compared and either discounted or not. Now
consider an observer who moves with head rigidly connected to
the torso (head-body). To the extent that movement of the head-
body entails acceleratory components, a reference signal will be
generated that can be compared with movements of a visual
target. However (and this is the crucial issue), in this case of
head-body movement no reference signal, independent of vi-
sion, exists for movements of constant velocity. The sensors of
the vestibulum and perhaps the viscera respond only to changes
in velocity. Efferent commands to the limbs which can move the
head-body, and might play a role as reference signals, activate
musculature that does not maintain movement at constant
velocity. The net result is that under the conditions of
Wertheim's example of prolonged drum rotation at constant
velocity (vection), no evaluating reference signal exists. The
reference signal is not merely of zero value, hence failing to
discount the retinal signal, but of no value. Consequently, the
conditions for applying the inferential theory are absent.
Wertheim fails to appreciate the inapplicability of the model in
this case; and, in an effort to preserve its relevance, he invents
the visual reference signal.
It is the absence of a reference signal which makes attribution
of the source of the retinal motion signal quite ambiguous,
unlike in the case of movement of the eye in its orbit or movement
of the head on the torso. The motion is equally likely to have
resulted from either head-body movement or drum movement
at constant velocity or any combination thereof that sums to the
required value. The occurrence of the trade-off between per-
ception of self-movement and object movement - the waxing
and waning and alternations between object motion and self-
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motion - under these conditions confirms the validity of this
implication. Many investigators have discussed this bistability of
vection, which seems counter to the predictions of Wertheim's
new model (not to mention direct perception ideology). As a
consequence of its ambiguity, the attribution of motion is subject
to attentional shifts, transient movements, perturbations in
visual stimuli, and habituation. For example, the perception of
drum motion at the initiation of rotation may be attributed to the
discrepancy between the rapid change in the retinal signal
(acceleration?) and the absence of a discounting signal from the
stationary head-body. Several seconds may elapse before satu-
rated vection is achieved. Such visual-vestibular interactions
commonly have time constants of the order of several seconds,
unlike most purely visual phenomena. Perhaps one should add
here that vection can also be produced by sinusoidal movements
of the drum which entail accelerations of the retinal signal.
These motions should be evaluated in conjunction with refer-
ence signals. Presumably, they may at times be so evaluated, but
vection is also frequently reported. The answer here is that the
visual system appears to be relatively insensitive to acceleration
of the retinal image. It appears likely that low levels of accelera-
tion are not distinguishable from constant velocity signals.
In conclusion, once the inapplicability of the inferential
model to movement of the retinal image at constant velocity is
recognized, no convincing need remains for the addition of the
visual reference signal proposed by Wertheim. Some form of the
extended inferential model appears to apply in all cases in which
a reference signal (nonvisual) is defined and in no cases in which
it is not.
Some problems with the gain of the
reference signal
Hitoshi Honda
psyhonda@cc.niigata-u.ac.jp; Department of Psychology, Faculty of
Humanities, Niigata University, Niigata 950-21, Japan
Many perceptual phenomena related to saccade and/or pursuit
eye movements have been explained by the classical subtraction
(inferential) theory. It is evident, however, that this theory is too
simple to deal with the complex aspects of these perceptual
phenomena; there have accordingly been many attempts to
correct the theory by adding complementary psychological
mechanisms such as visual masking, visual adaptation, informa-
tion from various visual cues or higher cognitive knowledge
about the visual world, and so on.
Wertheim's new model is based on a reconsideration of the
concept of an extraretinal signal, replacing the extraretinal
signal by a reference signal that includes (any combination of) an
efference copy, a vestibular component, and a visual compo-
nent. He claims that this model can successfully explain various
perceptual illusions that occur without eye movements (such as
motion aftereffect and circular vection) as well as perceptual
phenomena that are observed during pursuit eye movements
(the Filehne illusion and Aubert-FleischI phenomenon).
I. Wertheim's model was originally designed to describe the
perception of object motion or stationarity during self-motion.
However, as the author himself mentions, it can be extended to
include the perception of the position of external objects in
space. In this regard, I would first like to comment on the gain of
the efference copy signals from the pursuit eye movement
system. In one of his experiments, Wertheim (1987) examined
the possibility that the size of reference signals would be
affected by optokinetic stimulation, estimating that an efference
copy signal encoded about 80% of eye velocity in the head. This
gain magnitude of 0.8 is nearly consistent with the 0.8-0.9 I
estimated as the gain of efference signals available for judging
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the distance tracked by pursuit eye movements (Honda 1990).
Mack and Herman (1972) and Miller (1980) estimated similar
magnitudes. Also, in both Wertheim's (1987) and Honda's (1990)
studies, it was shown that the gain is independent of the velocity
of the eye. It should be noted here that Wertheim estimated the .
gain of efference copy signals for eye velocity whereas Honda
estimated gain for the distance tracked by the eye.' This coinci-
dence suggests the visual system knows that distance is mathe-
matically related to velocity.
It is interesting to compare the gain of the efference copy
signal from ;he pursuit eye movement system with that from the
vestibular system. Wertheim estimated reference signal gains
(Gror) when subjects were moved linearly without eye move-
ments in the total darkness. The Gr<jf for the otolith afferent
response was 0.76-0.8. Again, this is about the same as the Gref
estimated for efference signals from the pursuit eye movement
system. The coincidence of the Grefs between the otolith and the
pursuit eye movement system is plausible, because in each
system the undersized reference signal is compensated by
visually induced optokinetic stimulation.
On the other hand, the gain of the semicircular canal afferents
was shown to be 1.07 (Wertheim & Bles 1984). It is not apparent
why there is a discrepancy between the gain of the reference
signal from the otolith system and that from the semicircular
canal system. One possible explanation may be that unlike
forward or backward linear self-movement, ego rotation (head
rotation) is usually accompanied by slow (reflex) eye
movements.
2. As mentioned earlier, Wertheim's model can successfully
explain many perceptual phenomena that occur during slow eye
movements. There are some problems, however, which need
further explanation.
My first question concerns how the size of the visual compo-
nent in a reference signal is adjusted to a level appropriate to
maintaining the stability of the visual world. As already men-
tioned, the gain of efference copy signals from the slow eye
movement system is about 0.8. According to Wertheim's model,
the underregistration of the efference copy signal is compen-
sated by a visually induced optokinetic component. Therefore,
during slow eye movements, the size of compensation should be
about 0.2, never exceeding this value. Wertheim supposes that
this regulation of visual components in Grofis accomplished with
the help of a gating mechanism in the optokinetic pathway
which acts as a low band-pass spatiotemporal filter. However,
Wertheim (1987) showed that, in at least one experimental
situation, this mechanism does not work appropriately: with a
low spatial frequency visual stimulus the G,.ef become oversized
(Gref > 1). A solution to this problem may come from the fact
that in normal daylight circumstances there is usually not such a
low spatial frequency pattern. However, the overregistration
dramatically increases with eye velocity (35.6 deg/sec vs. 23.3
deg/sec in Wertheim's experiment). This overregistration,
which happens during relatively fast eye movements (> 30
deg/sec), seems to be overcome by the additional fact that in
normal everyday life we seldom track a fast moving object with
smooth eye movements; instead, the tracking is usually inter-
rupted by many corrective saccades.
The second problem, as Wertheim is aware, is that according
to his model image flow across the retinae generates optokinetic
stimulation which, on the one hand, produces a visual compo-
nent in reference signals, and on the other hand, is used for
perceiving self-movement or stasis in space. There is hence a
possibility that pursuit eye movements across a highly optokine-
tic stimulus pattern induce impressions of self-movement (vec-
tion). Wertheim solves this problem by postulating two gating
mechanisms with different thresholds, one for generating ego
motion and the other for converging on the reference signal.
This explanation is insufficient. What one needs to know is the
neurobiological or behavioral basis on which the thresholds are
determined.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1994) 17:2 321
Commentary/Wertheim: Motion perception
NOTE
1. A pursuit eye movement is frequently interrupted by small correc-
tive saccades (Collewijn & Tamminga 1984; Puckett & Steinman 1969).
The interruption by saccades occurs when the target velocity exceeds 30
deg/sec. In Wertheim's (1987) study, the target moved at 25 deg/sec or
40 deg/sec. Hence it seems that in his experiment the tracking of a
moving target contained many small saccadic components. To estimate
the gain of efference signals precisely, one must know about the role the
saccadic component plays in determining the apparent velocity and
position of external objects. A clue to the solution of this problem comes
from the generally accepted idea that saccades are predominantly
triggered by a displacement of targets, whereas pursuit eye movements
are triggered by a change in target velocity. Based on this idea, we can
assume that the reference signal gain (Gref) of saccades is 1.0 when it is
used for position judgment (Honda 1990) but 0 when it is used for
velocity judgment.
Optical foundations of perceived ego motion
Nam-Gyoon Kim and M. T. Turvey
gyoon@uconnvm.bitnet; Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and
Action, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-1020
Motivated by the results of experiments on human observers in
rotating drums, Wertheim hypothesizes that for an organism to
perceive motion (that is, self-motion and object motion), a
special reference signal is needed which encodes the time
derivative of the position of the retinal surface relative to the
environment. There are, however, reasons to believe, that the
optical conditions characterizing the empirical phenomenon
motivating Wertheim's model have been insufficiently analyzed.
Any analysis of the optical structure at a point of observation O
must identify what is exterospecific and what is propriospecific.
In the rotating drum, as the striped drum rotates about O, there
is accretion and deletion of the optical solid angles adjacent to
the solid angle corresponding to the fixation region, a small
surface or light spot interposed between O and the drum, on
which the observer is required to focus. These optical solid
angles constitute the optic array at O. Because there is no
disruption or deformation of internal optical structure as would
follow from a perspectival transformation (displacement of O), it
specifies one surface (the drum wall) passing behind another
(the fixation surface). At the same time, there are no widenings
or narrowings in the surface layout between the edges of the
occluding fixation surface and the peripherally extreme edges of
the drum. The optical solid angles whose bases are the alternat-
ing black and white stripes of the drum undergo continuous
changes in their adjacency structure but undergo no change in
their distribution relative to the fixation solid angle. This partic-
ular global pattern of change and nonchange is specific to a
rotation of the head-body in pursuing the movement of an object
in a uniformly textured environment.
In sum, the optical structure at O contains (a) exterospecific
information about two surfaces, one in front of the other relative
to O, with the further surface displacing relative to the nearer,
and (b) propriospecific information about the rotation of the
observer. The optic array in the rotating drum specifies an
ecological contradiction (Gibson 1979, p. 215) and the often
vague, nonuniform, vacillating responses of experimental sub-
jects (see Mergner & Becker 1990) suggest that they respect this
contradiction perceptually. Subjects behave as one would ex-
pect if the normal (lawful) complementarity of optical ex-
terospecific and optical propriospecific information had been
violated.
What of the time scales Wertheim considers to be critical?
Properties of the optic array specific to properties of an
organism-environment system are revealed over spatiotemporal
transformations (Gibson 1966; 1979). Their time course depends
on the properties in question and, in the laboratory, on how
faithful the experimental conditions are to those of the
organism-environment systems they are meant to capture.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the claim that
there are different lag times may be overstated. Other experi-
mental results suggest a closer temporal fit between optical
conditions and perceived self-motion and object motion (e.g.,
Lishman & Lee 1973; Ohmi et al. 1987).
There is apparently more to the optical structure in the
rotating drum experiment than Wertheim recognizes. The pre-
ceding description suggests, among other things, that the resul-
tant perceptions and their time scales depend nontrivially on
characteristics of the fixation region, the number and uniformity
of the stripes, and the rotational frequency and radius of the
drum - all considered in relation to each other. The theory
advanced by Wertheim seems to be a case of overinterpreting an
insufficiently developed empirical data base. At the very least, a
careful exposition and experimental analysis of the optical condi-
tions for the "circular vection" phenomenon is needed.
At best, Wertheim's mechanism addresses the fact that move-
ment (of self and/or a part of the surroundings) is taking place. It
addresses neither the kind of movement (e.g., rigid vs. nonrigid)
nor its direction (e.g., heading; Warren & Hannon 1988). Within
this restricted domain, the proposed mechanism seems limited
to a single object displacing relative to the observer. A "retinal
signal" is said to encode the velocity of the retinal image; if this
signal is matched by the reference signal then it is ego move-
ment that is taking place, not object movement. Suppose that
many objects are moving relative to the observer, in different
directions with different speeds - as is commonly the case.
What could it then mean to speak of perceived object velocity as
due to the magnitude difference between retinal and reference
signals minus their JND (just noticeable difference)? Our suspi-
cion is that Wertheim's model requires many ad hoc adjustments
to extend to real-world examples.
To illustrate some of the above points, we consider one
candidate strategy for modeling the optic flow field and its
perceptual implications. (This candidate does not consider oc-
clusion and disocclusion.) Suppose O is moving along a circular
path parallel to the ground plane in a stationary environment.
Optically, this corresponds to the ground plane rotating beneath
a stationary O and each surface element moving along a circular
path. Then, at each point in the ground at every instant, the
velocity of the element passing through the point can be repre-
sented as a vector V. Moreover, if O is moving at a constant
speed, the velocity vector at any point is constant. A time-
independent flow field is called steady. In this case, particle
trajectories can be determined by the fact that the velocity of a
particle is everywhere tangent to the trajectory. Trajectories are
obtained by plotting curves, called streamlines, so that their
direction at each point agrees with the direction of the velocity V
at that point. Each streamline can be represented as ^(x, y) = c.
Assigning different values to c gives a family of streamlines
whose totality is a one-parameter family of curves with c the
parameter and with ^ the stream function. Given, ^ , the
velocity of flow at a given point is
a¥ , dV
u = —- and v = —dy dx
where u and v are projections of V on the coordinate axes. In
hydrodynamics, no internal friction between particles means no
particle rotation. The result is irrotational flow. When the flow is
irrotational, there is another family whose curves intersect the
streamlines at right angles. This family of curves, <t>(:v, y) = c, has
its velocity as
a * . a *
u = — and v = — .
a a
4> is the velocity potential of the flow. A comparison of the
velocity components of <1> and ^ reveals that they satisfy the
Cauchy-Riemann equations
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a* ay . a*
— = -7— and —
ox 01/ dy 3A: '
which means that <P and ^ are the real and imaginary parts of
a single analytic function
F(z) = F(x + iy) (1)
F(z) is the complex potential of the flow. The curves of these
two families are mutually orthogonal and their trajectories are
the orthogonal trajectories of the given curves. The curves <I>(x,
y) = c are the equipotentials, and the orthogonal curves W(x,y)
— c are the streamlines. The velocity of the flow can be obtained
by differentiating (1) and using the Cauchy-Riemann equations
ax ax ax
= u — iv.
V = u + io = F'(z).
It follows that
The analytic function techniques facilitate investigating var-
ious flow patterns because the real and imaginary parts of an
analytic function of the complex variable z are the velocity
potential and stream function, respectively, of a steady flow. An
analytic function, split into real and imaginary parts, produces
an infinite variety of patterns of streamlines.
Returning to circular optical flow; as the observer moves along
a circular path, the corresponding flow field is a family of
concentric circles, where the observer's path is the circle be-
neath O, with radius r given from the center of rotation. These
circles correspond to the field's streamlines. Consider an ana-
lytic function
F(-) = — 1 -
where K is a real constant. From z = re10, we obtain
K .
2 ^ l n r ' (2)
and,
2iri z
Equation (2) shows that the streamlines are the circles r = c
(see Fig. 1), while the velocity is constant on every streamline.
When K > 0, the flow goes counter-clockwise, specifying for-
ward locomotion of O; when K < 0, the flow goes clockwise,
specifying backward locomotion. Given this, the question is
whether these properties in optical flow can be detected by an
observer (Warren et al. 1991).
How does an animal distinguish its own movements from
those of objects? Consider a streamtube - a closed curve in the
flow with all the streamlines passing through the curve. Thus, a
two-dimensional streamline pattern becomes a plane view of
three-dimensional tubes as if there were rigid walls inside which
fluid flows. When the observer moves, the array undergoes a
global transformation, which for circular movement results in a
torus-like streamtube. Conversely, when an object moves, a
local region of the array transforms. This corresponds to a local
streamtube within the global streamtube. Local streamtubes
are distinguished in the flow field because streamlines do not
cross each other, being everywhere parallel to the direction of
flow. This existence of nonparallel flows in optical flow means
there is more than one streamtube. The local streamtube means
an object moving independently of the observer.
Commentary/Wertheim: Motion perception
equipotentials
streamlines
observer's
path
Figure 1 (Kim and Turvey). Circular flow field defined by the
complex potential F(z) = K/(2 IT t)Inz. The equipotential lines
are the straight lines and the streamlines are the concentric
circles. The flow circles around the origin, from which the
observer's path lies with radius r.
Streamlines created by the movement of a neighboring train
completely occupy one's view through the window. The impres-
sion is of one's own train moving. The limited view eliminates
the distinction between global and local streamlines, resulting
in the otherwise local streamlines going proxy for the global.
Take another example. For a bird to stay in the same place in the
wind or a fish to maintain its position in a flowing river, they
must do the opposite - they must move to remain stationary.
Optically, this means they have to cancel the velocity vectors of
the flow field. These examples suggest that ad hoc devices such
as optokinetic stimulation are not needed to explain optically
induced ego motion. The so-called illusions are the lawful
outcomes of ecological optics.
What, then, is the role of the eyes? Why do they rotate?
Optical flow is described by various patterns of streamlines.
Specifically, optical flow in circular locomotion results in a torus-
like streamtube. The retina meets these streamtubes orthogo-
nally, taking their cross sections - the eye coincides with the
cross section of the flow field. The cross section of any vector
field is called a Poincan-i map. A map constructed from a flow via
a cross section is generally unique, allowing the study of how
visual perception is specific to flow. Animals with retina-like
optical systems should benefit from the ability to rotate them,
because through rotation they can sample a larger region than
otherwise would be allowed. That is, animals rotate their eyes
not to generate efference copies, but to detect as much informa-
tion in the optical flow as possible.
Wertheim's "reference" signal: Successful in
explaining perception of absolute motion,
but how about relative motion?
S. Mateeff8 and J. Hohnsbeinb
"percept@bgcict.bitnet and "hohnsbein@ifado.arb-phys.uni-dortmund.de;
"Institute of Physiology, 1113 Sofia, Bulgaria and "Institut fur
Arbeitsphysiologie, 4600 Dortmund, Germany
We like Wertheim's target article. He has succeeded in assem-
bling many pieces of the human spatial orientation puzzle into a
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clear unitary picture. As longtime admirers of the "inferential"
approach developed by such authors as Rock (1977; 1983) and
Epstein (1973), we are pleased to see Wertheim developing a
model that regards motion perception as the result of coopera-
tive contributions from different sources of information: retinal,
oculomotor, and vestibular. Wertheim has replaced Rock's "un-
conscious inference" by operations of addition and subtraction,
which makes his model more explicit.
Wertheim has been especially successful in two points. First,
he has shown how to manipulate the visual input to change the
strength of the Filehne illusion, and even to invert it. These
experiments strongly support the existence of a "reference"
signal that contains a substantial visual component. Second, he
has clearly pointed out that the visual input per se has no fixed
perceptual significance, since stimuli with the same retinal
velocity may lead to quite different percepts depending upon
eye velocity: for example, to percepts of stimulus stationarity or
of stimulus motion in a certain direction. This demonstrates
convincingly the existence of an extraretinal, eye-movement
related component in the "reference" signal.
But Wertheim's model has a strong competitor: the theory of
Post and Leibowitz (1985). Decisive data in support of
Wertheim's model seem to have been provided recently by
Mergner & Becker (1990), who showed that no vection occurred
when a low-contrast pattern was sinusoidally moved with low
velocity and amplitude in front of the subject and was concomi-
tantly pursued with the eyes. According to Wertheim, this
finding can be predicted by his model, but not by the theory of
Post and Leibowitz: slow eye movements produce an efference
copy that is strong enough to elicit a perception that the pattern
which is otherwise stationary on the retina moves in space and
that the observer's body is stationary. This explanation, how-
ever, poses additional problems arising from the common occur-
rence of circular vection (see sect. 6.2 of the target article).
Wertheim's model can successfully predict and explain exper-
imental data on the perception of the "absolute" motion of
objects and patterns, that is, visual motion relative to external
space. In our opinion, some problems may arise when percep-
tion of "relative" motion (motion of two or more objects relative
to each other) is considered. According to Wertheim, the veloc-
ity of relative motion is perceived as the difference between the
perceived absolute velocities of the two objects, or as the
difference between the two retinal image velocities (see his
Equation 12). His model implies, however, that the percepts of
the absolute velocities of the two objects are also (automatically)
given (Equations 10 and 11). The question then arises: What
happens when two objects move relative to each other and
relative to the external space; will the observer see the two
absolute motions or the relative motion?
To clarify the question, let us consider an example solely from
the standpoint of Wertheim's model, without reference to any
other existing theory. A bicycle moves along a street and a
stationary observer pursues the axle of one of the rolling wheels
with his eyes. There is a mark on the tire. The axle moves
linearly relative to external space; thus, the absolute trajectory
of the mark is cycloidal. Pursuing the axle with one's eyes usually
results in a percept of a linear motion of the axle and a circular
rather than a cycloidal motion of the mark relative to the axle
(Stern & Emelity 1978). Wertheim's model explains how the
absolute motion of the axle (its retinal image being stationary
during the pursuit) is perceived. The model also explains how
the circular motion of the mark relative to the axle is veridically
perceived, but it tells us nothing about why the absolute,
cycloidal motion of the mark is not perceived. This again raises
the question of how the visual system makes a "choice" as to
which of the three motions will be perceived. Is the choice
determined by some parameters of visual stimulation, or is it a
result of focusing attention on certain visual details and features?
In our opinion, both factors may determine the choice. As
Mateeff et al. (1987) have shown, when a small (0.35 deg) test
object moves too fast (15 deg/sec) during ocular pursuit of
another target, the degree of constancy may decrease to zero;
the observer perceives the retinal image trajectory of the test
object, that is, its motion relative to the pursued target. Increas-
ing the size of the test object and decreasing its velocity gradu-
ally lead to a recovery of constancy and the motion of the test
object is experienced in space rather than relative to the pur-
sued target. Thus, perception of the trajectory of the test object
is determined by the ratio between its size (in deg) and its
velocity (in deg/sec); when this ratio becomes more than 300
msec, the absolute motion of the test object is perceived. This
result is in a good quantitative agreement with the data of
Ehrenstein et al. (1987) that are discussed by Wertheim; both
results show the importance of the parameters of the stimulation
on motion perception during self-motion.
The attentional factor may also play a role in the choice
between perceiving relative or absolute motion. Mateeff (1980)
demonstrated that when a small test object moves at a high
velocity noncolinearly relative to a point that is tracked and the
observer has to report the direction of motion of the object, its
retinal direction is reported. Using the same physical stimulus
parameters but changing the task so that the observer now has to
localize the beginning and the end points of the test object's
trajectory, the observer's reports correspond much more to the
external, absolute motion rather than the retinal, relative mo-
tion of the test object. The choice of which motion to perceive
appears to depend on the observer's task.
Finally, Cogel and Sharkey (1989) used horizontal physical
motion of objects to induce perceived horizontal motion in a
vertically moving test spot that was pursued visually. They
showed that attending to or ignoring the inducing objects
resulted in a significant change in the direction of the perceived
trajectory of the pursued test spot. This finding also indicates
the need for Wertheim to extend his welcome model by includ-
ing at least an input for direct top-down influences.
Inferring the visual reference
Fred H. Previc
previc%kirk.decnet@hqhsd.brooks.af.mil; Crew Technology Division, Crew
Systems Directorate, Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, TX
78235-5104
In his target article, Wertheim does a commendable job of
arguing that ambient visual information serves as an important
reference for differentiating ego motion from object motion in
space. I would like to add two caveats that qualify his general
assertion that the existence of an ambient visual reference is
consistent with the theory of "direct perception." The first of
these seems to relate to Wertheim's description of the same
visual reference for both oculomotor phenomena (and related
ones such as induced motion) and "whole-body" percepts such
as vection. The second caveat relates to the inferential processes
involved in selecting the visual reference.
Wertheim seems to invoke the same visual reference signal
for such diverse phenomena as vection, oculomotor control,
induced motion, and even motion aftereffects. Yet there are
many experiments showing that the visual stimulus driving eye
movements and induced motion is fundamentally different from
the one controlling self-motion perception. Most of these differ-
ences relate to spatial parameters of the visual stimulus, al-
though optokinetic eye movements and induced motion also
differ from vection in their temporal dynamics (Heckmann &
Post 1988). Brandt et al. (1973), for example, showed that
optokinetic nystagmus and vection are driven primarily by the
central and peripheral portions, respectively, of a surround
whose central and peripheral sectors move in opposite direc-
tions. We have shown a similar relationship between induced
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motion - a phenomenon that is related to nystagmus-
suppression and other aspects of pursuit tracking - and vection:
no roll vection was elicited in our study using the same central
region (~50 deg) that gave rise to potent induced motion (Previc
& Donnelly 1993). Heckmann and Howard (1991) have further
shown that a coplanar stimulus eliciting superior induced mo-
tion does not stimulate the vection mechanism nearly as well as a
more distant stimulus (see also Brandt et al. 1975; Delonne &
Martin 1986; Ohmi et al. 1987). Finally, motion aftereffects are
also strongly elicited by very small visual stimuli, but require
higher spatial frequencies (>0.5 c/deg) than those which pro-
duce good vection (Cameron et al. 1992).
The possibility that different references exist for oculomotor
and related phenomena versus whole-body percepts such as
vection is probably less detrimental to Wertheim s theory than
arc the reasons why such different references exist. According to
Dichgans and Brandt (1978), the most distant and peripheral
portions of the visual field are used to infer self-motion because
motion in such regions is "the inevitable consequence of move-
ment of the body in space" (Dichgans & Brandt 1978, p. 778). By
contrast, motion in the central 60 deg of peripersonal (near-
visual) space is composed mainly of movements of the arm and of
objects we manipulate; we must disregard these as references
for head or body motion in space. Oculomotor outputs and
induced motion, on the other hand, are typically more affected
by centrally located surrounds in or slightly beyond the plane of
convergence (Heckmann & Howard 1991; Howard & Marton
1992), mainly because foveally tracked objects rarely appear in
front of a background surface. The induced motion imparted to a
tracked object by a coplanar or more distant central surround is
apparently useful in both pursuing and manipulating objects in
peripersonal space; this explains why induced motion is closely
related to visually mediated manual control mechanisms (see
Previc & Donnelly 1993). The above distinction between ocu-
lomotor and whole-body responses may also have neuro-
physiological reality, in that separate parietal areas seem to
mediate oculomotor control and reaching in peripersonal space
(the inferior parietal area) versus whole-body movement
through more distant space (the superior posterior parietal area;
Brain 1941; Grusser 1983).
Much evidence indicates that the selection of a visual refer-
ence for establishing whether or not self-motion has occurred
itself requires a set of perceptual decisions. This is illustrated by
the fact that a moving surround perceived as the background
elicits stronger vection than one that is perceived as the fore-
ground even if they are at the same actual depth (Ohmi et al.
1987). Likewise, vection is reduced when subjects attend to (but
do not actually fixate) a more distant surround lying behind a
proximal fixation target (Mergner & Becker 1990) - which
makes sense given that the perception of ego motion is carried
out by ambient (nonattentive) visual processes. Another indica-
tion of the inferential nature of vection is its much shorter
latency when the subject has been previously rotating around a
vertical axis (Mergner & Becker 1990) even if the lag of the
endolymph in the semicircular canals has dissipated and the
nonvisual sense of rotation has subsided. Finally, we have
recently demonstrated that large visual fields which ordinarily
elicit good vection may be unable to overcome illusory orienta-
tional percepts created by shifting the gravitoinertial vector in a
motion-based simulator if they are presented in a head-mounted
visual display that subjects believe to be part of their frame-of-
motion (i.e., a moving vehicle; Previc et al. 1992). Conversely, a
much smaller "real-world" scene that is located outside the
frame-of-motion can be quite effective in overcoming these
illusions. For example, the illusory climbing sensation during
takeoff in an aircraft is not eliminated by looking at a large
subject-fixed image such as the bulkhead of the aircraft, which is
interpreted as lying within the frame-of-motion, whereas a view
through a small window at an external reference (e.g., the
horizon) can completely break this illusion. Similar problems in
interpreting spatial orientation have been noted when no out-
side visual reference is present in a 0-g environment (Lackner
1992; Oman 1988).
In summary, Wertheim fails to recognize that we use different
portions of the visual world to reference oculomotor behavior
and related phenomena on the one hand, versus spatial orienta-
tion and vection on the other. Nor does he acknowledge the
critical inferences made in adopting such references, especially
in the case of whole-body ego motion. By contrast, I have
suggested an "ecological" visual approach highlighting the im-
portant decision-making that helps establish the perceptual
"frame" for everyday visuomotor activities, even though such
inferences become dramatically apparent only during abnormal
acceleratory and other sensory-conflict situations.
Why another alternative optokinetic model?
Thomas Probst
probstt@ze8.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de; Department of Experimental and
Clinical Neuropsychology, Heinrich-Heine-University of Dusseldorf, D-40225
Dusseldori, Germany
Wertheim's target article is a comprehensive review of motion
perception, particularly self- and object-motion perception. It
corresponds largely to Chapter 9 (Wertheim 1990) of the book
edited by Warren and Wertheim (1990), including both the
functional and the adapted functional model describing the
generation of reference signals and the interfacing of percepts of
object motion and ego motion in space (Figs. 1 and 7 of the target
article). The additional connections between the "oculomotor
mechanism" and the "retinal receptors" on the one hand and the
"estimator of head velocity in space" on the other, drawn in as
dotted lines in both figures are no substantial improvement of
Wertheim's model because they represent pathways for the
generation of optokinetic and vestibular nystagmus which are
well known and described in detail in the literature on the
subject.
I have difficulty with Wertheim's view of "optokinesis." The
optokinetic response (OKR) is an ocular reflex that produces eye
movements following a slow movement of the visual surround-
ings. In stationary visual surroundings, the OKR also acts to
stabilize eye position because otherwise there would be contin-
uous drifting and rapid resetting of eye movements. Eventually,
vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR) relay neurons mediate the OKR.
Thus, the VOR and OKR share the same vestibular relay
neurons and act conjointly to stabilize retinal images during
head movement (e.g., Ito 1987). Although effects on vestibular
nuclei neurons and optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) are strongest
when the whole visual periphery moves, it is not necessary to
have full-field motion to elicit OKN; much smaller fields are
sufficient (Henn et al. 1980). Nevertheless, extending the stim-
ulus field to the (horizontal) retinal periphery has a strong effect
in increasing the angular velocity of the slow phases of eye
movements during OKN (Dichgans etal. 1973). If the optokine-
tic stimulus is large enough ("area effect"), however, or stimu-
lates mainly the periphery of the retina ("retinal location effect"),
then this stimulus is suitable for eliciting visually induced self-
motion perception called vection (e.g., Dichgans & Brandt
1978). So, Wertheim's definition to the effect that "to be op-
tokinetic, a visual pattern must be large, have relatively low
spatial frequency characteristics, move (not too fast) across the
retinae, and remain visible for more than a very brief interval" is
misleading.
Wertheim describes briefly and adequately two theoretical
views of motion perception, the theory of "direct perception"
and the "inferential theory." One of his basic questions is, why is
the objectively rotating visual surround perceived subjectively
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Figure 1 (Probst). Schematic diagram of visual-vestibular in-
teraction explains the fact that during visually induced self-
motion perception, small contrasts that are stationary on the
retina such as a fixation point, connected to the subject's frame of
reference, seem to move with the observer. In this instance the
visual perception of stationarity of the objectively moving visual
surround would be reevaluated on the basis of a signal originat-
ing from the vestibular system (after Dichgans & Brandt 1978).
The dotted-line box is in itself a complex neurophysiological
circuit mediating the main routes from the accessory optic
system (AOS) including the nucleus of the optic tract and the
three terminal nuclei (dorsal, lateral, medial) via the dorsal cap
of the inferior olive (DCIO) and cerebellar structures to the
vestibular nuclei. An additional pathway runs from the AOS to
the nucleus reticularis tegmenti pontis (NRTP) and from here
both directly toward the vestibular nuclei and through cerebel-
lar structures (flocculus) (Berthoz 1981).
as stationary in space during saturated circular vection (CV)? I
disagree with Wertheim's opinion that the inferential theory has
a problem explaining this phenomenon. His elegantly formu-
lated and differentiated "alternative model," which he intro-
duces here again, is accordingly not necessary, at least not to
explain the subjective stationarity of the physically moving
visual environment inducing saturated self-motion perception
in the opposite direction. Dichgans and Brandt (1978) intro-
duced a schematic diagram of visual-vestibular interaction in
object-motion detection and dynamic spatial orientation. They
assumed that "a hypothetic explanation for the sensed stability
of the actually moving visual environment during CV might be
that the motion information arriving at the visual cortex is
neutralized by a collateral signal deriving from the vestibular
system" (p. 760), and they provided neurophysiological evi-
dence for this. Figure 1 shows their model of intersensory
neutralization, which should not be confused with the model of
von Hoist and Mittelstaedt (1950), who discussed cancellation of
sensory inflow by an efference copy of mot or commands. Dich-
gans's and Brandt's model explains the puzzling fact that during
CV small contrasts that are stationary on the retina, such as a
fixation point connected to the subject's frame of reference,
seem to move with the observer. In this instance, the visual
perception of stationarity would be reevaluated on the basis of a
signal originating from the vestibular system.
The basic assumption of distinct cortical areas for object-
motion perception and self-motion perception was taken up by
Probst (1983) on the basis of his experiments and was further
elaborated into a working model of visual-vestibular interaction
(Fig. 2). Here simply structured object-motion and self-motion
perception are mediated by adequate stimulation of the corre-
sponding peripheral receptors "eye" and "labyrinth' via the
well-known subcortical and cortical pathways. In addition, a
large, moving visual environment stimulating the retinal pe-
riphery with low spatial frequencies leads first of all to adequate
object-motion perception via retino-cortical visual structures.
However, the special characteristics of this visual stimulus,
which Wertheim calls "optokinetic," lead to a simultaneous
stimulation of the central vestibular system in the brainstem,
the vestibular nuclei, via both subcortical (eye-vestibular nu-
clei) and cortical (visual cortex-vestibular nuclei) pathways. The
consequence of this gradually increasing ("/clt," corresponding
to Wertheim's "gating mechanism") stimulation of the vestibular
nuclei is a dual one: it excites the cortical self-motion perception
area and second, it leads to a concurrent reduction of the input
signal to the object-motion perception area via a negative
feedback loop. Thus, the interrelation between both centers
mediates the perception of a gradual change, from pure object-
motion perception, through a phase of apparent rotary body
acceleration during which the surroundings seem to decelerate
at the same rate, until there is exclusive self-rotation, with the
visual surround appearing stationary. The working model has
one restriction, however: eye movements are not taken into
account. Nevertheless, a slight revision of this model also
explains inhibitory vestibulo-visual interaction for orthogonal
stimulus conditions with visual stimulation about the .\-axes and
simultaneous vestibular excitation in yaw, roll, and pitch
(Hofstetter-Degen 1988). This slightly revised model has re-
cently been published (Probst 1991).
The working model of Probst (1983) and Probst et al. (1986)
had to be completed because of new clinical findings in patients
with cortical hemianopia. According to the findings of Straube
and Brandt (1987), information about full-field motion in the
visual cortex must descend corticofugally to the vestibular nuclei
where the perceptual decision between object motion and self-
motion is reflected in latency-dependent frequency modulation
of second-order neurons. The sensation of CV requires func-
tional integrity of the vestibular cortex "switched on" by the
vestibular nuclei. The velocity of self-motion, however, can
be mediated by visual-vestibular cortical interaction where
the decision about self-motion is made by vestibular brain-
stem structures (Straube & Brandt 1987). These important cor-
ticofugal pathways (e.g., from the visual cortex to the nucleus of
the optic tract linked to the vestibular nuclei, partly via cerebel-
lar structures) are missing in Wertheim's model (Schoppmann
1981).
In conclusion, despite several disagreements, it is undeniable
that Wertheim has embarked on an exciting and promising line
of research.
Perception of motion with respect
to multiple criteria
Gary E. Riccio
griccio@uxT.cso.uiuc.edu; Beckman Institute for Advanced Science and
Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801
Wertheim describes a paradigm for evaluating the relative
influence of retinal and extraretinal "signals" on the phenome-
nology of ego motion. He uses data from such a paradigm to
develop a model for the combination of retinal and various
extraretinal signals in the "interfacing of percepts of object- and
ego-motion" (Fig. 7). Phenomenological data can inform the
study of perceived motion and Wertheim's model can help
organize the data. Below I present some caveats that should be
considered in the interpretation of such data and models. The
caveats concern the multidimensionality of perception and phe-
nomenal experience and, related to that, the multiple afford-
ances of ego motion in the context of posture and locomotion.
Wertheim's paradigm allows a subject to indicate whether or
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Figure 2 (Probst). Working model shows that large moving visual surroundings that stimulate the retinal periphery with low spatial
frequencies lead first of all to an adequate object-motion perception via retino-cortical visual structures. The special characteristics of
this stimulus, however, result in a simultaneous stimulation of the central vestibular system in the brainstem, the vestibular nuclei,
via both subcortical (eye-vestib. nuclei) and cortical (visual cortex-vestib. nuclei) pathways. The consequence of this gradually
increasing ("/dt") stimulation is twofold: (1) it excites the cortical self-motion perception area and (2) it leads to a concurrent reduction
of the input signal of the object-motion perception area via a negative feedback loop. Thus, the interrelation between both centers
mediates the perception of a gradual change from pure object-motion perception over a period of apparent rotary body acceleration
during which the surroundings seem to decelerate at the same rate up to exclusive self-motion with the visual surround appearing to
be stationary.
not "relative motion" between objects is perceived and whether
or not "absolute motion" with respect to an invisible inertia]
reference-frame is perceived. The perception of ego motion has
a less certain status in Wertheim's model and this is revealing. In
this and other models or theories, perception of ego motion can
result from motion of the body relative to an inertial reference
frame or from motion of the visible surroundings relative to the
body even when the body is stationary in the inertial frame (the
later is referred to as "vection"). It is assumed by Wertheim and
many others that the phenomenology of vection is commensu-
rate with the phenomenology of motion relative to an inertial
reference frame. The phenomenology of these two situations
may be similar, but rarely, if ever, identical. The primary
difference is in the dynamical consequences of motion with
respect to an inertial reference frame.
All motion involves speeding up and slowing down, at the
very least for starting and stopping, and most motion involves
change in direction. The linear and centripetal acceleration in
these activities is resisted by linear and centrifugal inertial
"forces," respectively. The forces on an accelerating observer
stimulate vestibular and somatosensory mechanoreceptors and
have consequences for any unrestrained parts of the body.
Motion with respect to an inertial reference frame feels (liter-
ally) different from motion with respect to the visible surround-
ings, and these two kinds of motion have different meaning in
the context of the ubiquitous postural activity of an active
observer (Riccio 1993b). An active observer must work with and
against the changing forces on the body to maintain balance and
control movement. An inertially stationary observer may also
have to adjust the configuration of the body to optimize the
visibility of moving surroundings. Thus, both inertial and opti-
cal motion have potential consequences though different ones
for postural control and for the perception and movement
systems that depend on postural control (Riccio 1993a). The
meaningful and perceivable consequences of an observer's in-
teraction with the environment, or affordances (see J. J. Gibson
1979), differentiate motion of the observer from motion of the
surroundings.
The motion of an observer is not a unitary phenomenon, nor is
motion of the surroundings; and the experience of these phe-
nomena is not unitary (cf. Neisser 1976, pp. 103-4). The closest
they come to being unitary is constant-velocity relative-motion
between a fully restrained observer and the visible surround-
ings. In this special case, motion of the observer and motion of
the surroundings are nearly identical phenomena. These are the
conditions to which Wertheim's paradigm currently applies, but
they are vanishingly rare in nature. The difference between
Wertheim's experimental conditions and the natural conditions
for a moving observer cannot be overemphasized. Perhaps this is
why Wertheim defines a distinction between ego motion and
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"self-motion' (see his Note 1). Self-motion naturally requires
multimodal perception and multicriterion control of the nested
body segments involved in the coordination of posture and
locomotion. The multiple criteria generally relate to the speed
and trajectory of self-motion, the management of kinetic and
potential energy, the changing direction of balance for the
various body segments, and stability of the sensory and motor
"platforms" (Riccio 1993b; see also J. J. Gibson 1966). There are
presumably phenomenological dimensions for each of these
criteria. The extension of Wertheim's model, or any model of
se//-motion, to natural situations requires the development of
experimental paradigms that are sensitive to the multidimen-
sionality of natural perceiving.
Wertheim's arguments are undermined by his extension of
the physiological distinction between retinal and extraretinal
signals to the philosophical distinction between "direct percep-
tion theory" and "inferential theory." This questionable concep-
tual leap distracts attention from his research and his model;
Wertheim thereby does himself a disservice. He states, for
example, that "the theory of direct perception, [which] origi-
nated from Gibson (1966; 1979) . . . assumes that the percep-
tion of motion derives exclusively from afferent retinal informa-
tion" (sect. 1, para. 2). This is not an accurate statement about
Gibsonian ecological psychology (as articulated, for example, in
J. ]. Cibson 1966; 1979); Wertheim must accordingly struggle
with the obvious inconsistency in his reading of ecological
psychology (see his Note 2). Furthermore, it is difficult to
imagine any modern philosophical argument that would link
direct perception to a single sensory modality.
A cause of Wertheim's confusion is revealed in his belief that
"actual research in the tradition of direct perception theory has
taken this line of thought and confined itself exclusively to the
investigation of optic (or retinal [sic]) flow invariants" (Note 2).
This statement is not accurate. The fact that J. J. Gibson inspired
much more work in visual perception than in nonvisual percep-
tion is not relevant to Wertheim's contention about the Gibso-
nian view of direct perception. It is reasonable to look to the
work of others who have been inspired by J. J. Gibson, but in
doing so, one should consider the full diversity of such work and
one should give special emphasis to the work that is widely
recognized for its adherence to Gibsonian first principles (e.g.,
E. J. Gibson 1991; Shaw et al. 1992; Turvey 1992).
Ego-centered and environment-centered
perceptions of self-movement
John J. Rieser
rieserjj@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu; Department of Psychology and Human
Development, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203
This is a rich paper. Especially helpful is Wertheim's framing of
the inference-based versus direct perception debate and the
research summary focused on perceptions of self-movement
induced by optokinetic drum stimuli. Especially thought-
provoking is the original "reference signal" theory and the
method to investigate it with enough precision to build quantita-
tive models. My commentary focuses on perceiving self-
movement. In it I point out three ways that the issues raised in
the target article could be broadened.
First, the data reviewed are about the ego-centered percep-
tion of self-movement; subjects were asked to judge whether
they were moving and how fast. What is left out is discussion of
environment-centered perception in which subjects are asked
to judge how fast or how far they have moved relative to features
of their surroundings. Second, the data reviewed relate to the
visually induced perception of self-movement and the role
played by eye movements in the perception. What is left out is
the context of visual perception set by biomechanical informa-
tion specifying head and trunk position and action. Third, the
evidence discussed is concentrated on the perception of simple
rotations while viewing the stimulus field created by an op-
tokinetic drum. What is left out is perceiving simple translations
and complex paths combining rotations and translations while
viewing stimulus fields that provide multiple depth planes.
These are each discussed briefly below.
1. Wertheim's discussion of self-movement is mostly focused
on findings of the inaccurate feeling of self-turning that occurs in
optokinetic drums where the entire visual field rotates around
an observer. Those who have experienced it know the resulting
illusion of self-turning is compelling. The methods typically
involve spinning a textured (usually striped), opaque, cylindri-
cal wall around an observer who is centered within it. Subjects
are typically asked to say whether they perceive self-movement
or drum movement and to estimate the magnitude of the
movement; in addition, the presence of forms of nystagmic eye
movements are sometimes recorded.
All these dependent variables assess ego-centered perceiv-
ing (self-movement relative to ones earlier positions), not
environment-centered perceiving (self-movement relative to
features of the surroundings). This emphasis on ego-centered
measures is consistent with the traditional methods of vestibular
researchers, who wished to understand near-threshold events
and the transduction properties of the end organs. To under-
stand adaptive behavior, however, it seem important to investi-
gate environment-centered perceiving in order to know how
perceptions of self-movement are integrated with remembered
features of the surroundings toward which actions might be
directed.
But how might visually based environment-centered percep-
tion of self-movement be studied? A direct method would be to
ask subjects to judge their position relative to features of their
surroundings. The method makes sense as long as the to-be-
judged features of the surroundings are occluded from view
(e.g., Rieser et al. 1991; Rieser et al. 1994), but it does not make
sense in test situations such as an optokinetic drum, because
subjects could see the to-be-judged targets and localize them
directly with vision whether or not they perceived self-
movement. Optokinetic drum test situations could be adapted
to assess environment-centered self-movement. This could be
engineered in different ways. For example, the drum could be
built with windows that could be switched from opaque (adding
to the optical flow stimulus used to induce perceived self-
movement) to transparent (providing a glimpse of the stable
surroundings, in order both to situate the perceiver within the
surroundings and to provide a brief view of a target object). In
this way optokinetic stimuli might be used to induce self-
movement perceived relative to the fixed surroundings.
2. There has been much research and computational theory
about whether (and how) optical flow alone can specify the
direction and rate of self-movement in situations when the eyes
are aimed off-path or when the eyes move. Perceiving self-
movement depends on information specifying whether retinal
image movement specifies object movement or self-movement,
and Wertheim points out that both visual and biomechanical
information can serve as a reference signal for eye movements.
In addition, it is clear that a perceiver's head and body posture
need to be taken into account as well. Visual information
specifies the direction of movement of the eye, not the trunk.
Perceiving the trunk's direction of motion from dynamic visual
information is possible only given information about the direc-
tion of the eyes and the head. Wertheim notes that vision alone
can specify eye direction relative to the skull, informed by the
shape of the visual field as it is bounded by the nose and eye
socket.
Similarly, a view of one's shoulder and upper trunk provides
information specifying the head-trunk relation. Whereas the
eye-in-head relation is ubiquitous and not readily screened from
view, the head-trunk relation is easily screened by wearing an
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occluding collar or viewing a lighted scene in the dark. Per-
coivers are not fooled in such situations, however; for example,
leftward optical flow with the head turned to the left is perceived
as forward self-motion, and so on. The existence of self-
movement is visually determined, as is the perceived rate of
self-movement. However, the perceived direction of self-
movement is based on visual information conditioned by its
biomechanical context specifying body posture.
3. Wertheim suggests that the time course for perceiving self-
movement based on optokinetic input is slower than that based
on vestibular input. The suggestion is based on observations that
people very rapidly detect the onset of turns that are well above
threshold when they are specified by vestibular input whereas 2
to 10 seconds is needed for an optokinetic stimulus to give rise to
perceive self-turning (instead of drum turning). The target
article provides an elegant explanation for these different time
courses, one that involves visual-vestibular interaction. I won-
der whether the different time courses might in part reflect a
methodological artifact, however, because although optokinetic
drum situations result in relatively slow perceptions of self-
movement, stimuli give rise to rapid-onset feelings of self-
movement in other situations. A commonplace example in-
volves stopping an automobile on a hill for a traffic signal when a
truck pulls alongside, giving rise to the panicked illusion that
one's automobile is rolling backwards. A laboratory example is
the swaying room used by Lee and others (e.g., Lee & Aronson
1974) to investigate optically induced body sway by infants as
well as adults.
Driving situations and the swaying room differ from optokine-
tic drum situations in many ways, and the different time courses
might reflect either different underlying processes or stimulus
differences. Consider three possibilities. First, it is well known
that the perception of actual self-turning is rapid when it is
specified vestibularly, for example, while being turned with
eyes closed in a rotating chair. The illusory perception of self-
turning necessarily conflicts with a vestibular reference signal
consistent with maintaining a fixed heading, and perhaps this
conflict results in gcnerically slow onset illusions of self-turning.
Unpublished observations in our laboratory seem to contradict
this, however, indicating a rapid onset for illusory self-
movements that are biomechanically specified. Following ear-
lier observations (Bles 1984; Lackner & DiZio 1985), Daniel
Ashmead, Anne Caring, Herbert Pick, and I built a turntable
consisting of a fixed T-bar centered within a rotating platform.
Subjects stood centered in the turntable, grasping the stationary
T-bar to maintain a fixed heading. When the platform rotated,
subjects stepped to compensate for its rotation while maintain-
ing their fixed heading. When they closed their eyes, subjects
experienced compelling illusions of self-turning relative to their
remembered surroundings within 2 seconds after the onset of
the biomechanical stimulus, averaging less than one second
delay (Rieser et al., submitted). Thus, although the onset of
perceived self-turning induced by an optokinetic drum has a
relatively slow onset, a slow onset is not generic to all illusory
perceptions of self-turning.
As the second possibility, consider whether optical informa-
tion for self-turning may have a slow onset, whereas optical
information for self-translation has a rapid onset. This can be
tested easily within an optokinetic drum stimulus situation by
simply asking subjects to move from the center of the drum to
stand close to the wall. If they are facing the wall, the rotating
wall stimulus would specify a rotation combined with a transla-
tion - the optical information would be the same as if subjects
stepped sideways along the inside circumference of the drum.
This is easy to try. Our informal observations are that the onset of
perceived rotation combined with translation is also slow, simi-
lar to the onset for simple rotation.
Finally, the third possibility is that the slow onset might occur
in optokinctic-drum-like stimulus situations where self-
movement information is specified mainly at the single depth
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plane defined by the cylindrical wall of the drum whereas the
swaying room and everyday driving situations both involve
differentiated depth planes. Perhaps a more "optimal" optico-
kinetic stimulus, arranged by providing multiple depth planes
or in other ways, would result in faster vection. Whether true or
not, this points out a logical limit to understanding perceptual
systems by investigating purely artificial stimulus conditions.
Active and passive head and
body movements
Helen E. Ross
h.e.ross@stirting.ac.uk; Department of Psychology, University of Stirling,
Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA, United Kingdom
Wertheim must be broadly right in asserting that visual move-
ment perception involves a multicomponent reference signal
and that the signal is related to how the eyes move in space
rather than in their sockets. He states that reference signals are
compound signals that may include any combination of an
efference copy, a vestibular and a visual component (sect. 3,
para. 4). In his model, knowledge of eye movements within the
head is (probably) derived from efference copy, whereas knowl-
edge of head movements is derived from vestibular afferent
information caused by head movements. The theory should be
generalised, however, to cover all types of information about
how the head moves in space, including efference copy about
intended head or body movements and afferent information
from the vestibular system and tactile and kinaesthetic
receptors.
Wertheim does not devote much space to the active/passive
distinction. Vestibular information is essentially passive, as it
normally signals that an accelerative force is being applied;
however, it may or may not be accompanied by efference copy
(for corresponding self-initiated movement) and by confirma-
tory information from the skin, joint, and muscle receptors.
An extreme case of unaccompanied passive vestibular stimu-
lation occurs in divers who suffer from pressure (or "alter-
nobaric") vertigo: high pressure air trapped in the middle ear
stimulates the semicircular canals, thus causing a strong sensa-
tion of circular vection. The whole body seems to rotate and any
object fixed opposite the diver appears to rotate around him at
the speed needed to keep pace (Ross 1976). The lack of tactile
cues to countermand the sensation of bodily rotation produces
very powerful sensations of both visual and bodily motion.
Circular vection is also very strong in zero gravity, when the
vection is induced visually by a rotating optokinetic drum: the
reduction on contradictory tactile cues makes it stronger than
under normal gravity (Young & Shelhamer 1990, pp. 523-38). In
the case of self-produced rotary and other types of movement, a
glowing light fixed opposite a diver's eye appears to move with
him, but with a slight lag (Ross 1990, pp. 480-81; Ross & Lennie
1968). This effect may be similar to lags noted by Craybiel and
Brown (1951) and Gregory (1958). Lags or leads may occur when
there is other information besides vestibular or visual informa-
tion (e.g., passive tactile or active movement information) that
may subtract from or add to the vestibular or visual effect.
Wertheim thinks it unlikely that the gain of the reference
signal is close to 1.0 during fast body movements but that the
discrepancy fails to cause apparent movement of the visual
world, perhaps because the JNDs for the reference signal are
too large (sect. 5.4, para. 5). Yet body movement can cause
illusory visual movement under ambiguous circumstances. For
example, Thompson (1879) described walking up a path to the
Clifton suspension bridge and watching it move up and down in
relation to his steps when observed intermittently through
trees. Hill walkers often report that rocks appear to move in a
mist, resembling moving climbers (Ross 1974, pp. 128-29). This
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phenomenon may be an example of autokinetic movement
without a predictable direction, but the effect usually occurs
only when the observer is walking (in which case the rocks
appear to move in the direction opposite to the motion of the
walker). The excessive apparent movement may be caused by
exaggerated apparent distance in a mist, a given angular move-
ment corresponding to a greater linear movement at a greater
distance; but it may equally well be caused by an undersized
visual contribution to the reference signal in such circum-
stances. Kinaesthetic information may be inadequate for a
veridical reference signal without a normal visual scene
component.
What does linear vection tell us about the
optokinetic pathway?
Xavier M. Sauvan
k364070@czhrzu1 a.bitnet; Department of Neurology. University Hospital.
CH-8091 Zurich, Switzerland
Wertheim states that an optokinetic (visual) pattern must be
large, must have relatively low spatial frequency characteristics,
must not move too fast across the retina, and must remain visible
for more than a very brief period. It should be possible to get a
more accurate understanding of the optokinetic pathway by
studying linear ego motion. This has not been done exhaustively
in the target article.
Regarding the low spatial frequency characteristics of an
optokinetic stimulation, it has been shown that rectilinear and
curvilinear vection is perceived when the spatial frequency of
the optokinetic stimulation is less than 1 c/deg (Sauvan &
Bonnet 1989). Rectilinear vection corresponds to the sensation
of moving in a straight line (Berthoz et al. 1975), and curvilinear
vection to the sensation of making a turn. The latter is similar to
the actual observer ego motion in a curved path and is induced
by asymmetrical visual stimuli, especially with respect to spatial
frequency (Sauvan & Bonnet 1993). Moreover, the perceived
velocity of curvilinear vection varies (decreases) to spatial fre-
quency (Sauvan & Bonnet 1993). The experienced velocity of
curvilinear vection therefore, depends on the spatial charac-
teristics of the optokinetic stimulation, as in circular vection (de
Graaf et al. 1990). This should be related to the low spatial band-
pass characteristic of gating mechanism defined here by
Wertheim.
There is also a zone of maximal sensitivity to the contrast for
rectilinear vection centered on the low spatial frequencies and
the middle temporal frequencies (Sauvan & Bonnet 1988). It has
also been shown that the perceived velocity of curvilinear
vection varies (increases) with contrast (Sauvan & Bonnet 1993).
Further investigation should indicate how this contrast input is
involved in the gating and/or comparator mechanism.
How the optokinetic pathway responds to angular velocity
seems to depend on the kind of ego motion. Indeed, linear
vection is perceived when the angular velocity of the stimulation
is slower than about 40 deg/sec (Sauvan & Bonnet 1989); circular
vection can be induced with faster angular velocity up to more
than 100 deg/sec (Buttner & Henn 1981).
Linear ego motion can be induced with central or peripheral
visual stimulation of small size. Rectilinear vection can be
induced with central radially expanding depth patterns as small
as 7.5 deg (Andersen & Braunstein 1985). Also, curvilinear
vection can be generated with drifting sinewave gratings dis-
played peripherally behind an aperture subtending a visual
angle of 23 deg (Sauvan & Bonnet 1989; 1993). Moreover, it has
been shown that circular vection can be obtained with central
stimulations as small as 13.5 deg (Howard & Heckmann 1989).
Consequently, the optokinetic pathway actually responds not
only to small and large but also to central and peripheral
optokinetic patterns.
It is known that complex visual information can characterize
optokinetic stimulation such as depth cues. Andersen and
Braunstein (1985) used radial flow patterns that simulated linear
movement through a three-dimensional cloud of dots for induc-
ing rectilinear vection. It was found that apparent depth (intro-
duced by using kinetic occlusion information) influences hori-
zontal linear vection strength (Telford et al. 1992). Therefore,
the parietal dorsal medial superior temporal (MSTd) area should
be a main part of the optokinetic pathway at the cortical level.
Indeed, neurons have been found in this area which code
motion in depth (Goodale & Milner 1992), respond to optic flow
stimuli (Wurtz & Duffy 1992, or project to the accessory optic
system (Maioli et al. 1989).
In short, it is worthwhile and challenging to compare linear
ego motion with circular ego motion. A better understanding
not only of complex self-motion should thereby be reached but
also of visuo-vestibular interactions. Indeed, there is doubt as to
the extent to which visuo-otolith and visuo-semicircular canal
interaction pathways are segregated. We think it is now impor-
tant to propose specific and testable hypotheses about the
physiological mechanisms and anatomical pathways involved in
visuo-vestibular interactions.
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Ecological efference mediation theory and
motion perception during self-motion
Wayne L. Shebilske
wls9357@zeus.tamu.edu; Department of Psychology, Texas A&M
University, College Station, TX 77843-4235
Wertheim's model of motion perception during self-motion and
Shebilske's (1984; 1987a; 1987b; 1990) ecological efference me-
diation (EEM) theory have mutual implications that highlight
important parts of Wertheim's contribution. First, Wertheim
makes a strong case that motion perception during self-motion is
determined by an interaction of information originating in light
patterns and information originating inside the observer.
Second, although Wertheim's quantitative model of this interac-
tion stems from inferential theory, the model with respect to
relative motion is consistent with direct perception theory, as is
the model with respect to absolute motion, though with one
exception: The mainstream of direct perception theory has
restricted its analysis of visual perception to the investigation of
optic flow invariants as documented in Wertheim's Note 2. As
documented in the same footnote, however, Gibson's (1966,
pp. 283-84) earlier systems approach recognized that sensory
information originating in light and sensory information origi-
nating in the observer could enter into a unique invariant
relation that could directly determine perceptions.
EEM theory extended this reasoning to include special in-
variant relations between light-based and efference-based infor-
mation. Wertheim's quantitative model can be thought of in
terms of this special kind of invariant relation. The impressive
predictive ability of Wertheim's model suggests that direct
perception theorists made a false step when they confined their
analysis of visual perception to information originating in light
patterns. Direct perception theory was on the right track when
it encouraged the consideration of invariant relationships be-
tween sensory information originating in light and sensory
information originating in the observer. Furthermore, the suc-
cess of Wertheim's model suggests that EEM theory is on the
right track.
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EEM theory holds, with other ecological theories, that
perception-action relationships are shaped by the interaction of
an organism with its environment and that operations for encod-
ing sensory information approach optimal efficiency in the
environment in which a species evolved. In contrast with the
dominant ecological theories, however, it also holds that (a)
efference-based information (e.g., from the oculomotor system)
interacts with higher-order light-based information (e.g., from
optical flow patterns) to determine performance during natural
events and that (b) fallibility in both visual and efference-based
information function synergistically to shape both the phy-
logeny and ontogeny of the visual system (Shebilske et al. 1984).
EEM theory is supported by research on minor motor anoma-
lies (MMAs) - dysfunctional states of slight misalignment or
misregistration of body part positions (Shebilske 1984; 1987a).
These motor states are abnormal in the sense that they are
dysfunctional rather than rare, and minor as opposed to major
errors (such as paralysis). For example, after people maintain an
eccentric direction of gaze for about 30 sec or longer, the biased
gaze direction causes a misregistration of eye position, which in
turn causes observers to misjudge visual direction. This MMA
influences pointing and dart throwing in reduced and full
viewing conditions (Shebilske 1977; 1984). Similar MMAs influ-
ence pointing to different distances (Shebilske et al. 1984) and
baseball batting (Shebilske 1987b). These experiments have
induced MMAs during natural events and have measured
MMA-illusions during natural events. Thus, the perceived
direction of objects in a given light pattern, including those
occurring during natural events, depends on the state of ocu-
lomotor information; and the visual consequences of change in
oculomotor information depend upon the state of visual infor-
mation. This pattern of results is exactly what would be expected
if visual and oculomotor information interact.
A gap in the previous support for EEM theory, however, was
the lack of a quantitative model of the interaction. Wertheim's
model fills that gap. Accordingly, if MMAs can be found for the
estimators of eye velocity in the orbit or head velocity in space,
Wertheim's model will be able to predict precisely the influence
of these MMAs on motion perception during self-motion in
natural events.
Even without MMAs, Wertheim's quantitative predictions
should allow precise specifications of boundary conditions that
are predicted by EEM theory. The theory distinguishes be-
tween conscious perceptions and sensorily guided actions that
are not mediated by conscious perceptions. It predicts that
practice can bring a sensorily guided skill under the control of an
unconscious representation generated by a unique input opera-
tion. EEM theory hence rejects the linear models that have
guided diverse scientific theories according to which sensorily
guided performance is based on perception (cf. Goodale 1988).
Advocates of linear models would not deny that perceptions
with and without action require different processes, but they
would insist on the assumption that the separate sensorimotor
modules diverge after perceptual constancy mechanisms yield
the stable representations needed for skilled performance.
Linear theorists must insist on this assumption because it is a
necessary consequence of a model in which action is based on
perceptual representations. This rationale could account for the
emphasis on appearance as opposed to performance in the
constancy literature. Diverging theories, constructs, and opera-
tions in constancy research suggest, however, that linear models
cannot account for constancy data (Shebilske & Peters, in press),
and that progress toward synthesis will be made when unilinear
approaches that ask either-or questions about perception are
replaced by a multilinear approach that investigates multiple
spatial representations for perception and performance in spe-
cific integrated sensorimotor modules.
The distinction between inferential and direct is accordingly
lost in the domain studied by Wertheim, but the distinction is
not resolved for other constancies (Shebilske & Peters, in press),
and we cannot assume that it is resolved for all sensorily guided
actions during self-motion either.
At this early stage in its development, the ecological efference
mediation theory provides only a loose packaging for the con-
stancy data. Quantitative models such as Wertheim's should
help articulate the integration and coordination of diverse oper-
ations (e.g., unconscious inference or direct perception), by
specifying the boundary conditions for the operation of specific
multiple representations that emerge as a result of interactions
between an organism and its environment.
The idea that space perception involves
more than eye movement signals and
the position of the retinal image has
come up before
Alexander A. Skavenski
skavenski@neu.edu; Department of Psychology, Northeastern University,
Boston, MA 02115
The main thrust of Wertheim's target article is that controversy
about how visual perception of motion takes place can be
resolved if it is realized that global retinal stimulation such as an
optokinetic drum actually contributes information that supple-
ments vestibular signals about how the body is moving in space.
This suggestion has been raised by numerous investigators of
the oculomotor compensation for body motion who noted that
the dynamic ranges of the vestibular and optokinetic systems
were complementary (for review, see Collewijn 1985; Simpson
& Graf 1985; Young 1985). As Wertheim notes, a problem in
motion perception is that information about head motion in
space must be used in addition to retinal image motion and
extraretinal eye movement signals referenced to the head.
Earlier, Skavenski (1990) made a similar suggestion, and noted
that if both retinal stimulation by large scenes and vestibular
signals contributed to the head motion signal this would account
for a number of illusory situations often taken to support a
limited role for nonretinal signals in space perception.
Skavenski made this suggestion to counter the Post and
Leibowitz (1985) suggestion that only the phylogenetically
newer pursuit system contributes eye movement signals to
motion perception while the older optokinetic system moves the
eye without signaling perception of that motion. Post &
Leibowitz had explained the Dunker illusion in which a physi-
cally stationary spot is seen to move when it is enclosed by a
moving frame in the following way. The frame produced retinal
image motion that stimulated optokinetic nystagmus (OKN)
without extraretinal signs. This OKN was countered by smooth
pursuit to keep the eye on the small spot. The pursuit-generated
extraretinal signals thus caused perceived motion in the spot.
Skavenski noted that it was equally plausible that the fraine
motion generated information that the head was moving in
space. Since the eye did not move in the head and the small spot
did not move on the retina, it must be moving with the person.
Skavenski also argued that the latter idea is more efficient
because it, unlike the Post & Leibowitz suggestion, does not
require an explanation of why nature would have taken the
trouble to evolve relatively sophisticated compensatory ocu-
lomotor systems to output behavior that would confuse the
animal about object location and motion.
In sum, Wertheim's target article mainly offers additional
evidence to support the idea that information beyond that
contained in the retinal image is used in perceiving object
motion. In this light, it is a surprise that Wertheim does not also
include the results of Hansen (1979), who reported a high
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quality of extraretinal eye position signal during smooth pursuit
eye movement or of Hansen and Skavenski (1985), who showed
that a good quality extraretinal signal (both in space and time)
was available for localization during saccades. Both of these
reports were concerned with judgments of the position of
objects, but other such observations which dealt with position
judgments were included (e.g., Matin et al. 1969).
"Sensory" reference frames and the
information for self-motion versus
object motion
Thomas A. Stoffregen
stoffreg@ucbeh.san.uc.edu; Department of Psychology, University of
Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0376
Wertheim describes a situation in which passive, restrained
observer's experience themselves as rotating while sitting in a
terms of the types of energy that stimulate different perceptual
systems. For example, the referent for the vestibular system is
believed to be specific force, for the auditory system, airborne
mechanical vibrations, and for vision anisotropic optical struc-
ture. An important property of these sense-specific reference
frames is that they are mutually exclusive. This leads to the
conclusion that each perceptual system can indicate object or
self-motion independently and that they often indicate different
(incompatible) motion relationships between the self and all or
part of the environment (cf. Stoffregen & Riccio 1988). These
assumptions underlie the common belief that an animal can have
a perception of orientation or motion that is peculiar to a
particular perceptual system, as when Wertheim, without any
prelude or subsequent justification, defines his area of study as
"the visual percept" of "motion or stationarity,' (emphasis
added).' The assertion that we can have a visual perception of
self-motion or stasis (physical events that stimulate multiple
perceptual systems; Stoffregen 1990) entails strong assumptions
about relations among perceptual systems. These assumptions
are rarely explicitly presented or defended. The belief in sense-
chair that is stationary with respect to a rotating optokinetic specific perception of self-motion is common in the literature on
drum. He describes their experience as "an illusory sensation of
ego rotation.' He does not explain why this percept is inter-
preted as an illusion. There is, however, a clear implication that
"illusory" self-motion is not real, that it constitutes a perceptual
error. There is an implied assumption (common in the self-
motion literature) that motion of the self relative to the sub-
stratum and gravity is "real," whereas motion relative to the
optical (or acoustic) surround is "illusory." Wertheim defines
motion relative to earth gravity as "absolute" motion. Similar
interpretations are made in the vestibular community in the
case of the so-called oculogravic and audiogravic illusions (Gray-
biel 1952; Graybiel & Niven 1951). In the literature on per-
ceived orientation, gravity is assumed to be primary (Schone
1984). In none of these cases is any a priori (theoretical) justifica-
tion offered for the primacy of gravity. In all of these cases,
subjective reports that deviate from gravity are illusory only if
we assume that observers are basing their perception of self-
motion on earth gravity.
In fact, the distinction between absolute and relative motion
is inaccurate and misleading; there is nothing absolute about
motion relative to earth's gravity, as Einstein showed (Einstein
& Infeld 1938). Moreover, there is reason to believe that gravity
is not a fundamental referent for animals. Recent theory and
experimentation have shown that gravity is not the primary
referent for the perception or control of orientation. Rather,
orientation is perceived and controlled with respect to the
direction of balance, which often differs from the direction of
gravity (Riccio et al. 1992; Riccio & Stoffregen 1990; Stoffregen
& Riccio 1988). Thus, the assumption that orientation and
motion are perceived and controlled relative to gravity is not
only theoretically problematic but contradicted by recent data.
The discussion of absolute and relative motion has importance
for Wertheim beyond the interpretation of subjective reports. It
supports one of his major conclusions: "Direct perception the-
ory is concerned with the perception of relative motion and
inferential theory with the perception of absolute motion." This
amounts to a claim that direct perception addresses perception
of motion relative to objects, whereas inferential theory ad-
dresses perception of motion relative to the earth. I doubt
whether either camp would accept this characterization. Shorn
of its incorrect terminology the claim becomes both less inter-
esting and less defensible.
Perception can be understood as a form of measurement and,
like other forms of measurement, it must be scaled relative to a
frame of reference (Bingham 1987). Wertheim's analysis is con-
sistent with traditional assumptions about scales or referents for
perception. One assumption of the traditional view is that there
is a separate "reference frame" for each perceptual system. The
hypothetical referents are defined external to the animal, in
vection (e.g., Sauvan & Bonnet 1993; Warren & Kurtz 1992), but
it is not universal (e.g., Stoffregen & Riccio 1990; 1991; cf. DiZio
& Lackner 1986).
Recent theoretical developments have questioned traditional
assumptions about sensory reference frames. Stoffregen and
Riccio (1988; 1991) have argued that the perceptual systems are
not sensitive to extrinsic reference frames defined in terms of
stimulus energy. Instead, the referents for perceptual systems
are kinematic events and states of the interaction between the
animal and the environment (and, hence, intrinsic rather than
extrinsic; cf. Mark 1987). For example, rather than being sensi-
tive to specific force, as has traditionally been assumed, the
vestibular system appears to be sensitive to kinematics that have
consequences for the control of posture, such as dynamic orien-
tation relative to the direction of balance (Riccio et al. 1992). The
perception of these kinematics can be achieved without prior or
concurrent sensitivity to specific force. Information about dy-
namic orientation relative to the direction of balance is available
to other perceptual systems in addition to the vestibule. For
example, postural sway gives rise to optical flow and the parame-
ters of this optical flow (e.g., patterns of changing acceleration)
are specific to dynamic orientation relative to the direction of
balance. Sensitivity to this information does not depend on
sensitivity to anisotropic optical structure. These examples
illustrate the argument that orientation can be perceived with-
out appeal to sense-specific reference frames (Stoffregen &
Riccio 1988; 1991). These postural kinematics are determined
by dynamical properties of the body in interaction with the
environment rather than by the dynamics of receptors or "esti-
mators" that are central to Wertheim's approach.
How does this analysis apply to the perception of self-motion
(translation) and its differentiation from object motion?
Stoffregen and Riccio (1990; Stoffregen 1985; 1986) analyzed
kinematic stimulation that is created by motion of the self
(postural sway) and motion of objects (looming, or impending
collision). Rather than relying on subjective reports of self- and
object motion (which have the problems of interpretation dis-
cussed above), this research relies on adaptive behavioral re-
sponses to different events (compensatory sway, dodging in
avoidance). Our data and analysis of the literature indicate that
self- and object motion cannot be differentiated reliably on the
basis of stimulus variables such as optical velocity and the
angular extent of stimulation, the kinds of variables that are
central to Wertheim's model. Optical velocity does not provide
reliable information about parameters of physical motion; it can
function as no more than a probabalistic cue (Stoffregen 1986).
Its use as a cue for estimating these parameters would be
unnecessary if the differing dynamics of self- and object motion
were specified directly in perceptual stimulation. Stoffregen
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and Riccio (1990) argued that this is the case: that self-motion
and object motion, being different events, give rise to different
patterns of sensory stimulation, and that these patterns of
stimulation are lawfully (and uniquely) related to the underlying
events, so that they provide information for the events.
Hence, the differing physical dynamics of object motion and
motion of the body are available in perceptual stimulation. To
the extent that perceptual systems are sensitive to these dynam-
ical differences, object and self-motion can be differentiated
directly, that is, without the need for internally generated
(mediated) estimates. This is similar to Wertheim's characteriza-
tion of the direct perception view as one in which veridical
perception arises exclusively from afferent information. How-
ever, Wertheim's understanding of afferent information is in
terms of sense-specific probabilistic dues in retinal flow, while in
my view afferent information is in terms of amodal or cross-
modal patterns of stimulation that are deterministically specific
to object-motion and self-motion events.
NOTE
1. The power of this assumption can be extraordinary. Wertheim
retains the terminology of "the visual perception of self-motion" despite
tile fact that lie discusses nonvisiial (vestibular) influences on the
percept. Apparently, vestibular stimulation influences the perception of
self-motion without disturbing or compromising its "visual" character.
Does the reference signal cancel
visual field motion?
Arnold E. Stoper
astoperQtseq.csuhayward.edu; Psychology Department, California State
University, Hayward, CA 94542
Wertheim's attempt to explain a wide variety of motion phenom-
ena in terms of a simple reference signal that adds vectorially to
the retinal signal has considerable appeal. However, I believe
that a serious problem in his presentation is a failure to distin-
guish between "visual field " motion and "visual world" motion
(Gibson 1950).
In the original Filehne (1922) illusion, the observer tracks a
moving point in normal room illumination and observes retro-
grade motion of the background. As I described it (Stoper 1967;
1973), this is a paradoxical motion - the background moves, but
it doesn't go anywhere. This can be characterized as a motion of
the "visual field" rather than "visual world" (see Mack 1978 and
Rock 1977, for sophisticated discussions of this distinction).
According to Gibson, one must take a "pictorial attitude," that
is, view the world as a picture, in order to experience the visual
field, and in this case, visual field motion. On a first demonstra-
tion, only about 50% of observers will spontaneously report such
motion, but with appropriate guidance (and patience!) I have
found that nearly everyone will report it. All observers will
agree that the background "smears" somewhat when one is
following a moving target. Once attention is called to this
"smearing," observers will agree that the image of the back-
ground does not just smear, it also moves, in some sense. At the
same time, in another sense, the background remains stable,
that is, there is no motion of the "visual world." Readers can
easily demonstrate these phenomena for themselves simply by
tracking a pencil point moving over a page of text.
Wertheim concluded (as did Mack 1978) that the Filehne
illusion is caused by an underregistration of pursuit velocity,
hence a reference signal too small to cancel the background
retinal signal. However, the Filehne illusion as measured by
Wertheim seems to differ in character from the one originally
noticed by Filehne. Wertheim measured the illusion by nulling
until the observer reported "stability." For a large, continuously
present background (sect. 5.1 and Fig. 4), he finds no Filehne
illusion at all, but these are precisely the conditions in which
Filehne first noticed his illusion, and the ones I describe above.
If Wertheim's observers were nulling visual world motion in-
stead of visual field motion they would, of course, have seen the
large background stable with no nulling necessary, and this
would account for the lack of any measured illusion; it seems
likely that this was in fact the case. Even though the large
background was reported stable, it would still have had visual
field motion. If this account is correct, then the illusion
Wertheim measured was something other than the original
Filehne illusion. Wertheim's experiments thus fail to show that
the reference signal has any capacity at all to cancel retinal image
motion once it results in visual field motion and his explanation
of the Filehne illusion in terms of the undersized reference
signal is not applicable to the illusion originally described by
Filehne.
The theoretical importance of the visual field motion of the
background seen during pursuit arises from its absence in the
case of a saccade. In a normally illuminated environment, there
is no hint of the field motion seen during pursuit. I showed
(Stoper 1967; 1973) that this difference in appearance is not due
to the smooth "dragging" of the image during pursuit as opposed
to the "hopping" of the image during the saccade, as had been
suggested by Gregory (1958). I believe that this difference
between pursuit and saccade presents problems for Wertheim's
assumption (Note 7) that the same reference signal and essen-
tially the same JND (just noticeable difference) raising process
are responsible for both stability during pursuit and stability
during the saccade. My conclusion was, and remains, that some
central process must take place during the saccade which does
not occur during pursuit. One candidate for such a "saccade
only" central process is the simple suppression of the retinal
signal, as suggested by Wallach and Lewis (1965).
In fact, it is quite possible, as I suggested (Stoper 1967), that
once generated the retinal signal is never cancelled by vectorial
addition of a reference signal, no matter how large. If the retinal
signal does not add vectorially to the retinal image signal, how
do they interact? One possibility is illustrated by the famous
"motion analysis " demonstration of Johannson (1982), consisting
of a wheel rolling in the dark. If a point on the rim is illuminated,
it is seen to describe a cycloid, which is its actual trajectory in
space. If a point at the center of the wheel is illuminated, it will
have only linear translational motion. If both points are illumi-
nated and the point at the center is pursued, the reference signal
will be translational and the retinal signal of the rim point will be
circular. If these two signals were to add vectorially, the "true'
motion of the rim point in space would be seen; it would be the
sum of the circular and translational components, that is, a
cycloidal motion. As is well known, this/is not the percept at all.
Instead, what is seen is a wheel rolling - the point at the rim is
seen to describe a circular motion about the center and the
entire wheel is seen to translate. The point at the rim has both
circular and translational components - it goes around the
center, but it is part of the wheel and translates with the wheel -
but these two components do not add vectorially. They remain
independent, and can be perceived separately.
Returning to the explanation of stability, perhaps it really is
visual world motion that is important, and as Gibson would say,
visual field motion is just an artifact produced by unnatural
viewing conditions. Can stability of the visual world be brought
about by Wertheim's proposed mechanism; that is, by vec-
torially adding a reference signal to the retinal signal? This is at
least plausible in the cases of eye movement or of purely
rotational movement of the observer, when the image motion
has one constant velocity at any one time over the entire retina.
It would be at least theoretically possible for a single valued
reference signal to "cancel" this retinal motion by subtraction.
However, if there is any translational component to the motion
of the observer, the optic flow and the corresponding image flow
on the retina become much more complex, with a wide range of
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velocities at any one instant in time. The image movement
would be a function of both distance and direction to each
particular surface element in the world (see, e.g., Gibson 1954).
Any reference signal which is subtracted from the retinal signal
must have a range of values similar to that of the retinal signal at
one instant of time in order to produce stability. A single valued
reference signal such as the one proposed by Wertheim cannot
fail to produce cancellation of the retinal signal and stability of
the visual world during translational observer movement.
Finally, consider the appearance of the visual field in the case
of translational observer movement. Despite the apparent sta-
bility of the visual world, the "optic flow" of the field remains
visible, that is, nearby objects appear to move back faster than
distant ones. This is, of course, visual field motion, and can be
taken as showing that the retinal image motion is not cancelled.
A better description of what happens to this field motion would
seem to be that of Duncker (1929): the field motion is attributed
to the motion of the observer rather than motion of the world.
Spatial motion perception requires the
perception of distance
Michael Swanston
bstwts@cluster.cc.dct.ac.uk; Dundee Institute of Technology, Bell Street,
Dundee DD1 1HG, Scotland
Wertheim presents a model of the process by which perceived
motion is derived from retinal and extraretinal information. The
model provides an account of a wide range of motion phenom-
ena, including veridical and nonveridical perceptions, the mo-
tion aftereffect, induced movement, and vection. Most cru-
cially, the model is expressed in terms of motion in space (of the
eyes, of the observer, and of stimuli), and thus appears to
provide a complete system of explanation. This impression may
be misleading, however, despite the use of the subscript "space"
to indicate the frame of reference for velocity terms in various
formulae.
The problem is apparent from a consideration of the situation
discussed in section 5.4. Wertheim describes the case of a train
driver looking forward as the train accelerates from rest. Ini-
tially, the vestibular system provides information for ego mo-
tion. This is said to provide a reference signal which will be
"approximately equal to the retinal signal evoked by the moving
image of the visual world," and the driver's world is therefore
perceptually stable, but this is clearly unworkable. The refer-
ence signal from the vestibular system defines an acceleration
along the z-axis. The retinal motion information is multidirec-
tional, and variable in magnitude across the retina. There is no
single retinal signal from which the vestibular reference signal
can be subtracted. What is required for this is a transformation
of the retinal information to express the spatial motion of objects
relative to the observer. Such a signal, which is egocentric
rather than retinocentric, could be combined additively with a
reference signal for self-motion to give a perceptually stable
visual world. Gogel and Tietz (1992) have recently described
experiments which show that the perceived sagittal motion of
objects during self-motion is determined by the product of
retinal motion and perceived distance and not just by the
subtraction of perceived self-motion from retinal motion.
In general, the operation of subtracting a reference signal
from a sensory signal can be considered a conversion of the
frame of reference with respect to which the sensory signal is
expressed (Swanston et al. 1987). Thus, subtraction of a refer-
ence signal representing movements of the eyes with respect to
the head from a sensory signal for image motion over the retinae
yields a value which represents image motion with respect to
the head. Such a signal will be altered by movements of the head
in space and by perceived distance (Swanston & Wade 1988;
1992a). This may not seem to be the case, however, if an
observer is stationary, perceived distance is constant, and reti-
nal motion is entirely due to object or eye movements. Under
such conditions, which obtain in the experiments described by
Wertheim in section 5.1, only one frame of reference (egocen-
tric) will appear to be operating and the influence of perceived
distance will not be apparent.
Even if physical distance is held constant, the influence of
perceived distance on perceived motion can readily be demon-
strated. Gogel's extensive work on this issue (see Gogel 1990 for
an overview and synthesis of his theoretical and empirical
investigations) can hardly be ignored by any theory of motion
perception that aims to describe object and observer motions in
three dimensions. Wertheim does not refer to this work, which
cannot be accounted for by the model presented in the target
article. Consider the case of an observer making lateral head
movements while fixating an object at a fixed distance. There
will be no motion on the retina, and the rotation of the eyes in
the head will be such as to cancel out the effects of the lateral
head movements on the retinal position of the object. If, as
Wertheim makes clear, registered values for image motion, eye
movements, and head movements are veridical, then the object
will appear to be stationary. However, this will not be so if there
is any mismatch between the object's physical and perceived
distance. If the object is seen to be nearer than its physical
distance, it will appear to be moving with the head. If it is seen as
farther away, it will appear to move against the head. These
effects are indistinguishable from, and additive with, real mo-
tions, and they occur equally in a structured visual field (Gogel
1982; Gogel et al. 1985). Thus, a physical motion can be
perceptually increased, cancelled, or reversed, solely by the
manipulation of perceived distance. In Wertheim's model, only
a single value of the reference signal representing eye move-
ment "in space" is available, regardless of the perceived distance
of the stimulus object, and thus no influence of perceived
distance on perceived motion would be predicted.
A similar problem arises when there is relative motion be-
tween visible objects. In section 5.3, Wertheim states that such
motion signals are independent of eye movements; this is only
the case if the head is stationary, however, and the eye move-
ments are rotations in the head (Wade & Swanston 1987). If the
head moves, and the retinae move in space, then the objects'
physical distances will determine their relative retinal motions
and give rise to motion parallax. The perceived outcome is then
some combination of relative depth (Rogers & Graham 1979)
and relative motion, the balance between the two being influ-
enced by the perceived egocentric distance of the objects (Ono
et al. 1986). We have discussed the role of relative motion
information in induced movement (Wade & Swanston 1987) and
the motion aftereffect (Swanston & Wade 1992b) in the context
of a model of motion perception which explicitly incorporates
perceived distance and covers much of the same ground as that
proposed here by Wertheim. In addition, we have argued that
the issues of binocular combination and visual direction from the
cyclopean eye should be addressed by any model of spatial
motion perception (Swanston et al. 1990).
From our point of view, Wertheim has provided a detailed
analysis of the early stages in motion perception, concerning the
derivation of an egocentric signal from motions of and over a
retina, where the former are due to equal rotations of both eyes.
Much valuable information regarding the psychophysics of this
process is summarised, but the model itself does not appear to
be able to support a truly spatial account of motion perception.
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A cortical substrate for motion perception
during self-motion
Peter Thier,° Roger G. Ericksonb and Johannes Dichgans0
'thier@mailserv.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de; "Department of Neurology, University
of Tubingen, 72076 Tubingen, Germany and "Laboratory of
Neurophysiology, National Institute of Mental Health, Poolesville, MD 20837
Wertheim's target article provides a model of motion perception
during self-motion that rests on the assumption that percepts of
object motion are derived by comparing retinal slip of the object
image with an internal reference signal. The reference signal
suggested by Wertheim describes how the eyes move in space
and relies on both visual and nonvisual information. His theory
is largely based on psychophysical observations. Quite under-
standably, the question of where and how in the brain the
mechanism he proposes might be implemented is accordingly
not the focus of his attention. The results of our recent experi-
ments using monkeys shed some light on this as well as on some
of the other issues discussed by Wertheim.
In our experiments, single-unit electrophysiological record-
ings from cortical visual areas were used to compare the re-
sponses of visual neurons to slow retinal image motion caused
either by object motion or pursuit eye movement. Three of our
results are directly relevant to the target article. First, direc-
tionally selective cortical visual neurons that respond selectively
only to externally induced visual motion were found (we named
these "passive-only" cells). Second, these neurons were lo-
calized in a single visual area (the dorsal part of medial superior
temporal area MST). The overwhelming majority of neurons
sampled from other cortical visual areas (including medial tem-
poral area, MT) could not discriminate the source of retinal
image motion. Third, our results clearly showed that both visual
and apparently nonvisual signals contribute to the passive-only
properties of cells in MST. We therefore support Wertheim's
suggestion that both visual and nonvisual signals contribute to
evaluation of object- and self-motion.
The passive-only neurons found in MST respond vigorously
to retinal image motion resulting from object motion ("passive"
image slip) but weakly or not at all if the same retinal image slip
results from smooth pursuit eye movements ("active" image
slip). Assuming that monkeys perceive a stable visual world
during ego motion much as we do, these MST passive-only cells
are currently the only known candidate substrate for spatial
stability during ego motion. Our finding that most other parts of
the monkey visual system simply ignore the source of retinal
image motion (object motion or ego motion) simply reaffirms the
fact that visual motion information can contribute to several
aspects of visual perception in addition to spatial orientation and
ego motion. This is demonstrated clearly by our finding that
most neurons in area MT, the prototypical cortical motion-
processing area, do not discriminate object motion from ego
motion (Erickson & Thier 1991). The same inability to discrimi-
nate object motion and ego motion also characterizes earlier
stages of visual-motion processing. As early as 1969, Wurtz had
shown that visual neurons in area 17, the primary visual cortex,
could not discriminate high velocity retinal image motion
caused by saccadic eye movements from those caused by object
motion. Although one might argue that the neurons studied by
Wurtz (1969) were mostly nondirectional visual neurons, that is,
neurons not involved in the analysis of visual motion, the
absence of passive-only properties in directionally selective MT
neurons indicates that this information is not available to the
direction-specific VI neurons projecting to MT, a fact recently
confirmed in our laboratory (Ilg & Thier 1993).
Our analysis of the mechanisms contributing to the passive-
only property is directly relevant to evaluating the competing
theories of motion perception discussed by Wertheim. Propo-
nents of the direct perception theory have suggested that the
ability to discriminate object- and self-motion might be derived
from retinal information alone. One visual cue that might be
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used for this purpose is the coherent displacement of the entire
visual background that occurs during eye movements. The work
of Tanaka et al. (1986) has shown that full-field visual motion can
activate otherwise silent directionally specific inhibitory recep-
tive field surrounds in some MST neurons, thus suppressing
responses that would otherwise result from the motion of con-
tours across the receptive field center if contours outside the
field were moving in the same direction. Our experiments
showed that some of the passive-only cells did indeed appear to
depend on this strictly visual mechanism. When possible, such
cells could rely solely upon easily calibrated relative-motion
cues to discriminate the visual conditions that usually occur
when self-motion occurs in an environment with ample back-
ground visual contours.
These cells lose their passive-only property, however, during
eye movements against a background that is relatively dark or
featureless except for the stimulus crossing the receptive field.
In this instance it is necessary to rely upon other, possibly
nonvisual reference signals. Our results demonstrated that
some of the passive-only cells did not have center-surround
visual interactions of the type described by Tanaka et al. and
instead relied upon apparently nonvisual inputs to cancel the
normal effect of retinal image motion across the cells' receptive
field (Erickson & Thier 1992). We therefore agree with
Wertheim that both visual and nonvisual mechanisms are neces-
sary to provide an accurate sense of ego motion under the entire
range of natural conditions. Our analysis has not yet addressed
the question of whether passive-only cells that use nonvisual
reference signals are able to enhance their selectivity for object
motion when additional visual information is available to help
discriminate ego motion. At any rate, our results show that, at
least at the population level, the integration of both visual and
nonvisual signals referencing eye movements is present.
While the contribution of both visual and nonvisual compo-
nents to the reference signal is in general agreement with
Wertheim's model, an apparent discrepancy between the
single-unit data and his model should be mentioned. According
to Wertheim, the visual component of the reference signal
basically corresponds to an optokinetic signal which, despite a
short onset latency, is characterized by slow buildup and decay
involving a reinterpretation of the source of the perceived visual
motion, that is, whether the retinal image motion represents
target or self-motion. On the other hand, the discrimination of
self-induced retinal image slip represented in the discharge of
MST passive-only cells was always prompt and stable. It would
be interesting to determine whether visual conditions provok-
ing optokinetic responses larger than those usually prevailing in
our experiments also induce gradual changes in the responses of
passive-only cells. We do not, however, feel that lack of this
direct comparison calls into question our attempt to relate
Wertheim's unified theory of motion perception to a cortical
substrate.
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Two straw men stay silent when asked about
the "direct" versus "inferential" controversy
J. R. Tresilian
lames.tresilian@mrc-apu.cam.ac.uk; Medical Research Council (MRC)
Applied Psychology Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge CB2 2EF, United
Kingdom
According to the "inferential" theory, visual information about
image motion is compared to extravisual information about eye
movement to determine whether it is motion of the eyes or of
the environment that is giving rise to the image motion. This
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1994) 17:2 335
Commentary/Wertheim: Motion perception
simple theory is so obviously wrong that it hardly merits men-
tioning. It predicts that if the eyes are stationary in the head as
the head rotates, the resulting image motion will be interpreted
as motion of the environment, yet everyone knows that this does
not happen. As pointed out in the target article, it is motion of
the eyes with respect to the fixed environment that should be
compared with image motion if the "inferential theory" is to
work. Thus, the inferential theory is the hypothesis that image
motion is interpreted as being due to eye movement or to
environmental motion by a comparison with information about
how the eyes are moving relative to the environment.
This inferential theory is most bizarre. Despite all the theo-
retical work which demonstrates that global image motion
specifies how the eyes are moving relative to the environment
(e.g., Bruss & Horn 1983; Gibson et al. 1955; Koenderink & van
Doom 1981; 1987; Lee 1974; Longuet-Higgins & Prazdny
1981), the inferential theory asserts a priori that this information
is not used. Instead of using global image motions as information
about how the eyes are moving, the brain has to interpret these
image motions as due to eye movement or environmental
motion by actually computing how the eyes are moving, using
articular, vestibular, and efference copy information. The infer-
ential theory makes this most extraordinary assertion without
any justification. Hardly surprisingly, it is wrong; it has been
known for a long time that global image flows give rise to the
perception of ego motion.
The "direct theory" described in Wertheim's target article
states that image motion is interpeted as being due to eye
movement or environmental motion directly, that is, without
any use of extravisual information. The idea is simple: global
image flows specify movements of the eyes with respect to the
environment and are thus perceived as such. This direct theory
is also obviously wrong. It predicts that in the absence of global
image flows the eyes will not be perceived as moving when, for
example, pursuing a moving target. That this is, in general, false
is amply demonstrated by people's ability to accurately perceive
the motion of self-luminous objects in the dark (e.g., Rosengren
et al. 1988), something many people have experienced and can
easily verify.
The major distinction between the two theories is not, as
asserted in the target article, that the indirect theory maintains
that "information about how eyes move (in space) is always
necessary to perceive object motion or stationarity" (sect. 3,
para. 8) while the direct theory denies this. Both theories take
this to be a fact. The two theories differ only in what sensory
system they consider to be the source of information about eye
movement in space (Table 1).
The two "theories" must be straw men, because they make
unjustified, a priori assertions which are obviously wrong.
Moreover, they do not bear on the "direct" versus "inferential"
controversy which they misrepresent by reducing it to a debate
over whether motion perception involves only retinal (visual)
information or both retinal and extraretinal information. Re-
gardless of Gibson's opinion about the source(s) of information
involved in visual motion perception, his notion of directness
centres on the idea that stimulus information (across all senses:
there exist what Gibson called "intermodal invariants") is suffi-
cient for veridical perception - nothing need be added. Associ-
ated with this is the notion that the processes of information
extraction cannot be meaningfully decomposed into a sequence
of subprocesses (discussed extensively in Ullman 1980). Theo-
ries which contrast with direct perception are those which
propose either that stimulus information is not sufficient or that
information extraction proceeds in a series of stages. Neither
contrast is made in the target article, which cannot, therefore,
be considered relevant to the controversy. There is some men-
tion of a claim that extraretinal information about eye movement
is insufficient but no reasons are given - though one can see that
there will typically be no extraretinal information at all about
translation of the eyes through space when moving at constant
velocity; but this case is not discussed.
There appear to be a variety of hypotheses about the source(s)
of information about how the eye(s) move in space that might be
proposed to account for motion and no-motion perception. Six
are listed in Table 1. The only hypotheses worth considering are
"dual mode," MDM (modified dual mode), TA (hypothesis
presented in the target article), and MTA (modified target article
hypothesis) because these propose that all available sources of
information are used (though not necessarily all at the same
time). Dual mode theory is the hypothesis that when visual
Table 1 (Tresilian). Six hypotheses about the source(s) of information used in generating percepts of motion and stationarity
Direct Inferential Dual mode MDM" TA'' MTA"
Visual only Extravisual only When "large-field"
image motion is
present only visual
information is used.
Extravisual
otherwise
When "whole-field"
image motion is
present only visual
information is used.
When less than
whole field image
motion is present ex-
travisual information
is used as well.
When no visual field
information is pres-
ent only extravisual
information is used.
Both visual and ex-
travisual may be
used when available.
Not clear exactly
what influences
whether a source is
used and what con-
tribution it makes to
perception. Perhaps
the extent of a wide-
field image motion
influences its contri-
bution.
Both visual and ex-
travisual may be
used when available.
Whether a source is
used and the contri-
bution it makes to
perception depend
not only on whether
it is available but
also on the task and
the context. Thus,
sometimes only visu-
al information may
be used despite ex-
travisual information
being available (and
vice versa).
"MDM is a modified version of the dual mode hypothesis.
fcTA is the hypothesis presented in the target article.
CMTA is a modified version of TA which supposes that the use and contribution of an information source depends on several factors.
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information about eye movement is available it is used and when
it is not, other information is used. I doubt whether this theory
can really be criticised on the grounds that motion is perceived
when pressing on the eyeball (sect. 5.1, para. 4). When I press
on my eyeball I see motion, but if someone asked me if I saw the
world move I would say "no, I saw the image move" - I suppose
that with a bit of effort you could persuade someone to say that
they saw the world move, but this does not prove anything.
What is needed is an objective measure of world-motion (as
opposed to ego-motion) perception following eye-ball pressing.
I do not see that the material reviewed in the target article
allows one to distinguish between the MDM, TA, and MTA
theories as described in Table 1 (the TA theory is rather vague
about what factors influence the sources of the eye-movement
information used and their contribution to perception). The
interesting empirical questions are not concerned with the
distinction between direct and inferential perception (which is
essentially philosophical). Some interesting questions are,
"What sources of information are used? If more than one source
can be used are these sources always used when they are
available or does their use depend on the task and stimulus
conditions? When two or more sources are used together, how
are they combined? Are they differentially weighted according
to task and context? Research described in the target article
addresses some of these questions; I think it is unfortunate that
it has been submerged in a battle between two straw men.
Space as reference signal? Elaborate
it in depth!
Boris M. Velichkovsky3 and A. H. C. Van der Heijdenb
"velich@hrz.uni-bielBfeld.de and "heijden@rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl; "Center for
Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, W-4800 Bielefeld,
Germany; Faculty of Psychology, Moscow State University, 103009
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AK Leiden, The Netherlands
Early psychologists/philosophers distinguished two different
problems in the field of visual spatial perception: the perception
of two-dimensional position and size on the one hand and the
perception of depth on the other (see Kaufman 1974, pp. 213
and 322). The perception of size and of two-dimensional position
were not regarded as problematic issues. An image of an object
covers a portion of the retina at a particular location. It can
therefore be argued that the location on the retina determines
the object's perceived location and that the amount of retinal
surface covered determines the size of the object. In contrast,
depth perception was indeed regarded as problematic. Because
the retinal surface is two-dimensional, depth perception cannot
be related in the same obvious way to one or another aspect of
the retinal image. Thus, the perception of depth required a
different scientific treatment from the perception of size and
two-dimensional position. For this problem, two questions had
to be answered. The first was: What cues are used in depth
perception? The second: How are these cues used in producing
veridical depth perception? The first question brought discov-
eries such as "pictorial cues" (detail perspective, image size,
relative brightness, interposition, etc.) and "physiological cues"
(accommodation, convergence, retinal disparity, etc.). The
second question is conventionally answered by a family of
models using weighted linear combinations of various depth
cues (Cutting et al. 1992a), although, for instance, a fuzzy logical
(Bayesian) model can handle the empirical data equally well
(Massaro & Cohen 1993).
Nowadays there is sufficient reason to ask whether this theo-
retical encapsulation - one type of explanation for size and
position perception and another, more liberal, type of explana-
tion for depth perception - is forced upon us by external nature.
One can doubt (as Gibson 1979 and Kohler 1947 did) whether
retinal size and retinal position are indeed the fundamental
givens that theories about perception must start with. Possibly
other retinal and "extraretinal" parameters are important. One
can even take the view that for visual perception what is
pictured on the back of the retina is of no importance (see
Gibson 1979, for compelling arguments). Then one is clearly in
the position to argue that exactly the same two scientific prob-
lems must be solved for size and position perception as for depth
perception: What cues are used and how are they used in
producing veridical size perception and veridical position
perception?
Wertheim's theory of motion perception during self-motion
makes these questions even more pressing. On the one hand,
Wertheim takes an important step forward in claiming that it is
the representation of space that plays the role of final frame of
reference ("reference signal") for motion and self-motion per-
ception. On the other hand, he does not seem to recognize all
the consequences of this conclusion. He explicitly follows only
one line of analysis derived from the conclusion, namely, the
idea of intermodal, visual-vestibular contribution to the motion
and velocity perception.' In general, however, his theory still
belongs to the traditional "size and position" category and not in
the "depth perception" class.
In Wertheim's theory, information processing for motion
perception and for velocity perception starts with one retinal
given, a "retinal signal" reflecting image motion on the retina,
and only results in a veridical perceptual motion and velocity
interpretation after subtraction of the "reference signal," reflect-
ing artefactual image motion due to movements of the observer.
In a similar vein, in orthodox size and position theories the size
and position of the retinal image was taken as the starting code:
code size is taken as size code and code position is taken as
position code. For motion and velocity such an easy equation is
not possible, of course, and a more abstract code must be looked
for. This code has to be derived from, or calculated on the basis
of, the retinal information. In Wertheim's theory the retinal
signal, Vrel, is this more abstract code. But again the magnitude
of the signal in general corresponds to the retinal image velocity
(even if coding errors can occur in this velocity as when, for
instance, retinal signals underregister image velocity; see sect.
6.4).
In other respects, however, Wertheim's theory must be quali-
tatively more sophisticated than other members of this category.
Thus, in most orthodox size and position theories the problem of
how to undo the raw retinal code from its artefactual compo-
nents is solved in one step: veridical size equals retinal size
times distance and veridical position equals retinal position
minus eye position. For absolute velocity perception such a
simple operation will not do. The problem is not that the
reference signal is a compound signal which includes an effer-
ence copy, a vestibular component and a visual component (see
sect. 3) that all have to be "subtracted" from a retinal velocity.
Rather, contrary to what Wertheim's theory seems to suggest,
veridical absolute velocity perception also requires distance to
be taken into account. In terms of the classical approach, the
equation for absolute perceived velocity has to be as follows:
Distance x (total retinal velocity - artefactual retinal velocity)
Indeed, there are rather dramatic demonstrations of the
importance of depth information exactly in the domain of
Wertheim's research. One of us (Velichkovsky 1982) has, for
example, described the following effect of an excessive eye
vergence in the situation of induced motion perception and
vection. If the convergence is strong enough to warrant the
binocular fusion of vertical drum stripes shifted one period then
the stripes suddenly jump closer to the observer, with their
width diminishing accordingly. Of course, all this is to be
expected on the basis of the common size-distance relationship
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considerations. But at the same time and to the same extent the
perception of motion is changing: both perceived motion of
fixated objects and self-motion become much slower although
the physical stimulation (retinal motion) and hypothetical sub-
tractive components of Wertheim's theory remain effectively
unchanged.2 Together with well-known facts about the depen-
dence of thresholds and perceived parameters of real (Kano
1970; Tyler & Foley 1974) as well as apparent (Corbin 1942;
Larsen et al. 1983) motion on the trajectory in 3-D space these
observations - paradoxically - support the main idea of
Wertheim's work ("space as the reference for visual motion), but
cast doubts on how he tries to elaborate this insight.
There are some additional complexities connected with the
organization of perceptual space. Not only is perceptual space
three-dimensional and intermodal (or amodal). In contrast to the
space of Newtonian physics, it is also anisotropic and non-
homogeneous, so our spatial orientation relies on a multitude of
simultaneously presented frames of reference. In fact, a fairly
common experience in induced motion situations is that several
frames of reference are simultaneously at work: strong vection
can coexist with equally strong motion perception of the "op-
tokinetic" background. A rather similar effect of multiple localiz-
ation of an object is also known from investigations of spatial
perception during saccadic eye movements (Bischof & Kramer
1969). The Gestalt school - being perhaps more sensitive to
peculiar aspects of phenomenal experience - was very con-
cerned with describing and theoretically interpreting such phe-
nomena (see Duncker 1929). According to one of these inter-
pretations, proposed by Metzger (1941), spatial frames of refer-
ence can build functional hierarchies restricting exactly the
applicability of vector analysis to the problems of visual motion
perception (cf. sect. 6.5).
Orthodox size and position theories were convincing largely
because of their simplicity. As is now clear, in Wertheim's theory
of motion and velocity perception this tempting simplicity is
completely absent. In his theory, retinal movement and retinal
velocity are not codes but must be calculated on the basis of
retinal information. The reference signal needed for a correct
perceptual interpretation of this code is not a simple signal but a
compound one calculated on the basis of a diversity of indepen-
dently calculated contributions. And the veridical perceptual
interpretation is not arrived at after a single arithmetic operation
but requires at least several independent calculations within
different domains of processing. The multiple of indirect calcu-
lations makes one wonder whether this type of motion percep-
tion theory is really on the right track. Maybe the time has come
to analyze two important questions in depth: What cues are used
in motion and velocity perception and how are these cues used
in producing veridical perception?
NOTES
1. The list of possible intermodal coordinations in the visual percep-
tion of motion can indeed be larger: there are data on the possibility of
influencing visual autokinesis by providing a stable or moving acoustic
landscape (Velichkovsky 1971).
2. These observations also present a strong argument against modern
versions of "innervation" or "effort" theories of perceived motion (see
e.g., Post et al. 1986), especially in view of individual variability in
parameters of the fixational optokinetic nystagmus in this situation
(Velichkovsky 1973).
The illusion of self-motion in virtual
reality environments
John Wannab and Simon Rushtona
johnT@edinburgh.ac.uk and s.rushton@edinburgh.ac.uk; "Department of
Psychology, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9JZ, Scotland and
"Department of Human Movement, University of Queensland, Australia
The model presented by Wertheim provides a useful stimulus to
reopen debate on a dichotomy that is particularly relevant for
the rapidly emerging technology of virtual environments. A
problem with much of the previous debate in this field is that, in
most natural settings, perception is veridical and hence the
mechanisms of perception remain ambiguous. By contrast, the
principle underpinning the creation of a virtual environment
(VE) is deception. It is technically impossible to present an
observer with a VE that has coherence across the perceptual
domains (e.g., for vision and vestibular stimulation), so the
emphasis has to be on presenting visual displays that are salient
enough to induce the required percept and to establish what
other sensory conditions may be necessary to maintain that
illusion. Research into perception in VEs also reflects back onto
theory by providing a bridge between the ecological contexts
that were favoured by Gibson (1966; 1979) and the unusual
experimental conditions used by Wertheim and coworkers (e. g.,
rotating subjects sinusoidally in darkness with brief flashes of a
striped display).
A typical VE application would be based upon a head-
mounted display (HMD) with two liquid crystal screens (to allow
a stereoscopic display), one positioned in front of each eye, with
magnifying optics. Using the HMD is attractive because it can
be made sensitive to head movement. Hence users can turn
their heads and gain a new perspective or walk forward or back
to explore detail within the computer display. The small exit
pupil of most HMDs places severe limitations on the use of eye
movements to sample the environment so our primary interest
is in Wertheim's proposals on the percept of self-motion.
Wertheim presents the simple example of a train engineer,
where the train accelerates and hence stimulates the vestibular
apparatus, and produces a suitable motion percept (Vhe.l(| s: see
target article). As the train velocity plateaus, however, the
vestibular contribution to VhencLs is gradually replaced with a
visual reference signal, and the transition is smoothed by a
conveniently large JND. The example of the train engineer tells
us little, because in a natural environment it is most unusual to
have vestibular conditions that conflict with the vection informa-
tion, so the transition is assumed rather than confirmed. By
contrast, the observer in a VE may experience visual-vestibular
conflict. In our lab we have sat observers on a chair and sent
them on a virtual (visual) roller-coaster ride where the visual
experience should clearly be correlated with vestibular stimula-
tion. Most naive users report quite a good impression of ego
motion and while this is difficult to explain from an inferential
perspective, it presents few problems for either direct theorists
or Wertheim's model: Vhc!uLs builds up as a result of saturated
vection in the absence of vestibular stimulation. On this point
we make two observations.
(1) In recreating a virtual model of David Lee's (Lishman &
Lee 1973) swinging room, we generally note that postural
responses to expansion and contraction of a visual texture array
are immediate and do not appear to build up over a saturation
period, which argues for a more direct route than the proposed
gating mechanism.
(2) Although some naive users can find our roller-coaster a
moving experience, it is not compelling, and it is clear that
vection is not sufficient to maintain a percept of ego motion
beyond the transient perturbations of Lishman and Lee (1973).
It is also well established that to produce an ego-motion experi-
ence strong enough to generate revenue from the public re-
quires the addition of vestibular stimulation that is correlated,
but not necessarily veridical (e.g., the type of public access
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simulator built by Universal Studios). This in turn argues for
some additive model for the perception of self-motion similar to
that proposed by Wertheim.
So in what way might visual and vestibular inputs contribute
to the V|lt.Iui., reference? Well, further observations arise from
the conditions under which the VE observer may not be stat-
ically rocketing around a roller-coaster. The observer may
suddenly lean or walk forward, producing a conflicting vestibu-
lar signal rather than the convenient silence of the static ob-
server or train engineer. Some VEs have even been designed on
the basis of conflict, with observers locomoting around the VE
by using small natural footsteps which are scaled to larger leaps
in the visual world they see. The question facing the designer of
VE concerns whether a stable percept of the world can be
maintained in the face of visual-vestibular conflict. This then
reflects on theoretical models of perception: How is this pattern
of stability/nonstability to be explained in terms of a (nonlinear)
additive model of ego-motion perception?
Imagine the following scenario: Participants sit on a play-
ground swing and don an HM D through which they can observe
a textured virtual world. We push them so that they feel motion
through the environment and at the same time see an equivalent
optic expansion. As they start to lose amplitude in their actual
swing, however, we maintain the same expansion and contrac-
tion of the visual display. An inferential perspective might
predict a breakdown in the percept of a stable visual world, but
both Gibson (1979) and Wertheim could account for the subjects'
perceiving that they were still swinging with the same ampli-
tude and that visual information can overwhelm conflicting
vestibular cues (e.g., Lishman & Lee 1973). Suppose, however,
that we give them a second push, so their actual amplitude
increases, but we rapidly decrease the visual amplitude of their
swing. A point of departure must occur between a theory that
stresses the primacy of one information source (vision) and a
theory that suggests the previous percept resulted from strongly
weighting a signal (vision) that is now diminishing and a lightly
weighted signal that is now increasing (vestibular afference).
Unfortunately, we could not get a playground swing built in
our laboratory before the deadline for this commentary, but we
did translate this situation to the rotary equivalent. This has the
advantage of being similar to the "vection drum" used by
Wertheim, although we find it a less desirable paradigm because
of the potential influence of eye movements (nystagmus) and
also because uniform texture flows across the visual field very
seldom occur in natural settings. Rotational movements of the
head are also normally coupled closely with visual motion for
many VE applications, but they serve to illustrate the paradigm.
Subjects knelt on a swivel platform while wearing an HMD.
On the display they were presented with either a (stereoscopic)
view of a drum with different texture stripes or a three-
dimensional stereoscopic world with fields, roads, and buildings
in view. The view then either rotated continuously at 60 deg/sec
or it rotated sinusoidally (80 deg amplitude) to simulate the
visual pattern that would result from the subjects' swivelling
back and forth on the chair. In a second variant of the back-and-
forth condition, an actual body rotation was introduced that was
initially both in-phase with the visual rotation and of a similar
amplitude (Fig. 1).
The subjects initially closed their eyes, then opened them and
fixated a small rectangle presented at a constant (fusible) posi-
tion on each screen. They then reported whether they had the
impression they were moving and whether the world was stable.
In the back-and-forth condition, the amplitude of actual move-
ment was first steadily reduced and then increased as proposed
for the playground swing experiment (above). Some further
observations arise from these pilot experiments:
(3) It was much easier to induce the percept of self-motion in
the back-and-forth (ecological) context than with constant uni-
directional rotation, despite the fact that the back-and-forth
motion would ordinarily have produced more variable vestibu-
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Figure 1 (Wann and Rushton). Upper: The two coordinate
systems of a VE. The observer is presented with a visual array
with orientation and flow components determined by the speci-
fication of a virtual viewpoint. Actual movement: of the observer
can be detected via a head tracking system. The crucial factor is
that the coupling of actual (vestibular) motion to the motion of
the visual array is done purely through software, and in many
cases this coupling has to be weak to allow effective (visual)
exploration in the absence of actual body motion.
Lower: Overhead schematic of the experiment reported here,
where the observer is presented with visual rotation in the
presence of differing degrees of actual body rotation. In all cases
the two motion patterns are temporally synchronised (phase =
0), but can differ in amplitude.
lar stimulation. This in turn seems to emphasise the role of
motion "plausibility" in such percepts.
(4) The illusion of self-motion was much stronger if the visual
display was of a rotating world rather than a texture striped
drum. Once again there seems to be some advantage to a more
ecological context of objects and surfaces, which in turn produce
a retinal flow that is not uniform (e.g., there is differential
motion parallax).
(5) Although it was possible to reduce the amplitude of the
actual (vestibular) motion without disturbing subjects' percep-
tion of their self-motion, this was not a robust effect. In particu-
lar, a breakdown in the perception of a stable world (e.g., in the
fact that all global visual motion is the result of self-motion) was
likely when there was a small phase difference between visual
and vestibular information. This raises the question of how the
optokinetic pathway can provide a strong self-motion reference
signal to substitute for decreasing vestibular cues, while the
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system is at the same time sensitive to small phase differences in
visual and vestibular motion. These results are not in them-
selves sufficient to resolve any of the issues raised, but they
suggest that in settings where visual and vestibular motion cues
may be in conflict there is more to self-motion than meets the
eye. They also emphasise that the target article makes a substan-
tial contribution in restimulating research on the conditions
supporting the percept of self-motion and environmental stabil-
ity. We would stress our doubt, however, that a suitable theory
of self-motion perception can be fashioned purely on data
gleaned from highly constrained experimental conditions or
unusual illusions such as the vection drum. What is required is a
translation of such hypotheses to more naturalistic settings that
can still be controlled experimentally. To take this model further
there is a need to present subjects with natural optic arrays and
flow characteristics while at the same time remaining able to
manipulate the stability of the observer or visual world indepen-
dently. Although current VE systems have a number of inade-
quacies, we believe they can provide a valuable window on
human perception; the experiments quickly devised for this
commentary provide example of this.
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The significance of the active pick-up of
information in ecological theories of
motion perception
Lucy Yardley
l.yardley@ucl.ac.uk; Department of Psychology, University College London,
London WC1E6BT, United Kingdom
The target article presents a welcome reaffirmation of the
contribution of vestibular information to the perception of ego
motion relative to visual space. As Wertheim rightly notes, the
contribution of vestibular information to visual perception has
been underestimated or neglected by many investigators, and
some of those who have adopted a "direct perception" approach
have questioned the utility of the vestibular system as a source of
information about absolute orientation (Stoffregen & Riccio
1988). Nevertheless, a number of studies have confirmed that
information picked up by the vestibular system has a significant
influence on judgments of visual orientation (e.g., Marendaz et
al. 1993; Mittelstaedt 1983).
Wertheim also provides a valuable integration of research into
ego and object motion, yielding many interesting and important
analyses and questions for future research. His model of the
processes involved in perception, however, appears to be an
extension and refinement of the inferential approach; and his
claim that the concept of a "reference signal" can incorporate,
reconcile, and supersede both the inferential and direct theories
of perception is consequently unconvincing. Wertheim has
defined direct perception theory solely in terms of recent
attempts to identify features of the optic flow that can visually
specify object or ego motion. Although some proponents of
Gibson's ecological theory of perception have been principally
engaged in the search for visual kinaesthetic invariants, Gibson's
original ecological theory of perception (as Wertheim himself
acknowledges) contained many other vital elements, notably the
idea that perception consists of the active detection of properties
of the environment which are of significance in the context of the
organism's activities; "The observer . . . explores the available
fields of light, sound, odor and contact, selecting what is rele-
vant and extracting the information" (Gibson 1966, p. 32).
Gibson conceived of information pick-up as multimodal, em-
phasising that "information about the self is multiple and that all
kinds are picked up concurrently" (1979, p. 115). Hence, al-
though Gibson and his followers were interested in properties of
the visual array which could offer the organism immediate
veridical information about ego motion, the visual system was
considered to be just one source of congruent information which
could be picked up by many means and senses during active
exploration of the natural environment.
The multimodal nature of the "reference signal" is therefore
not incompatible with ecological theory, but the quasi-
mathematical computation of ego motion from visual and ves-
tibular "cues" posited by Wertheim is inconsistent with the
ecological approach. Vection and other experimentally induced
forms of misperception constitute perceptual anomalies, occur-
ring only when the available perceptual information is impov-
erished or unusual, and when exploration is prevented; if head
movement is permitted, the illusion of vection is delayed and
attenuated (Lackner & Teixeira 1977), while more extensive
exploration (e.g., moving around freely and touching the op-
tokinetic drum) can dispel the illusion altogether. Artificial
experimental conditions can provide a useful means of exposing
constraints and biases inherent in our neurophysiology and
perceptual habits, precisely because these conditions violate
the naturally occurring environmental regularities to which we
are attuned by evolution and experience (Runeson 1988). How-
ever, such conditions deliberately attempt to exclude most of
the processes involved in natural perception, namely, the ac-
tive, flexible utilisation of meaningful information derived from
rich, veridical, multimodal sources.
Nevertheless, despite strict experimental control, the experi-
ence of researchers who have previously attempted to establish
how visual and vestibular "stimuli" combine to "produce" spe-
cific sensations of ego motion has shown that inter- and intra-
subject variability is typically very wide and seems to be more
closely tied to perceived higher-order properties of the environ-
ment such as the foreground/background distinction (Ohmi et
al. 1987) than to physical parameters such as the area and
velocity of motion in the visual field. Moreover, perception of
ego motion has already been shown to be influenced not only by
visual and vestibular information but also by auditory and
somatosensory information, cognitive evaluations, and sen-
sorimotor activities, experience, and skills (see Yardley 1992, for
a review). If Wertheim's conception of a reference signal is to
provide a truly "unified framework," able to account for natural
perception as well as for the various situations in which misper-
ception occurs, it will be necessary to determine how the
reference signal (perhaps more appropriately termed the "mo-
tion percept") is influenced by neurophysiological constraints,
multimodal information, sensorimotor experience, and pur-
poseful activity.
Author's Response
Motion perception: Rights, wrongs and
further speculations
Alexander H. Wertheim
wertheim@izf.tno.nl; TNO Institute for Human Factors, 3769 ZG
Soesterberg, The Netherlands
R1. Ego-motion perception
The defining feature of inferential theory is its assumption
that extraretinal information is used in the perception of
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object motion. It is this feature which direct perception
theory finds difficult to accept. My model provides an
alternative to that debate, rather than an alternative to
current theories of ego-motion perception. Many com-
mentators do not seem to have understood this. Yardley,
for example, calls the model a "welcome reaffirmation of
the contribution of vestibular information to the percep-
tion of ego motion," and Kim & Turvey misrepresent the
model by stating that it implies that when a retinal signal
"is matched by the reference signal then it is ego move-
ment that is taking place." However, as noted correctly by
Honda, the model was proposed as a description of how
we perceive object motion, not ego motion.
The description of object-motion perception should
also be valid during ego motion of the observer. This is
why the mechanism responsible for perceiving ego mo-
tion had to be included as a module in the model. The
object-motion perception mechanism needs to "know"
about ego motion, otherwise it cannot estimate how the
eyes move in space (see Becker & Mergner, who consider
this so "logical" as to call it "trivial").
In describing the subsystem for ego-motion percep-
tion, however, I did not hypothesize (as assumed by Wann
& Rushton). Instead, I just borrowed from the existing
body of (mainly neurophysiological) literature, in which
the mechanism responsible for sensations of ego motion,
vection, and visual-vestibular interactions is described in
great detail. This literature - which rarely makes refer-
ence to mechanisms of object-motion perception - is
often unfamiliar to researchers in the field of visual
perception. This is illustrated by some of the commen-
taries. Thus, for example, Coombs provides some ideas
about how we should investigate possible effects of con-
firmatory or conflicting vestibular stimulation on the
salience and time course of vection sensations. Rieser
(who gives a partial answer to Coombs) speculates about
how exocentric ego-motion perception might be empiri-
cally measured. Wann & Rushton suspect that the com-
plementary interaction between vestibular stimulation
and vection in my example of the train engineer is "as-
sumed rather than confirmed" (see also Rieser's doubts).
But there is already a long research tradition and a rich
literature on all these issues (for classic reviews see Cohen
& Henn 1988; Dichgans & Brandt 1978; Guedry 1974;
Henn et al. 1980).
This is why I deemed it necessary to summarize the
literature to the extent that seemed relevant for present
purposes. I may rightly be reprimanded for being incom-
plete. Thus, I discussed only those developmental time
courses for visual vestibular interactions that were
needed to illustrate certain theoretical arguments. This
no doubt caused Kim & Turvey to remark that I seem to
overstate the time course of development of circular
vection as presented in section 2. Other objections
(Becker & Mergner, Belopolsky, Coombs, Da Vitoria
Lobo, Previc, Rieser, Ross) refer to my incomplete cata-
logue, or lack of a mathematical description, for additional
factors contributing to the inputs of the mechanism that
generates percepts of ego motion and vection (postural
and tactile information, arthrokinetic feedback from the
joints, afferents from the neck muscles, or specific cogni-
tive inputs such as expectancies and depth perception,
and whether ego motion and self-motion are active or
passive). These objections are valid of course, and I am
indebted to those commentators (e.g., Buttner &
Straube, Probst, Sauvan, Thier et al.) who have taken
the trouble to review in their commentaries much more of
the relevant recent information from this field of
research.
Although the present model can be used to add to this
body of literature (see sect. 5.4), one might of course
challenge these ego-motion theories from a different
point of view and speculate about alternatives. Such
challenges are found in the commentaries of Riccio, Kim
& Turvey, Coombs, Stoffregen, Yardley, and Wann &
Rushton. The main thrust of these arguments stems from
direct perception theory, and is focused on the belief
(expressed explicitly by Kim & Turvey) that much more
attention should be devoted to the nature of the visual
input to the system. This illustrates the point I made
(perhaps a little too strongly) in Note 2, that the main line
of research in the tradition of direct perception theory
concerns the analysis of this visual input. Nevertheless, as
the note states, I agree with Stoffregen, Yardley, Sheb-
ilske, and Riccio that even within that tradition some
attention has also been given to other inputs, such as
vestibular ones.
These challenges, however, (and whether or not they
are sensible) are quite secondary to the model proposed
in the target article as they do not relate to object-motion
perception.
The erroneous belief that the model is intended to
explain ego-motion perception may have led some com-
mentators to become confused about the role of reference
signals. The most obvious examples are Kim & Turvey
(according to whom I supposedly hypothesize that "for an
organism to perceive. . . self-motion. . . a special refer-
ence signal is needed"), Previc (who assumes that I use
the concept of a "visual reference" to explain "whole-body
percepts such as vection," or to establish "whether or not
self-motion has occurred") and Riccio, (who assumes that
my paradigm serves to describe the effects of extraretinal
signals on "the phenomenology of ego motion"). These
commentators apparently assume that the reference sig-
nal affects percepts of ego motion. It does not: in my
Figures 1 and 7, reference signals feed only into the
mechanism for object-motion perception.
Whatever the reason for these misunderstandings,
they should serve as a warning not to use the term
"motion perception" carelessly, without mentioning
whether object or ego motion is meant. One can easily be
misunderstood. For example, Riccio criticizes the first
sentence of the second paragraph of my section 1, where I
claim that according to direct perception theory "the
perception of motion derives exclusively from afferent
retinal information." Riccio erroneously assumes that I
mean the perception of ego motion, but I meant the
perception of object motion: up to this point in the target
article the only topic discussed is object-motion
perception.
R2. The reciprocity assumption
The mixup of ego- and object-motion perception may well
stem from what I would like to call the "reciprocity
assumption."This is illustrated most explicitly in Probst's
commentary. In his Figure 2, he proposes a model that
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differs in an important way from the present one (apart
from its failure to describe how eye movements affect
object-motion perception): it postulates a reciprocal rela-
tionship between percepts of object motion and percepts
of ego motion (see the dotted reciprocal arrows between
the boxes which represent the mechanisms for self- and
object-motion perception). A similar assumption is made
by Andersen, who criticizes my model on the grounds
that the percept of self-motion should also be an output of
the object-motion perception system.
As Belopolsky correctly notes, there is no such interac-
tion in my model (see Fig. 7). I postulate something else:
that the object- and ego-motion perception systems
share, to a large extent, the same inputs. Hence their
outputs (the percepts) often develop more or less syn-
chronously. This creates the impression that the two
percepts are reciprocal, but it is more appropriate to
speak of a complementarity (Skavenski) between percepts
of ego and object motion, a complementarity I have called
the interfacing of object- and ego-motion percepts. But no
reciprocal two-way interaction, such as present in the
Probst model, is implied.
The reciprocity assumption is easily associated with my
example of circular vection in section 2, because here the
time course of development of the percept of circular ego
motion runs so nicely parallel to the development of the
percept of (a gradually slowing down of) object motion.
Similar parallel time courses between object- and ego-
motion percepts occur in many normal nonlaboratory
situations — such as when we look at a moving train next to
our own stationary train, or, as Rieser mentions, when a
car next to our own stationary car unexpectedly moves -
creating both vection and a concurrent percept of object
stationarity. Such instances may indeed give rise to the
idea that object-motion percepts affect ego-motion per-
cepts, or vice versa (see Andersen, who states that "sta-
tionarity resulting from vection saturation necessarily
implies that the observer perceives self-motion").
The present model does not take the apparent reciproc-
ity between percepts of ego and object motion as an a
priori, self-evident premise, but as something that must
be explained. In fact, the model was developed with this
purpose explicitly in mind, as should be obvious from my
introductory question in section 2: "Why, during satu-
rated circular vection, is the drum perceived as stationary
in space?" I might as well have phrased this question:
"Why can we not perceive the drum as moving in space
when vection has reached its maximum steady state?"
The reciprocity assumption sometimes takes a hidden
form. This happens when we ask questions such as: "How
does the system choose a combination of ego motion and
object motion that accounts for the observations?"
(Coombs), or: "How does an animal distinguish its own
movements from those of objects?" (Kim & Turvey). Such
questions presuppose acceptance of a reciprocity assump-
tion. They imply that percepts can be ambiguous as to
whether they refer to object or ego motion (Held). This
implies that one can have percepts that do not mean
anything until the brain "decides" what they mean, using
a kind of trade-off rule in which part of the "percept" is
attributed to object motion and the remaining part to ego
motion or vice versa. Rieser, for example, seems to
assume that the brain uses visual and vestibular informa-
tion to take the decision, and Probst mentions that he has
extended his model to accommodate the assumption that
the "perceptual decision between object motion and self-
motion" takes place at the level of the vestibular nuclei.
In my model, however, no such decisions are taken. It
simply postulates the existence of two distinct mecha-
nisms, which create percepts of different events (object
motion and ego motion), often in temporal synchrony.
Thus how such decisions are made becomes a nonques-
tion. A particularly interesting case of a hidden reciproc-
ity assumption is the problem presented by Kim &
Turvey. They claim that the model must be in error,
because it cannot explain how we can have a single
experience of ego motion in the presence of many objects
moving at various speeds. If one embraces the reciprocity
assumption, and believes that perceived object motion
affects percepts of ego motion, Kim & Turvey would be
right. This shows the problematic consequences of the
reciprocity assumption. Without it Kim & Turvey's prob-
lem is nonexistent.
It should be noted here that, although some direct
perception theorists appear to adhere to a reciprocity
assumption, it is not a requirement of direct perception
theory at all. According to that approach, there is no
ambiguity in optic (or retinal) flow, because information
about object and ego motion is present in separate invari-
ants. Both Tresilian and Stoffregen make this quite clear.
But traditional inferential theory does not need the reci-
procity assumption either, because it postulates that per-
cepts of object motion stem from retinal and extraretinal
signals and inferential theory does not concern itself with
percepts of ego motion (with the notable exception of the
Post and Leibowitz (1985) theory, but that theory also
implies no reciprocity assumption).
But if not from direct or inferential theory, where does
the reciprocity assumption stem from? My guess is that it
originated in the physiological literature on visual ves-
tibular interactions and ego motion (see Probst, who
mentions his own and Dichgans and Brandt's [1978]
neurophysiological hypotheses to explain the reciprocity
assumption, and Mergner and Becker [1990] for a sum-
mary review of discussions around the assumption).
Could it be that perception theorists have borrowed the
reciprocity assumption just to explain what happens in
cases where it is difficult, if not impossible, to apply the
traditional concepts of extraretinal signals or object-
motion invariants?
R3. The optokinetic component in the
reference signal
The example of circular vection was brought up to illus-
trate problems for both direct and inferential theories if
one does not accept the reciprocity assumption: how to
explain the particular time course of development of the
percept of object (i.e., drum) motion and stationarity in
space, which is known to concur with the development of
circular vection inside an optokinetic drum. This is where
the optokinetic component in the reference signal comes
in. It explains that particular time course.
The fact that it is a more or less new concept (but see my
reply to Skavenski below) seems to have motivated Held
to consider it an example of "contorted reasoning." As
Probst correctly states, the name "optokinetic compo-
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nent" might create some confusion (perhaps I should have
called it just a "visual component"), but that is only a
matter of semantics. Held's doubts about whether this
"dubious" and "strange" postulate is "necessary at all" do
not stem from the name I gave the component. They stem
from his acceptance of the reciprocity assumption, which
apparently eclipses my extensive discussions about the
reasons for postulating the component and about the
strong explanatory and predictive power of this concept,
issues which are addressed throughout the target paper.
Held's argument against the optokinetic component
derives from his belief that during circular vection there
simply is no reference signal, and that my model there-
fore does not apply to such circumstances. To bolster his
view, Held refers to the phenomenon of "waxing and
waning" of vection sensations in the optokinetic drum. He
claims that this phenomenon "confirms the validity" of his
belief that no reference signal is present during vection
because it implies a perceptual ambiguity. According to
Kim & Turvey, the ambiguity reflects what one would
normally expect in such a situation of "ecological contra-
diction" (which is why Stoffregen would not call it an
illusion), but Held explains it by referring to the reciproc-
ity assumption: it presumably steins from "the trade-off
between perception of self-movement and object
movement."
These commentators present the "waxing and waning"
phenomenon as a normal characteristic of vection. But in
fact, it occurs only sporadically - mostly during circular
vection induced with a fixed semicircular screen (on
which moving stripes are projected) and during trials
which last very long. Usually it does not happen at all
inside a really rotating optokinetic drum. As Rieser notes,
everyone who has ever experienced vection inside such a
drum can testify to the overwhelmingly powerful and
usually continuous sensation of ego motion. Neither
Held, nor Kim & Turvey, nor Stoffregen seem to attri-
bute any significance to this fact.
The "waxing and waning" phenomenon does not con-
tradict my model as Held suggests. On the contrary, it can
easily be explained as stemming from modulations of the
reference signal: first, the "waxing and waning" phenome-
non has, to my knowledge, never been reported with
empirical evidence that the observer's eyes and head
remain fixed in space, as was the case in my example of
circular vection. Thus, when it happens, it might well be
related to eye or head movements of the observer (for
discussion see Mergner & Becker 1990), which by chance
stabilize the image of the striped drum on the retinae.
Vection should then stop. This is not my prediction, but a
prediction of Mergner and Becker (1990), who showed
this to happen during sinusoidal vection (see my sect.
6.1). There are in fact more reasons why the inputs to the
mechanism responsible for perception of ego motion (i.e.,
vection) may be distorted, such as habituation (as Held
himself notes) or attentional factors (see Coombs's sugges-
tions, and Da Vitoria Lobo's observation that we do not
seem to experience vection in the cinema). Thus, I do
indeed recognize that vection may sometimes change or
is occasionally lost entirely. Such features of the ego-
motion perception mechanism are not at all incompatible
with my model.
Second, the model uses precisely these features to
explain the "waxing and waning" of perceived drum rota-
tion in space: as mentioned before, inputs to the ego-
motion perception system also serve to generate refer-
ence signals. Hence, when these inputs change they
change reference signal magnitude, and thus percepts of
object (i.e., drum) motion in space. In other words,
whenever (and for whatever reason) vection "waxes and
wanes," the perception of drum rotation in space "wanes
and waxes."
R4. Retinal image motion has no
perceptual meaning
Held's claim that drum velocity is perceived as "waxing
and waning" because of an absence of reference signals
implies that we can somehow perceive object motion
without using reference signals. This runs counter to the
main premise of the model - which is also the main
premise of all inferential theories of object-motion per-
ception: image motion across the retina cannot in itself
serve as information about object motion. Da Vitoria
Lobo also disagrees with this premise, but for another
reason. He does not believe in an efference copy signal.
Instead he assumes that all information in the reference
signal about eye movements derives from computations
made on the basis of retinal information. The concept of
such a "visual efference copy" was discussed in section
6.3. I questioned it because when such visual information
is not available, we can still perceive object motion (e.g.,
the motion of a single dot moving in total darkness; see the
commentary of Tresilian). If Da Vitoria Lobo agrees that
this is true and still maintains that eye movement informa-
tion is purely visual, it follows that he believes there exist
situations where object motion in space can be perceived
in the absence of reference signals. Hence his opposition
to my analysis of the graph presented in Figure 3 of the
target article: he assumes that it is specific to experimen-
tal conditions that do not exclude visual information about
how the eyes move (presumably stemming from the visi-
bility of the borders of the screen). This is not true, how-
ever. Such a graph is always obtained, including with a
very small stimulus visible in an absolutely darkened
environment (e.g., De Graaf & Wertheim 1988), that is,
when there is no visual information (screen borders, etc.)
from which knowledge about eye movements might be
abstracted.
Figure 3 is simply a plot of the velocity of the retinal
image of a stimulus at the two opposite thresholds for
motion ( of that stimulus) obtained while the eyes move
across that stimulus. Other stimuli, or stimuli presented
in absolute darkness, might yield different thresholds, but
one always gets thresholds. The slope or width of the no-
motion range might differ, but there will always be a
certain no-motion range, an area above that range where
the subject perceives stimulus motion against the eyes
and an area below that range where the stimulus is
perceived as moving with the eyes. Any horizontal line
will always necessarily cross through these areas. Hence,
whatever the conditions of the experiment, the argument
that retinal image motion itself has no perceptual mean-
ing remains valid.
The same can be said of the reference signal. This signal
has in itself no perceptual meaning either. The percep-
tion of absolute object motion - that is, the awareness that
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we are seeing something that moves in space - arises from
a specific interaction between retinal and reference sig-
nals. Neither of these signals has any priority over the
other. Some commentators have not understood this
basic point. For example, Yardley proposes that I should
have termed the reference signal "the motion percept,"
and Andersen incorrectly assumes that my model implies
that retinal motion is "the primary perceptual stimulus."
Bridgeman & Blouin also err when they claim that my
model supports their assumption that "in a normal struc-
tured visual environment, retinal signals provide the
dominant information. . . for perceiving the motion of a
visual object," while "in a dark room. . . extraretinal
signals necessarily dominate."
R5. Frames of reference
Several commentators (e.g., see Swanston, Velichkovsky
& Van der Heijden) suggest that the vector subtraction
process between retinal and reference signals can or
should be viewed as a process of redefining retinal image
motion in terms of an exocentric frame of reference. This
is true, but I avoided that terminology because it could
mix levels of analysis, confusing cognition with physiol-
ogy. Belopolsky, however, seems to believe that such
translations are impossible (there being "no uniform rule
for transforming one coordinate system into another"),
and Swanston, in his final remark, doubts whether my
model supports such an account of motion perception. Yet
there is no reason for such doubts. In this section I will try
to illustrate this, as it might elucidate several other issues.
Retinal image motion is encoded in the retinal signal as
image slip across the retinal surface, that is, it is defined in
terms of a retinal coordinate system. If image motion is to
gain any other meaning, it must be redefined in coordi-
nates of another frame of reference, one created by the
brain itself.
It is possible to assume that this self-generated frame
represents a head- body- or egocentric coordinate system,
as mentioned by Becker & Mergner and by Swanston.
Percepts are then generated of how objects move relative
to the head or body. The model presented in my Figures 1
and 7, however, is not about such percepts at all. Kim &
Turvey's remark that the model is limited to an "object
displacing relative to the observer" is incorrect. The
model concerns percepts of absolute object motion,
which is object motion defined in terms of the spatial
coordinates of exocentric space. To generate such per-
cepts, the brain must translate the retinal coordinates of
image motion into coordinates which somehow corre-
spond to the abstract "Newtonian" dimensions of environ-
mental space. Those who like to use the terminology of
cognitive psychology might refer to this self-generated
frame of reference as a mental representation of the
dimensions of external space. The signal that carries the
building blocks for this mental representation - or, stated
differently, the signal that enables the appropriate coordi-
nate translations of image motion to be carried out - may
be called the "information-for-an-exocentric-frame-of-
reference signal." I prefer the shorter name of "reference
signal."
The generation of a percept of object motion in space
can thus be viewed as a recalibration of image motion with
the help of the reference signal. Shebilske thus rightly
suspects that my model may be classified as a calibration
model in the sense intended in the Bridgeman, Velich-
kovsky, and Van der Heijden article in this BBS issue. It is
this recalibration that I have described formally as a
vectorial subtraction of retinal and reference signals.
Hence, I agree with Stoper that the subtraction does not
mean that a retinal signal is (partially) canceled, that is,
annulled. The subtraction is needed to determine the
difference between the two signals. It is this difference
that provides the stimulus for percepts of object motion or
stationarity in space.
One single reference signal can recalibrate the move-
ment parameters of many image motions at the same
time. Thus the solution to Kim & Turvey's problem (if
there are many moving objects at various speeds, "what
could it then mean to speak of perceived object velocity as
due to the magnitude difference between retinal and
reference signals. . . ?") is simple: the vectorial differ-
ences between all retinal signals on the one hand and that
single reference signal on the other yield a multitude of
percepts of how all these objects move in space.
It is external environmental space, defined by the
direction of gravitation and the earth's surface, with which
we, and many other organisms, must deal in an ecological
sense. Hence the mental representation of this frame of
reference better be a good one. No wonder the reference
signal uses vestibular afferents as inputs. The vestibular
apparatus is a sensory system which (among other things)
"picks up" the direction of the earth's gravitational field
and thus allows a kind of "anchoring" of the mental
representation to physical reality.
I hence strongly disagree with Stoffregen, who claims
that our percepts (or the internal estimates involved in
their generation) are not linked to such external physical
parameters as gravitational force. He refers to the fact that
there is "nothing absolute" about Newtonian space, be-
cause Einstein's theory of relativity has shown it wrong.
But that is irrelevant. The dimensions of Newtonian and
Einsteinian space differ indeed when our subjects, or
their retinal images, move relative to us (the investi-
gators) with speeds approaching the speed of light.
But usually they don't. Thus Newtonian and Einstein-
ian dimensions are indistinguishable for all practical
purposes. I concede that my model does not apply to
Superman.
Although this vestibular "anchoring" no doubt im-
proves the veridicality of the internal representation of
exocentric space, it is no guarantee against errors. They
may occur for a variety of reasons, such as errors made by
the vestibular apparatus. In the target article much atten-
tion is devoted to the perceptual consequences (illusions)
of such errors, and to how the perceptual system defends
itself against them (e.g., by masking them with the JND).
It should by now be clear why I disagree strongly with
Held, who claims that reference signals can be absent, but
not zero. They cannot be absent, and sometimes they are
zero. They are always present, because without them the
translation of image motion into percepts of object motion
or stationarity in space would be impossible. Zero is just a
scale value: reference signals can have positive or negative
values, depending on the direction of eye velocity in
space. A zero reference signal simply means that the
message encoded in the reference signal is that the eyes
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do not move in space. The same can be said about retinal
signals (the sign of which expresses the direction of image
slip across the retina) and about the difference between
retinal and reference signals (the sign of which deter-
mines the direction of perceived object motion). Hence,
when we perceive an object as stationary, it means we
perceive it as having a zero velocity. It is wrong to assume
that in such cases the object-motion perception mecha-
nism is inactive and generates no percept.
R6. Perception of relative and absolute motion
It should now also be clear why I consider it crucial
that we distinguish between percepts of absolute and
relative motion. Absolute motion refers to an absolute
"Newtonian" frame of reference. Relative motion be-
tween two objects does not need any frame of reference
external to the objects themselves: the relative motion
between two cars is defined by the spatiotemporal rela-
tionship between only the two cars themselves. If they
move relative to each other with, say, a velocity of 50 mph,
that velocity is the same, irrespective of how fast they
move in Newtonian space (they may be moving at 30 and
80 mph, or any other combination of absolute velocities
which differ by 50 mph) or in any other frame of refer-
ence. For example, the two cars will still move relative to
each other with a velocity of 50 mph in an egocentric
frame of reference, for example, when they move on a
road parallel to the track of a train traveling at 100 mph,
from which I look at them (they may then move relative to
me with velocities of —70 and —20 mph). These examples
illustrate that we need not take frames of reference into
consideration when analyzing percepts of relative motion.
This is why I have stated that reference signals have no effect
on relative motion. Equation 12 is just shorthand for this
argument. This is not to say that relative motion is always
perceived veridically. When the two objects do not move
in a plane parallel to the one in which the observer moves,
their retinal image velocities are affected differentially
(see below), and we will misjudge their relative velocity.
This is why I disagree with the assumption (see Bridge-
man & Blouin and Tresilian) that reference signals are
used only in dark environments. The involvement of
reference signals in perception does not depend on cir-
cumstances but on the kind of percept we are talking
about: percepts of absolute motion or percepts of relative
motion. These are separate percepts. They do not reflect
different inteipretations of the same event but different
aspects of it. The brain does not decide how much image
motion should be attributed to absolute and how much to
relative motion (as claimed by Wallach 1959). To assume
that it does is like assuming that the brain has to decide
how much of an object's image must be attributed to the
perception of its size and how much to the perception of
its shape. These are distinct percepts; they refer to
different stimulus aspects, even though the aspects may
have some physical (e.g., perspective) relation to each
other.
I accordingly also object to the assumption that relative
motion distorts percepts of absolute motion. Mateeff &
Hohnsbein criticize my objection by referring to the
"cycloid phenomenon" (see also Stoper): a single light
spot on the rim of a rolling wheel in total darkness is
perceived as absolute motion (its path is correctly seen as
cycloidal). If another light is attached to the hub of the
wheel, the perception of this cycloid disappears. The dot
on the rim of the wheel now appears to rotate, like a real
wheel, around the hub light. This presumably illustrates
the influence of relative motion on percepts of absolute
motion.
I disagree: in both conditions we perceive absolute
motion on the basis of the difference between a retinal
and a reference signal. In the condition without the hub
light, where the eyes track the light on the wheel, the
retinal signal is zero, but the reference signal is not. Its
magnitude modulates in a manner that corresponds to
how the eyes move in space, which is cycloidally. Hence
the difference between retinal and reference signal,
which corresponds to the perceived absolute motion of
the rim light, is cycloidal as well. When the eyes pursue
an added light positioned on the translatory moving hub,
the reference signal encodes a unidirectional eye move-
ment (it represents a velocity vector with a fixed direc-
tion). However, the image of the light on the rim now
moves in a circular path on the retinae (around the fovea).
The vectorial combination of this rotating retinal velocity
vector and the unidirectional reference vector is a velocity
vector rotating around a center, which itself moves uni-
directionally in space. This is what we perceive, although
the percept is not veridical. This explanation corresponds
to the one given by Stern and Emelity (1978) and does not
involve (presumptions of dominance of) relative motion.
This explanation of the "cycloid phenomenon" can be
tested, because it yields a prediction: if we pursue the rim
light in the presence of the hub light, we will again see it
as moving cycloidally, because its retinal signal and the
reference signal are the same as in the condition without
the hub light. Their difference (i.e., the perception of
absolute motion of the rim light) should not be affected by
the presence of an additional image from the hub light. I
tried this on my computer, because I could find no
reference in the literature which includes this condition,
and I can recommend it to my readers: one easily per-
ceives the cycloid again.
T,he "cycloid phenomenon" is interesting for other
reasons as well: it runs counter to two basic postulates of
direct perception theory. First, it shows that our percepts
may be radically different, depending on how we move
our eyes. This contradicts the assumption that eye move-
ments only serve to improve perceptual veridicality (see,
e.g., Kim & Turvey). Second, the percept we have when
fixating the hub light is one we are so accustomed to that
we "recognize" it as that of a rotating wheel and therefore
think it is veridical. In fact, it is not. This shows that the
addition of visual information does not necessarily lead to
improved perceptual veridicality. Even worse, the re-
stricted laboratory condition with only a single light in
total darkness (the condition without hub light) yields a
more veridical percept than visually rich everyday situa-
tions. If, for example, we look at the hub of a bicycle
wheel (as we normally do if asked to look at a wheel), we
see the air valve of the tire as rotating in space, that is, we
perceive an illusion. Hence it is not necessarily true that
perception research carried out in "artificial conditions"
runs into "logical difficulties" (Rieser), and needs to be
done with "more natural visual stimulation" (Wann &
Rushton, Riccio).
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Mateeff & Hohnsbein ask what would be the outcome
of an experiment on relative motion similar to the one that
underlies my Figure 5, but with stimulus patterns that
move not only relative to each other, but also relative to
space. Actually, in the experiment of Figure 5 this was
already the case. In each condition we used a criterion
stimulus with a fixed absolute velocity, while the absolute
velocity of the other stimulus was variable (it had to be
adjusted by the subject until no relative motion between
the two stimuli was perceived). In each condition, how-
ever, the absolute velocity of the criterion stimulus was
not zero but slightly below its threshold for absolute
motion in that condition (determined prior to the experi-
ment, with only the criterion stimulus and the moving
fixation point). This was done for methodological reasons:
if the criterion stimulus had been perceived as moving at
various absolute velocities, we might have been open to
the criticism that this could have affected the results (as
depicted in Fig. 5). I agree with Mateeff & Hohnsbein,
however, that an experiment in which the criterion stim-
ulus moves at higher (above threshold) absolute veloc-
ities, would be interesting. The reason is that, although
relative motion cannot affect perceived absolute motion,
the converse is not necessarily true: when two stimuli do
not have the same distance from the observer, their
absolute motions in space affect how we perceive the
relative motion between them, because distance affects
image velocity. But this does not alter my prediction that
their thresholds for motion relative to each other will still
be a function only of their retinal image velocities and the
JND between them.
R7. The distance parameter
This brings us to the role of distance in motion percep-
tion. Several commentators (e.g., Belopolsky, Boothe,
Hadani & Julesz, Rieser, Sauvan, Swanston, Ve-
lichkovsky & Van der Heijden) criticize my model be-
cause it does not take distance into account. This is true.
The model has been developed to explain and test the
effects of other factors on object-motion perception, dis-
tance being constant between conditions. HowevW,
the model can be extended to include a distance parame-
ter. In this section I will make a first attempt in this
direction.
Image velocity, if expressed as linear velocity across the
retinae, is reduced in proportion to the distance between
the object and the eyes. The proportionality may be very
complex, because it depends not on distance alone, but
also on the particular combinations of ego and object
motions, that is, their directional, angular, and linear
components (see, e.g., Stoper).
The reduced image velocity with distance has implica-
tions for the reference signal. At the point of subjective
stationarity (PSS), where the stimulus is perceived as
stationary in space, retinal and reference signals are by
definition equal irrespective of how far away the object is.
It thus follows that the reference signal too is scaled down
in proportion to distance. Hence, the definition of the
reference signal as the brain's estimate of eye velocity in
space must be changed to: the estimate of eye velocity in
space scaled down in proportion to an estimate of dis-
tance. In the terminology of frames of reference, this
estimated distance parameter in the reference signal
could be said to correspond to the depth axis of the
internal representation of external space.
Honda's suggestion may be right, that "the visual
system knows that distance is mathematically related to
velocity" (see also Gogel 1981; Van de Grind et al. 1992;
Wist et al. 1976). The function according to which the
reference signal is scaled down might well derive from
such knowledge, although it will always include the ob-
server's subjective estimate of distance.
In a formal sense we have a case here in which a
cognition (of distance) - whatever its source - is an added
input to the reference signal. That agrees with the finding
that perceived distance affects vection (see Previc and
Velichkovsky & Van der Heijden), because any stimulus
that serves as an input to the ego-motion perception
mechanism should also contribute to the reference signal.
This reasoning yields the prediction that when distance
is misperceived, the reference signal is in error and
illusions may occur, for example, those described by Ross
(e.g., illusory motion of objects during walking, which
happen when the distance to the object cannot easily be
perceived) and Swanston.
It is intriguing to speculate on the possibility that this
also explains (part of) the stationarity tendency of large
objects. The point is that size and perceived distance are
Gestalt related: small objects may appear to be further
away than large ones, especially when other distance cues
are absent (e.g., in a darkened environment). Hence,
reference signal magnitude may be reduced with smaller
stimuli. Consequently, the Filehne illusion (which is
caused by the fact that the reference signal is already too
small) should become stronger with smaller stimuli, even
if they are only briefly visible, as suggested by Mateeff &
Hohnsbein (and Ehrenstein, see sect. 6.3). We are cur-
rently investigating this issue in our laboratory by com-
paring PSS measurements with large and small stimuli
placed at various distances from the observer. Comparing
the magnitudes of reference signals between conditions
might yield an empirical measure of the distance parame-
ter in the reference signal.
R8. Motion parallax
Referring to Gogel's (1990) work, Swanston mentions
correctly that during head and ego motion percepts of
illusory object motion (sometimes called motion parallax)
may occur. However, if the model includes a perceived
distance parameter, it easily explains this phenomenon.
Let us start by restating that, at a certain moment in time,
there can be only one "single valued" (Stoper) reference
signal and by assuming that its magnitude depends on the
distance D to a certain plane P. Let us further assume that
a stationary object O, which lies in plane P is indeed
perceived as stationary in space. Hence the magnitude of
the reference signal equals the velocity of Vof O's image
on the retinae. Now assume that at various other distances
there are also some stationary objects in the environment.
Their retinal image velocities, that is, their retinal signals,
are thus smaller or larger than V, that is, different from the
singular reference signal. If these differences become
larger than one JND, those objects are seen to move in
space.
Imagine an object farther away than D. Its retinal signal
will be smaller than the reference signal. If that difference
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exceeds one JND, the object will appear to move in space
in the same direction as the eyes of the observer (see sect.
5.2). Conversely, an object closer to the observer than D
will have a retinal signal larger than the reference signal.
Thus it will, if this difference is larger than one JND, be
perceived as moving in space in the direction opposite to
the eyes. This is Gogel's phenomenon of motion parallax
as described by Swanston.
The JND for reference signals containing vestibular or
optokinetic components may be rather large (see sect.
5.4). Hence we may normally perceive little illusory
object motion if any during ego motion. Note that this
description of motion parallax qualifies it as illusory abso-
lute motion in space. It does not refer to how (images of)
objects move relative to each other on the retinae (as
suggested by Swanston).
R9. Perceiving visual world versus
visual field motion
This brings to mind the distinction between percepts of
visual world and visual field motion (see Stoper and
Tresilian). It seems that this distinction just reflects the
distinction between perceiving object motion with a ref-
erence signal that takes proper account of distance and
perceiving object motion with a reference signal in which
the distance parameter is incorrect with respect to that
stimulus. The difference in "salience" that seems to relate
to the distinction between percepts of world and field
motion may simply reflect an attentional correlate: illu-
sory object motion in space caused by errors in distance
estimation would remain unnoticed, not only because the
errors yield differences between retinal and reference
signals smaller than one JND. It is also quite likely that we
pay little attention to such objects, although this does not
mean we never perceive motion of unattended objects
(e. g., when driving a car, or when specifically asked to, as
in my experiments on the Filehne illusion, or in the
experiments mentioned by Becker & Mergner).
This explains why situations such as those described in
the lower right hand panel of Figure 2 in Boothe's com-
mentary do not usually yield such illusory motion per-
cepts. Hence, I disagree with Stoper, who calls visual
field motion "an artifact produced by unnatural viewing
conditions" and who attributes it to "the motion of the
observer rather than motion of the world" (which implies
the reciprocity assumption).
Another reason to doubt the tenability of the distinc-
tion between percepts of visual world and field motion is
that it yields curious contradictions, as illustrated by
Stoper's remarks. He claims that my experiments on the
Filehne illusion (or on "paradoxical motion" as Stoper
would call it) do not measure percepts of visual world
motion because such percepts are veridical: if I had
measured visual world motion, my subjects "would, of
course, have seen the large background stable." Because
sometimes they did not see the background as stationary
(e.g., with a briefly visible stationary background; see
Fig. 4b), they must have been reporting visual field
motion. That cannot be correct, however, because in
other cases (e.g., with a continuously visible background)
the subjects correctly reported background stationarity
(see Fig. 4a), although Stoper claims that in such cases
visual field motion should still occur.
In my experiments on the Filehne illusion, the fixation
point and the background stimulus move in the same
plane. Hence, their distance to the observer is the same
and corresponds to the distance parameter in the refer-
ence signal. Both the velocity of the background stimulus
and that of the fixation point are thus perceived with the
appropriate reference signal, even though the eyes focus
only on the fixation point. I therefore disagree with
Becker & Mergner's suggestion that my model does not
apply to the perception of motion of the fixation point.
Just enter its image velocity (zero) and the velocity of the
tracking eyes into my Equation 9 and the perceived
velocity of the tracked fixation point will result. In fact,
this is how I explained the Aubert-Fleischl paradox and
center surround induced motion (sects. 5.2 and 5.3).
R10. Mathematics
Belopolsky states that the model confuses dimensions be-
cause it implies the addition of linear and angular motion
vectors. The use of different dimensions is just a mathe-
matical convention, however. The brain could just as well
use only one dimension. Take the example of an observer
who fixes his gaze on a tree while pressing his nose to a
window in a train that moves at a given velocity. The
reference signal then consists of a linear ego-motion
component induced by optic flow and a rotary efference
copy component from the counter-rotation of the eyes. Let
us further assume that the observer correctly perceives the
tree as stationary in space. Since the retinal signal is zero,
the reference signal must be zero too (approximately). In
my model, this happens because the two reference signal
components cancel each other. Mathematically we can
express this as a requirement to translate the efference
copy angular velocity component into a linearly dimen-
sioned velocity component equal in magnitude, but oppo-
site in sign, to the optokinetic component in the reference
signal. Such a translation is simple, although the (esti-
mated) distance to the tree is needed. At any given
moment in time it would be:
efference copy = - V =
D
X a)
where Vefference copy is the translated linear velocity of eye
rotation, Vego is linear ego velocity, D is the (estimated)
distance on a straight line between eye and object, a is the
visual angle of the eyes in the head, and w is the angular
velocity of the eye rotation.
Becker & Mergner seem to misunderstand the nature
ofaJND(andmy Fig. 5), because they ask whether it also
applies to retinal signals. Yes, it does. The JND can be
conceptualized as noise in retinal and reference signals,
that is, as temporal variability in the neural firing patterns
of those cells whose output activity forms the physiologi-
cal substrate of these signals (see, e.g., Wertheim et al.
1985). I don't know precisely what kind of noise this is. In
Note 10 I assumed it to be Gaussian, but that is anyone's
guess. It may well depend on the types of signals in-
volved. This explains why, as Becker & Mergner note, the
JND is different in Figures 2 and 5: in Figure 2 the JND
represents noise in a retinal and a reference signal,
whereas in Figure 5 it reflects noise in two retinal signals.
Thus, one cannot easily predict the magnitude of a JND
from theory (apart from the indications that Weber's law
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applies), especially with such compound signals as the
reference signal, where each component contributes in its
way to the noise level of the whole signal. I should have
been more careful and warned the reader that one can-
not just add or subtract noise components from each
other without arriving at anomalies like those illustrated
in Gregson's Equation 17c (see also Becker & Merg-
ner). In this respect, my equations are indeed "quasi-
mathematical" (Yardley). However, whatever the answer
to how JNDs add mathematically, this issue is itself
irrelevant to the main thesis, which is that the JND can be
measured and systematically and predictably affects per-
ception. The inaccuracy implied by the concept of a JND
is not so great that it prevents the perceptual system from
using extraretinal signals, as suggested by Hadani &
Julesz.
Gregson suggests that my vector equations describe or
predict the outcome of the process, not its dynamics, and
he doubts that my equations can be used to obtain a
dynamic system analytical description of the process. I
agree. The gain values of reference signals reported in the
target article, with the exception of the one mentioned in
Figure 6, should not be understood in system analytical
terms. These values reflect the ratio between reference
signal magnitude and physical eye velocity in space, but
only at one point: where the PSS measurements took
place. Thus, strictly speaking, the values may also reflect
a phase shift in the modulation of reference signals,
relative to eye velocity in space. This can only be figured
out with experiments in which sinusoidal eye movements
in space are made with many frequencies, while PSS
measurements should take place at several phases of
these sinusoidal eye movements in space (similar to the
experimental setup that yielded Fig. 6). This may be the
reason some reported gain values appear to differ from
those reported by Honda and by Becker & Mergner.
Nor should Becker & Mergner interpret the fact that
during relatively short duration of pursuit eye movements
the optokinetic component is small, whereas it may grow
much larger if there is no other component in the refer-
ence signal, as a difference in gain of the optokinetic
component. In sections 3 and 6.5 I did mention the
nonlinear contribution of the optokinetic component in
reference signals. These nonlinearities are still largely
unknown (which is why I applied to them no vector
algebra, as Belopolsky notes, and why I agree with Becker
& Mergner that my account of visual-vestibular interac-
tions is insufficiently detailed). The nonlinearities may
well contribute to variations in the time course of develop-
ment of vection (as in Wann & Rushton's example of
David Lee's [1990] swinging room). Such nonlinearities
might also have caused the increased "gain" of reference
signals - consisting of an efference copy and an unusually
large optokinetic component - with faster eye move-
ments, in my 1987 study (as noticed by Honda). It is also
possible that the optokinetic component always adds to
the reference signal. If so, my explanation of induced
motion would not be at variance with Becker & Mergner's
unpublished observations about induced motion, which
suggest that reference signals cannot be reduced to zero
when they contain an optokinetic component.
My equations should rather be viewed as a kind of
short-hand which saves space, summarizes ideas, and
allows for precise quantitative predictions. I do not see
why this should make Velichkovsky & Van der Heijden
wonder whether the model "is really on the right track."
R11. Priority
Probst suggests that there is no need for my model
because he has already proposed a similar one. However,
I considered that model (and others he and Becker &
Mergner list) as part of the body of literature dealing
mainly with ego-motion perception and visual-vestibular
interactions, which I only needed to summarize briefly
(see above). To discuss all existing models from this
literature that may have something to say about object-
motion perception, especially if this is not their main
theme (Probst concedes that his is a "model of visual-
vestibular interactions"), would have lengthened the tar-
get article beyond acceptable limits. A great many of
these models can be found in the references I gave (see,
e.g., Henn et al. 1980 for a comprehensive review). In
addition, I did not list Probst's model among inferential
theories, because it lacks their defining feature: an effer-
ence copy or extraretinal signal encoding eye movements.
Skavenski claims that my explanation of center/sur-
round induced motion, as well as my claim that visual and
vestibular signals contribute to the reference signal, is not
new. He is right, of course, but not because he had already
published some qualitatively similar ideas in 1990 (which I in-
deed overlooked, for which I apologize): he is right because
I have been publishing my ideas ever since 1981, including
a detailed description of my model and its explanation of
induced motion (Wertheim 1987). Hints that these ideas
have "come up before" are herewith gracefully beamed
back to sender. Skavenski correctly suspects that I do not
cite Hansen (1979) and Hansen and Skavenski (1985)
because these papers do not concern motion, but position,
perception. He is wrong, however, to suggest that this is
unfair, given my attention to Matin's (1982; 1986; Matin et
al. 1969) work on the perception of position during sac-
cades. I referred to these three papers of Matin, not to cite
his work, but because I wanted to mention the source of the
term "extraretinal signal," and of the claim that it is
generated from nonretinal information. Both the term and
the claim had to be discussed in the target article.
R12. The direct and inferential controversy
Tresilian calls it a "most bizarre" idea that the perceptual
system would pick up invariants that specify eye move-
ments from optic flow, and would, instead of using this
information, generate efference copies to obtain it. I
agree. The two assumptions are mutually exclusive. This
is why adherents of inferential theory usually reject the
"theoretical work which demonstrates" (Tresilian) that
eye movement information is picked up from optic flow.
Nobody accepts both assumptions at the same time.
Nevertheless, both Shebilske and Yardley state that my
multidimensional concept of a reference signal is compat-
ible with direct perception theory (Shebilske calls my
approach an ecological efference mediation theory). The
compatibility is attained by asserting that invariants spec-
ifying ego motion are not present next to reference sig-
nals, as Tresilian would have it, but are used to generate
reference signals within the system responsible for
object-motion perception (note the exception of invari-
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ants that would specify eye movements — see the above
discussion about the "visual efference copy"). This runs
counter to the basic premise of direct perception theory,
according to which that system only needs optic flow
invariants that specify object motion. Questions such as
whether the ego-motion invariants that generate ref-
erence signals are picked up exclusively from optic
flow (Kim & Turvey, Hadani & Julesz), or consist of
multidimensional combinations of sensory afferents
(Stoffregen, Tresilian) are irrelevant. The point is that
these invariants do not specify object motion. Even if they
are encoded in reference signals, they would still have no
perceptual significance because reference signals in
themselves have no perceptual meaning (see above). The
only way to save the direct perception assumption that
object-motion perception derives exclusively from a
invariant would be to assume that the interaction between
retinal and reference signals yields something that could
be called a "multidimensional" or "intennodal" invariant
of object-motion perception within the mechanism re-
sponsible for object-motion perception (Shebilske;
Stoffregen [?]). But that reduces the distinction between
direct and inferential theory to a matter of semantics.
There are other comments on direct perception theory.
Thus Yardley, Da Vitoria Lobo, and Andersen mention
disagreements as to whether the perceptual system does
or can perform computations on retinal or optical informa-
tion (see also Kim & Turvey, and Ullman 1980), and one
may disagree about whether or not such computations are
mathematically possible (Hadani & Julesz, Stoffregen).
These issues are irrelevant to the target article, however,
as they do not concern the distinction between direct and
inferential theory. This distinction is the topic of my
paper: one either believes that object-motion percepts
(not "motion percepts," as Tresilian states) derive only
from visual information, or one does not believe this. I
hope to have shown that, in terms of my model, these two
opposite beliefs are no longer mutually exclusive.
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